On 20th Century Presidents - FDR, LBJ etc etc ...
Final Exam for Professor Seyb's "The Presidency" ... 12/16/11
by Eric Shapiro
The Johnson Treatment: Lyndon Johnson’s famously convincing method of convincing Congressmen and other government officials to do what he wants. It was characterized by exuberant personal appeals in which the president employed a mix of flattery, compromise, veiled threats and promises of reciprocity if the person at hand gave Johnson his way. Johnson honed these skills during his time in Congress, bringing them along when he was elected president. According to Barbara Kellerman, the Johnson treatment played a major part in the successful passage of the president’s beloved Great Society.
George Washington and the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793: Washington strongly believed that it was in the national interest to avoid “entangling alliances” (as he put it in his farewell address). When war broke out between England and France, many people in government advocated taking sides with one side or the other. Drawing on his stature as America’s foremost founder, Washington issued a Neutrality Proclamation affirming a U.S. commitment to not getting involved. He and Alexander Hamilton justified this and other presidential decisions pertaining to foreign policy on the grounds that it was the president’s Constitutional role to take actions in the interest of national security, even if that meant not seeking Congressional permission before hand. Hamilton also made the more technical argument that since Article II of the Constitution stated that the executive power should be vested in the executive, without the “herein granted” qualification present in Article I intended to set limits on legislative authority, the president had some leeway with regards to conducting foreign policy.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Creation of an “Economic Constitutional Order:” Presidents of the Progressive era such as Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson established some precedent for a more active role of government in overseeing the economy. FDR went much further, arguing that the nature of the modern industrial economy demanded a social safety net to protect people from economic instability. Private institutions could not do this, and it was therefore incumbent on government to establish a program (the New Deal) to provide certain basic necessities for the people. This was a strong departure from the constitutional order established by the Founders, who to varying degrees saw the responsibilities of government as being comparatively minimal (levying taxes, ensuring national security, etc.)
“By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life.”
Before and during his presidency, Lincoln made it a point to defend and act in accordance with the Constitution. However, he held that the unprecedented nature of the Civil War, perhaps the worst crisis ever to befall the nation necessitated certain measures that were not granted by the constitution. Among these special war powers were the suspension of habeas corpus, ability to make decisions without Congressional approval and blockading of Southern Ports. Lincoln justified his actions on the grounds that in order to protect the fundamental spirit of the Constitution, which did not permit succession and was intended to provide unity, he must go against certain elements that would stand in the way of solving the crisis. He also claimed that since the Confederacy was technically an insurrection, he did not have to get the same approval from Congress in order to intervene as he would if it were a war with an external enemy.
“We have the opportunity…”
Lyndon Johnson sought to expand on the welfare state created by the New Deal in order to eliminate poverty. According to Johnson, it was not enough for the U.S. to be rich and powerful; it must also strive for the basic equality and opportunity of all its citizens. To this end, he successfully passed the Economic Opportunity Act and set about constructing an elaborate (and many say ill-conceived) series of programs and agencies designed in large part to provide services to the poor, especially in the inner city, although it also fulfilled other unrelated roles such as creating a National Endowment for the arts. Johnson’s critics accused him going above and beyond the constitutionally-acceptable role of the president and creating an unwieldy and costly bureaucracy that fostered a culture of dependency among the people it was intended to help.
Nixon’s Attempt to “Out-Bid” Liberals with His Family Assistance Plan: Coming into power during a liberal era in the wake of the most significant expansion of government in the nation’s history, Richard Nixon knew that it would be futile to attempt a total dismantling of the welfare state. Instead, he sought to streamline the labyrinthine bureaucracy that had grown out of the Great Society in favor of a simpler approach that placed more responsibility on individuals. He proposed a “Family Assistance Plan” that would mandate a yearly income for all citizens provided they showed evidence of seeking or holding a job. He hoped that his ostensibly radical plan would win the support of some liberals (in the process creating division in the Democratic Party), even as it appealed to conservatives by promoting work in lieu of dependency. However, Barbara Kellerman claims that Nixon’s lukewarm promotion on behalf of the initially well-received program resulted in its failure.
Essay 1
In The Rhetorical Presidency, Jeffrey Tulis explains that the rhetorical expectations of the presidency have changed drastically since the founding. However, rather than going with the conventional wisdom which explains this development in terms of technological advancement and other “little” changes, Tulis argues that American’s understanding of rhetoric has been fundamentally altered. The modern conception of presidential rhetoric, far from just involving speeches, has also resulted in a much different, far more powerful executive office.
Certain political norms went some way towards discouraging what was seen as excessive rhetorical appeals by the president. Americans considered such appeals, particularly those of a partisan nature, as beneath the dignity of the office. This idea persisted until after the Civil War, when Andrew Johnson was widely criticized for his angry rhetoric. Furthermore, leaders were encouraged to present themselves as humble servants of all the people, not partisan figures with obvious agendas.
In isolation, these norms were insufficient to rule out the possibility of a demagogue coming into power. In times of crisis, the people might allow their passions to get the better of them. With this in mind, the Founders tailored the Constitution to prevent popular tyranny. They feared that the people, whose political views derived from psychological factors rather than prudence and reflection, might be swayed by the appeals of demagogues. They did not conceive of the president as a popular leader in today’s sense. On the contrary, they feared that without certain safeguards, the people would be prone to electing demagogues, or those who manipulated the public through emotional appeals. They divided demagogues into two categories: soft demagogues, who flattered the people and claimed to speak for them, and hard demagogues, who sowed division by exploiting the fears and prejudices of their constituents.
Therefore, they designed the Constitution to make demagogic appeals as unlikely as possible. The Constitution would prescribe the basic responsibilities of government, ensuring what Alexander Hamilton called a politics of administration rather one of disputed ends. In other words, the foundation would provide a blueprint that, while ambiguous in certain respects, would prevent demagogues from altering the principles agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention. Accepting as a given that competent and well-intentioned statesmen would not always be at the helm, the Founders established an executive institution that did not allow the president (or any branch of government) to deviate drastically from the institutionally prescribed powers of his office.
Despite their fear of popular tyranny, the Founders held sacred the people’s right to play some role in choosing their leader. The key was to come up with a means of election that would allow citizens to vote while simultaneously limiting the possibility that they might select a demagogue. To this end, the Founders devised the Electoral College system, in which the people would vote for representatives whose judgment they trusted to choose the president. While compelled to vote the public will in ordinary circumstances, the delegates reserved the right to bar a demagogue from office if necessary.
Rhetoric was a very minor factor in the Founder’s conception of executive responsibilities. If public appeals were common, they reasoned, people would select candidates for their rhetorical rather than administrative abilities. Therefore, the president made very few speeches. Although his addresses to Congress were made available to the public, they were not specifically tailored for public consumption. On those occasions that presidents did speak directly to the people, they were expected to “educate” the public and give some sense of the government’s general direction rather than put forward specific policy proposals. Overall, Tulis argues that the public’s limited role in the legislative process allowed for more substantive and effective deliberation.
It would be impossible to discuss the transformation of the rhetorical presidency without providing some context. The situation in the U.S. in the early 20th century was quite tense. The unimpeded growth of industry over the course of the previous century had given rise to monopolies that controlled vast amounts of wealth and cared little for the working conditions, hours, and wages of their employees. The federal government, operating according to a laissez faire economic approach, was reluctant to stand up to the trusts that were, after all, expanding the U.S. economy (and in many cases pulling politicians strings).
Indeed, William Jennings Bryan, with his famous “cross of gold speech” and other populists seemed to fit the founders’ criteria for demagoguery. Workers and small businesses were understandably unhappy with the current state of affairs. Populists such as William Jennings Bryan, best known for his “cross of gold” speech, established their reputations criticizing big business and its government enablers. Their emotional, sometimes inflammatory appeals met the Founder’s criteria for demagoguery. Meanwhile, socialist and anarchist organizations were gaining support among frustrated workers.
Teddy Roosevelt feared that the public anger could result in great instability, and possibly even revolution. After being elected president, he made it his mission to regulate the trusts in order to disarm radical demagogues’ calls to topple the government. In order to do so, Teddy Roosevelt reasoned, he would have to engage in some demagoguery of his own. He justified his public appeals on the grounds that they were intended to protect the Founder’s Constitutional order; like Washington and Lincoln, he claimed he was straying from the intent of the Constitution in order to ensure its survival.
The railroad industry, according to Tulis, represented more than any other industry the class divides that threatened to tear America sunder. The Hepburn Act, backed by Roosevelt and progressives on both sides of the aisle, would regulate shipping, setting price limits and not allowing the railroad trusts to provide special rates for large shippers, a source of great consternation for many Americans. When it looked as if the bill would stall in Congress, Roosevelt felt he had no other choice but to appeal to the people for support. Thus, he commenced a “swing around the circle,” campaigning on behalf of the Hepburn act. Roosevelt’s public support, along with some deft legislative maneuvering (involving Sothern Democrat “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman and pro-business Republican Nelson Aldrich), resulted in passage of the act.
Although Roosevelt went beyond the Founder’s conception of presidential rhetoric, he did so cautiously and with some reservations. He was carefully not to fan the flames of class antagonism, asserting that it was just as wrong for the poor to demonize the wealthy as the other way around. He claimed that his public appeals were only acceptable because the class tensions of the time constituted a major crisis. Roosevelt also cultivated a public image, foreshadowing the tabloid-esque obsession with president’s personal lives present in modern politics. Although he may have had good intentions, Roosevelt’s justification established a precedent for the “crisis politics,” in which politicians routinely invoke a real or imagined crisis as a pretext for expanding their power at the expense of adherence to the Constitution.
Teddy Roosevelt’s use of presidential rhetoric, if we take him at his word, was a departure from the constitutional norm reluctantly undertaken to prevent a crisis. Woodrow Wilson’s, on other hand, was a conscious and deliberate attempt to fundamentally alter the nature of the presidency. Tulis calls the president’s underlying philosophy a “second constitution” because it established a new set of norms on which future presidents would operate.
Wilson took issue with what the Founder’s constitutional order had become. Government lacked a greater sense of purpose, focusing on minutiae and losing touch with the people it was designed to serve. Furthermore, he characterized the branches of government as prescribed by the Constitution as working in a Newtonian (that is to say, mechanical) way, competing with each other and thwarting attempts to govern effectively. The only way to solve this problem, Wilson claimed, was to create a Darwinian manner, in which the branches worked together as an organic whole dedicated to fulfilling the will of the people (more similar to a parliamentary system). Wilson conceived the proper role of the president in this new order as that of a public interpreter. A good leader, he claimed, was one who could discern and then give voice to the “general will” of the public. In order to do this, the president must make frequent public appeals to promote legislation and imbue the nation with a sense of purpose. Accordingly, he promoted his “trust busting” with frequent public appeals. Following World War I, he successfully convinced the public to join the League of Nations, although his inability to compromise with isolationists in Congress ended up thwarting him.
Conscious that his version of the presidency could be construed as favoring demagoguery, Wilson presented several arguments to reassure critics that this was not the case. First, he claimed, the rhetorical leaders would pass on a set of enduring political values, encouraging leaders to be virtuous and devoted to the common good. If this failed to dissuade a would-be demagogue, then the public’s natural sense of judgment would allow them to discern his true intentions. Finally, if the president willfully or inadvertently failed to properly interpret the public and pushed for rapid change or otherwise unacceptable change, the people would vote him out of power.
Above all, the Founders’ and Woodrow Wilson’s disagreements regarding the proper role of the president stem from fundamentally opposed views of human nature. The founders believed that although the best government is one that derives its authority from the consent of governed, they were deeply suspicious of what they saw as men’s tendency to make decisions based on fleeting passions rather than reasoned consideration. The Constitution was in many ways their attempt to respect the people’s democratic rights while guarding against the threat posed by demagogues who would manipulate the public’s emotions to their own ends. Wilson, on the other hand, had an optimistic view of human nature, on the part of leaders and their constituents. He genuinely believed that presidents of sufficient character could be trusted to wield great authority for progressive ends, and that the people could be depended upon to recognize demagogues with unwholesome purposes. While it is a matter of opinion as to which view of human nature and, by extension, American government, more closely reflects reality, but it is clear that all modern presidents must contend with the daunting task of choosing how to apply them.
Essay 2
Eisenhower, like Washington before him, was eager to retire after a long career of military service. However, politicians and the public alike exerted a magnetic pull on the former general, drawing him inexorably towards seeking the presidency despite his initial reluctance. Once elected to office, Eisenhower, in his own subtle way, would leave a mark on the institution that is still recognized today.
After World War II, Europe was in ruins and the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the two major powers. The two former allies’ interests and ideologies inevitably resulted in competition and antagonism. The ensuing Cold War ignited rabid anti-communist sentiment in the U.S. Many Republicans and some Democrats accused President Truman of not doing enough to root out communist infiltrators in government. The hysteria reached a new height when the Soviets stole the U.S. plans for a nuclear bomb. No longer could the U.S. take comfort in being the one nation to hold such an effective deterrent.
Determined to curb the spread of communism according to the policy of containment, President Truman dispatched troops to Korea to fight against the Chinese and North Koreans. Eager for capable help, Truman naturally called on Eisenhower for advice, once again putting him in the spotlight. Many Americans, from political operatives to average citizens, strongly encouraged Eisenower to run for president. They reasoned that as a war hero with vast military experience and an impeccable sense of character would be the ideal Cold War president.
Eisenhower was initially reluctant to run. However, when it became clear that the Republican Party would elect an isolationist, he agreed to seek the nomination. He came into office during the height of the McCarthy Era, and many citizens expected him to challenge the belligerent Congressman for his communist witch hunts. To their dismay, he seemingly refused to confront the issue, even when McCarthy ludicrously accused his friend and fellow World War II general Douglas MacArthur of having communist sympathies. It appeared as if Eisenhower was too weak to stand up to the McCarthy. To make matters worse, he seemed disengaged from key political issues and often gave confused press conferences, deliberately obfuscating his points to mislead the press and deflect criticism. Although the public continued to admire the war hero Eisenhower, his stature among scholars plummeted, who claimed that he lacked leadership ability and questioned his intelligence. The former claim, as this essay explains, is not accurate. And the latter claim is even more spurious; while certainly not an intellectual powerhouse, Eisenhower was well-informed about national affairs and, according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, consulted the Federalist Papers for guidance.
In reality, Eisenhower was anything but apathetic; in his own way, he was as politically adept as any president. The difference lay in his approach; in the place of the flashy rhetoric and frequent public appeals that have come to be expected of modern presidents, he engage in a “hidden hand” method of governance. Like the “old” kind of president, Eisenhower stayed out of the spotlight, neglecting to engage opponents on controversial issues or behave in a partisan manner. Instead, he appointed members of his staff such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to act as lightening rods for criticism. Aloof from political catfights, Eisenhower’s reputation went untarnished. Even McCarthy exercised restraint, rarely criticizing the president.
Eisenhower’s strategy in regards to McCarthy was to give him as little recognition as possible, intuiting that the notorious communist hunter thrived on publicity. The president did, however, allow his staff members to speak out against McCarthy. Eventually, the Senator would go too far and destroy himself without the intervention of the president, which might have just served to embolden him. Sure enough, McCarth self-destructed as suddenly as he had risen to prominence.
In allowing his aides to deal with many political concerns, Eisenhower conserved his political capital for when he needed it most. Like Washington, he placed the most importance on his role as Commander in Chief. When isolationists in Congress proposed the Bricker Amendment in order to curb the president’s discretionary war powers, Eisenhower spoke out forcefully against the bill. He also, somewhat counter intuitively considering his military career, shrank the military budget, choosing to invest more heavily in missile systems and less in conventional weapons. As a war hero, no one could credibly calls his judgment into question on such matters. Eisenhower frequently presided over meetings of the National Security Council.
Further drawing on his military experience, Eisenhower engineered a massive reorganization of the Executive Branch. He had noticed while serving as an advisor to President Truman that the president’s cabinet was not efficient and encouraged rivalries to break out between different departments. To mitigate this problem, he reorganized the Executive Branch to reflect the disciplined military hierarchy under which he had served. Eisenhower had no problem delegating authority to his staff on minor and even some major issues, but in contrast to other relatively “detached” presidents such as Ronald Reagan, he always maintained strict control and was fully aware of every decision that was made.
Eisenhower defies conventional standards of what constitutes great presidential leadership. He was no great orator, and he did not propose an ambitious domestic agenda. It is understandable that contemporary scholars, unaware of what was going on behind the scenes of the president’s administration, considered him disengaged. However, a closer examination of Eisenhower’s presidency reveals a man with a distinct “hidden hand” leadership style and a clear vision for how to run the country. His success, widely recognized in retrospect, not only exonerates Eisenhower, but also reaffirms the continued relevance of the Founder’s conception of dignified presidential leadership.
by Eric Shapiro
The Johnson Treatment: Lyndon Johnson’s famously convincing method of convincing Congressmen and other government officials to do what he wants. It was characterized by exuberant personal appeals in which the president employed a mix of flattery, compromise, veiled threats and promises of reciprocity if the person at hand gave Johnson his way. Johnson honed these skills during his time in Congress, bringing them along when he was elected president. According to Barbara Kellerman, the Johnson treatment played a major part in the successful passage of the president’s beloved Great Society.
George Washington and the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793: Washington strongly believed that it was in the national interest to avoid “entangling alliances” (as he put it in his farewell address). When war broke out between England and France, many people in government advocated taking sides with one side or the other. Drawing on his stature as America’s foremost founder, Washington issued a Neutrality Proclamation affirming a U.S. commitment to not getting involved. He and Alexander Hamilton justified this and other presidential decisions pertaining to foreign policy on the grounds that it was the president’s Constitutional role to take actions in the interest of national security, even if that meant not seeking Congressional permission before hand. Hamilton also made the more technical argument that since Article II of the Constitution stated that the executive power should be vested in the executive, without the “herein granted” qualification present in Article I intended to set limits on legislative authority, the president had some leeway with regards to conducting foreign policy.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Creation of an “Economic Constitutional Order:” Presidents of the Progressive era such as Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson established some precedent for a more active role of government in overseeing the economy. FDR went much further, arguing that the nature of the modern industrial economy demanded a social safety net to protect people from economic instability. Private institutions could not do this, and it was therefore incumbent on government to establish a program (the New Deal) to provide certain basic necessities for the people. This was a strong departure from the constitutional order established by the Founders, who to varying degrees saw the responsibilities of government as being comparatively minimal (levying taxes, ensuring national security, etc.)
“By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life.”
Before and during his presidency, Lincoln made it a point to defend and act in accordance with the Constitution. However, he held that the unprecedented nature of the Civil War, perhaps the worst crisis ever to befall the nation necessitated certain measures that were not granted by the constitution. Among these special war powers were the suspension of habeas corpus, ability to make decisions without Congressional approval and blockading of Southern Ports. Lincoln justified his actions on the grounds that in order to protect the fundamental spirit of the Constitution, which did not permit succession and was intended to provide unity, he must go against certain elements that would stand in the way of solving the crisis. He also claimed that since the Confederacy was technically an insurrection, he did not have to get the same approval from Congress in order to intervene as he would if it were a war with an external enemy.
“We have the opportunity…”
Lyndon Johnson sought to expand on the welfare state created by the New Deal in order to eliminate poverty. According to Johnson, it was not enough for the U.S. to be rich and powerful; it must also strive for the basic equality and opportunity of all its citizens. To this end, he successfully passed the Economic Opportunity Act and set about constructing an elaborate (and many say ill-conceived) series of programs and agencies designed in large part to provide services to the poor, especially in the inner city, although it also fulfilled other unrelated roles such as creating a National Endowment for the arts. Johnson’s critics accused him going above and beyond the constitutionally-acceptable role of the president and creating an unwieldy and costly bureaucracy that fostered a culture of dependency among the people it was intended to help.
Nixon’s Attempt to “Out-Bid” Liberals with His Family Assistance Plan: Coming into power during a liberal era in the wake of the most significant expansion of government in the nation’s history, Richard Nixon knew that it would be futile to attempt a total dismantling of the welfare state. Instead, he sought to streamline the labyrinthine bureaucracy that had grown out of the Great Society in favor of a simpler approach that placed more responsibility on individuals. He proposed a “Family Assistance Plan” that would mandate a yearly income for all citizens provided they showed evidence of seeking or holding a job. He hoped that his ostensibly radical plan would win the support of some liberals (in the process creating division in the Democratic Party), even as it appealed to conservatives by promoting work in lieu of dependency. However, Barbara Kellerman claims that Nixon’s lukewarm promotion on behalf of the initially well-received program resulted in its failure.
Essay 1
In The Rhetorical Presidency, Jeffrey Tulis explains that the rhetorical expectations of the presidency have changed drastically since the founding. However, rather than going with the conventional wisdom which explains this development in terms of technological advancement and other “little” changes, Tulis argues that American’s understanding of rhetoric has been fundamentally altered. The modern conception of presidential rhetoric, far from just involving speeches, has also resulted in a much different, far more powerful executive office.
Certain political norms went some way towards discouraging what was seen as excessive rhetorical appeals by the president. Americans considered such appeals, particularly those of a partisan nature, as beneath the dignity of the office. This idea persisted until after the Civil War, when Andrew Johnson was widely criticized for his angry rhetoric. Furthermore, leaders were encouraged to present themselves as humble servants of all the people, not partisan figures with obvious agendas.
In isolation, these norms were insufficient to rule out the possibility of a demagogue coming into power. In times of crisis, the people might allow their passions to get the better of them. With this in mind, the Founders tailored the Constitution to prevent popular tyranny. They feared that the people, whose political views derived from psychological factors rather than prudence and reflection, might be swayed by the appeals of demagogues. They did not conceive of the president as a popular leader in today’s sense. On the contrary, they feared that without certain safeguards, the people would be prone to electing demagogues, or those who manipulated the public through emotional appeals. They divided demagogues into two categories: soft demagogues, who flattered the people and claimed to speak for them, and hard demagogues, who sowed division by exploiting the fears and prejudices of their constituents.
Therefore, they designed the Constitution to make demagogic appeals as unlikely as possible. The Constitution would prescribe the basic responsibilities of government, ensuring what Alexander Hamilton called a politics of administration rather one of disputed ends. In other words, the foundation would provide a blueprint that, while ambiguous in certain respects, would prevent demagogues from altering the principles agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention. Accepting as a given that competent and well-intentioned statesmen would not always be at the helm, the Founders established an executive institution that did not allow the president (or any branch of government) to deviate drastically from the institutionally prescribed powers of his office.
Despite their fear of popular tyranny, the Founders held sacred the people’s right to play some role in choosing their leader. The key was to come up with a means of election that would allow citizens to vote while simultaneously limiting the possibility that they might select a demagogue. To this end, the Founders devised the Electoral College system, in which the people would vote for representatives whose judgment they trusted to choose the president. While compelled to vote the public will in ordinary circumstances, the delegates reserved the right to bar a demagogue from office if necessary.
Rhetoric was a very minor factor in the Founder’s conception of executive responsibilities. If public appeals were common, they reasoned, people would select candidates for their rhetorical rather than administrative abilities. Therefore, the president made very few speeches. Although his addresses to Congress were made available to the public, they were not specifically tailored for public consumption. On those occasions that presidents did speak directly to the people, they were expected to “educate” the public and give some sense of the government’s general direction rather than put forward specific policy proposals. Overall, Tulis argues that the public’s limited role in the legislative process allowed for more substantive and effective deliberation.
It would be impossible to discuss the transformation of the rhetorical presidency without providing some context. The situation in the U.S. in the early 20th century was quite tense. The unimpeded growth of industry over the course of the previous century had given rise to monopolies that controlled vast amounts of wealth and cared little for the working conditions, hours, and wages of their employees. The federal government, operating according to a laissez faire economic approach, was reluctant to stand up to the trusts that were, after all, expanding the U.S. economy (and in many cases pulling politicians strings).
Indeed, William Jennings Bryan, with his famous “cross of gold speech” and other populists seemed to fit the founders’ criteria for demagoguery. Workers and small businesses were understandably unhappy with the current state of affairs. Populists such as William Jennings Bryan, best known for his “cross of gold” speech, established their reputations criticizing big business and its government enablers. Their emotional, sometimes inflammatory appeals met the Founder’s criteria for demagoguery. Meanwhile, socialist and anarchist organizations were gaining support among frustrated workers.
Teddy Roosevelt feared that the public anger could result in great instability, and possibly even revolution. After being elected president, he made it his mission to regulate the trusts in order to disarm radical demagogues’ calls to topple the government. In order to do so, Teddy Roosevelt reasoned, he would have to engage in some demagoguery of his own. He justified his public appeals on the grounds that they were intended to protect the Founder’s Constitutional order; like Washington and Lincoln, he claimed he was straying from the intent of the Constitution in order to ensure its survival.
The railroad industry, according to Tulis, represented more than any other industry the class divides that threatened to tear America sunder. The Hepburn Act, backed by Roosevelt and progressives on both sides of the aisle, would regulate shipping, setting price limits and not allowing the railroad trusts to provide special rates for large shippers, a source of great consternation for many Americans. When it looked as if the bill would stall in Congress, Roosevelt felt he had no other choice but to appeal to the people for support. Thus, he commenced a “swing around the circle,” campaigning on behalf of the Hepburn act. Roosevelt’s public support, along with some deft legislative maneuvering (involving Sothern Democrat “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman and pro-business Republican Nelson Aldrich), resulted in passage of the act.
Although Roosevelt went beyond the Founder’s conception of presidential rhetoric, he did so cautiously and with some reservations. He was carefully not to fan the flames of class antagonism, asserting that it was just as wrong for the poor to demonize the wealthy as the other way around. He claimed that his public appeals were only acceptable because the class tensions of the time constituted a major crisis. Roosevelt also cultivated a public image, foreshadowing the tabloid-esque obsession with president’s personal lives present in modern politics. Although he may have had good intentions, Roosevelt’s justification established a precedent for the “crisis politics,” in which politicians routinely invoke a real or imagined crisis as a pretext for expanding their power at the expense of adherence to the Constitution.
Teddy Roosevelt’s use of presidential rhetoric, if we take him at his word, was a departure from the constitutional norm reluctantly undertaken to prevent a crisis. Woodrow Wilson’s, on other hand, was a conscious and deliberate attempt to fundamentally alter the nature of the presidency. Tulis calls the president’s underlying philosophy a “second constitution” because it established a new set of norms on which future presidents would operate.
Wilson took issue with what the Founder’s constitutional order had become. Government lacked a greater sense of purpose, focusing on minutiae and losing touch with the people it was designed to serve. Furthermore, he characterized the branches of government as prescribed by the Constitution as working in a Newtonian (that is to say, mechanical) way, competing with each other and thwarting attempts to govern effectively. The only way to solve this problem, Wilson claimed, was to create a Darwinian manner, in which the branches worked together as an organic whole dedicated to fulfilling the will of the people (more similar to a parliamentary system). Wilson conceived the proper role of the president in this new order as that of a public interpreter. A good leader, he claimed, was one who could discern and then give voice to the “general will” of the public. In order to do this, the president must make frequent public appeals to promote legislation and imbue the nation with a sense of purpose. Accordingly, he promoted his “trust busting” with frequent public appeals. Following World War I, he successfully convinced the public to join the League of Nations, although his inability to compromise with isolationists in Congress ended up thwarting him.
Conscious that his version of the presidency could be construed as favoring demagoguery, Wilson presented several arguments to reassure critics that this was not the case. First, he claimed, the rhetorical leaders would pass on a set of enduring political values, encouraging leaders to be virtuous and devoted to the common good. If this failed to dissuade a would-be demagogue, then the public’s natural sense of judgment would allow them to discern his true intentions. Finally, if the president willfully or inadvertently failed to properly interpret the public and pushed for rapid change or otherwise unacceptable change, the people would vote him out of power.
Above all, the Founders’ and Woodrow Wilson’s disagreements regarding the proper role of the president stem from fundamentally opposed views of human nature. The founders believed that although the best government is one that derives its authority from the consent of governed, they were deeply suspicious of what they saw as men’s tendency to make decisions based on fleeting passions rather than reasoned consideration. The Constitution was in many ways their attempt to respect the people’s democratic rights while guarding against the threat posed by demagogues who would manipulate the public’s emotions to their own ends. Wilson, on the other hand, had an optimistic view of human nature, on the part of leaders and their constituents. He genuinely believed that presidents of sufficient character could be trusted to wield great authority for progressive ends, and that the people could be depended upon to recognize demagogues with unwholesome purposes. While it is a matter of opinion as to which view of human nature and, by extension, American government, more closely reflects reality, but it is clear that all modern presidents must contend with the daunting task of choosing how to apply them.
Essay 2
Eisenhower, like Washington before him, was eager to retire after a long career of military service. However, politicians and the public alike exerted a magnetic pull on the former general, drawing him inexorably towards seeking the presidency despite his initial reluctance. Once elected to office, Eisenhower, in his own subtle way, would leave a mark on the institution that is still recognized today.
After World War II, Europe was in ruins and the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the two major powers. The two former allies’ interests and ideologies inevitably resulted in competition and antagonism. The ensuing Cold War ignited rabid anti-communist sentiment in the U.S. Many Republicans and some Democrats accused President Truman of not doing enough to root out communist infiltrators in government. The hysteria reached a new height when the Soviets stole the U.S. plans for a nuclear bomb. No longer could the U.S. take comfort in being the one nation to hold such an effective deterrent.
Determined to curb the spread of communism according to the policy of containment, President Truman dispatched troops to Korea to fight against the Chinese and North Koreans. Eager for capable help, Truman naturally called on Eisenhower for advice, once again putting him in the spotlight. Many Americans, from political operatives to average citizens, strongly encouraged Eisenower to run for president. They reasoned that as a war hero with vast military experience and an impeccable sense of character would be the ideal Cold War president.
Eisenhower was initially reluctant to run. However, when it became clear that the Republican Party would elect an isolationist, he agreed to seek the nomination. He came into office during the height of the McCarthy Era, and many citizens expected him to challenge the belligerent Congressman for his communist witch hunts. To their dismay, he seemingly refused to confront the issue, even when McCarthy ludicrously accused his friend and fellow World War II general Douglas MacArthur of having communist sympathies. It appeared as if Eisenhower was too weak to stand up to the McCarthy. To make matters worse, he seemed disengaged from key political issues and often gave confused press conferences, deliberately obfuscating his points to mislead the press and deflect criticism. Although the public continued to admire the war hero Eisenhower, his stature among scholars plummeted, who claimed that he lacked leadership ability and questioned his intelligence. The former claim, as this essay explains, is not accurate. And the latter claim is even more spurious; while certainly not an intellectual powerhouse, Eisenhower was well-informed about national affairs and, according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, consulted the Federalist Papers for guidance.
In reality, Eisenhower was anything but apathetic; in his own way, he was as politically adept as any president. The difference lay in his approach; in the place of the flashy rhetoric and frequent public appeals that have come to be expected of modern presidents, he engage in a “hidden hand” method of governance. Like the “old” kind of president, Eisenhower stayed out of the spotlight, neglecting to engage opponents on controversial issues or behave in a partisan manner. Instead, he appointed members of his staff such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to act as lightening rods for criticism. Aloof from political catfights, Eisenhower’s reputation went untarnished. Even McCarthy exercised restraint, rarely criticizing the president.
Eisenhower’s strategy in regards to McCarthy was to give him as little recognition as possible, intuiting that the notorious communist hunter thrived on publicity. The president did, however, allow his staff members to speak out against McCarthy. Eventually, the Senator would go too far and destroy himself without the intervention of the president, which might have just served to embolden him. Sure enough, McCarth self-destructed as suddenly as he had risen to prominence.
In allowing his aides to deal with many political concerns, Eisenhower conserved his political capital for when he needed it most. Like Washington, he placed the most importance on his role as Commander in Chief. When isolationists in Congress proposed the Bricker Amendment in order to curb the president’s discretionary war powers, Eisenhower spoke out forcefully against the bill. He also, somewhat counter intuitively considering his military career, shrank the military budget, choosing to invest more heavily in missile systems and less in conventional weapons. As a war hero, no one could credibly calls his judgment into question on such matters. Eisenhower frequently presided over meetings of the National Security Council.
Further drawing on his military experience, Eisenhower engineered a massive reorganization of the Executive Branch. He had noticed while serving as an advisor to President Truman that the president’s cabinet was not efficient and encouraged rivalries to break out between different departments. To mitigate this problem, he reorganized the Executive Branch to reflect the disciplined military hierarchy under which he had served. Eisenhower had no problem delegating authority to his staff on minor and even some major issues, but in contrast to other relatively “detached” presidents such as Ronald Reagan, he always maintained strict control and was fully aware of every decision that was made.
Eisenhower defies conventional standards of what constitutes great presidential leadership. He was no great orator, and he did not propose an ambitious domestic agenda. It is understandable that contemporary scholars, unaware of what was going on behind the scenes of the president’s administration, considered him disengaged. However, a closer examination of Eisenhower’s presidency reveals a man with a distinct “hidden hand” leadership style and a clear vision for how to run the country. His success, widely recognized in retrospect, not only exonerates Eisenhower, but also reaffirms the continued relevance of the Founder’s conception of dignified presidential leadership.