On the Yom Kippur War ...
Eric Shapiro 5/7/2012
Contemporary International Politics Professor Roy Ginsberg
War as Politics by Other Means: Israel, Egypt, And The Yom Kippur War As a Vindication of Political Realism
Introduction
Over the course of its generation-spanning history, the Arab-Israeli conflict has given rise to a myriad of historical grievances and cultural animosities that have manifested themselves in different ideologies. Zionism and pan-Arabism, while extant prior to 1948, developed new military implications in the wake of what Israelis refer to as the War of Independence and what Arabs call the “Nakhba”, or Great Disaster. In light of this bitter, emotionally charged history, it is temping to examine this most intractable of conflicts through the prism of ideology. However, it is also necessary to weigh appropriately the cold calculus of national self interest, great power politics, and other well-established theories that have influenced events in the modern era. It is these factors that are most relevant to understanding the topic of this paper, the Yom Kippur War.
While reflecting on the clash of nationalisms underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict can be useful in explaining the animosities that reside at the heart of the conflict, it can also be limiting in its assumption that the actors involved lack the capacity for rational decision making. For all of their well-publicized cultural and ideological differences, Israel and the Arab states do not differ fundamentally in their goals from all other states in the international system. It is the contention of this paper that it is useful to analyze the decisions of its participants according to the same rules and standards that one would apply to any other states or events in the international system[1].
Neoclassical realism is an ideal theoretical framework by which to analyze the Yom Kippur War. Like neorealism, it is predicated on the assumption that every state actor is governed primarily by self-interest, and that it is subject to the same uniform “rules” that apply to all other state actors. However, unlike neorealism, neoclassical liberalism allows for an in-depth exploration of the specific internal factors at play in the decision-making processes of state actors. According to this framework, all are ultimately motivated by the same underlying concerns, but societal and/or political differences can dictate how they go about pursuing their objectives.
Examining Arab-Israeli relations through the lens of realism[2], neoliberal or otherwise, is not only useful for scholars. History supports the contention that attempts to solve the security dilemma[3] at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been most successful when the mediators and participating actors have adopted a pragmatic approach. It might follow that such an approach would necessarily be a peaceful one, predicated on a mutual agreement by participating actors to refrain from military action. In an ideal world, two or more states with opposing interests could set down their arms and gather around the negotiating table to iron out the conditions for a lasting peace according to the principle of reciprocity[4] in its positive form.
However, a variety of complicating factors have the potential to make this impossible. At times, military action is the only viable way for states to break a diplomatic stalemate when the current balance of power makes negotiations impossible.[5] Granted, international norms[6] dictate that the use of force is only justifiable when all other options have been exhausted, and it is incumbent on any state considering such a drastic step to do so with clear, attainable goals in mind, rather than acting on transient political passions and/or ideological impulses. Provided that these preconditions are met, however, it is possible that decisive military action might be the only way to achieve conditions that favor a lasting peace.
In the long run, pressuring states to negotiate when they are at an impasse could serve to prolong a conflict by neglecting to address the fundamental issues that are obstructing peace. This is especially true when there exists an asymmetrical bargaining position, in which one state, operating from a position of perceived strength, refuses to make concessions that would allow another state to accept peace. In such cases, a successful military operation on the part of the disadvantaged state might serve to level the diplomatic playing field so as to foster a situation in which a mutually acceptable agreement is possible.[7]
There is perhaps no greater example of war laying the groundwork for peace than the Yom Kippur War. The years leading up to the conflict were marked by a series of ineffectual attempts at peacemaking on the part of the U.N. and the superpowers.[8] As a result of conditions stemming both directly and indirectly from the outcome of the war, Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement at the 1978 Camp David Accords. To be sure, this peace has been categorized fairly as a “cold” one, but it has also been enduring; neither state has explicitly violated the terms of the Camp David Accords since 1978. As a result, no additional wars have taken place. Given the unprecedented success of the peace between Israel and Egypt, it is useful for scholars of international relations to study the historical event that made it possible.
The Yom Kippur War proved to be a game-changer in the Middle East. Despite marking yet another Israeli victory over its Arab neighbors, the conflict nevertheless altered an asymmetrical bargaining situation in which Israel and its benefactor, the United States, held an untenable advantage over Egypt. The Jewish state’s tangible gains were greater, since it suffered relatively minor losses in comparison to its enemies and kept much of the territory it had acquired in prior wars, but Egypt’s successes early in the Sinai campaign shattered Israel’s sense of invulnerability. Chastened by setbacks early in the war, Israel accepted negotiating terms it had deemed unacceptable prior to 1973. Following over half a decade of tough diplomacy, the conditions established by the Yom Kippur War would eventually yield the 1978 Camp David Accords.
The Six-Day War had the unforeseen effect of moving Egypt’s leadership towards a more realist conception of foreign policy, one that was ultimately more conducive to serving its national interest than Nasser’s pan-Arab concerns. For Israel, on the other hand, victory gave rise to a fatal sense of overconfidence that allowed nationalism and ideology to distort its formerly sober assessment of balance of power in the region. This shift in approaches goes some way towards explaining the surprising outcome of the Yom Kippur War.
Chapter 1: The Sinai Campaign
When it comes to addressing a topic as complex and multifaceted as the Yom Kippur War, 25 pages is barely enough to scratch the surface. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on some elements of the conflict at the expense of others. This research paper is concerned first and foremost with explaining how an Egyptian campaign against Israel was the inevitable result of the diplomatic stalemate that existed between 1967 and 1973. Consequently, it will focus most heavily on the time before the conflict actually began. It would be difficult if not impossible, however, to discuss the prelude of a major historical event without first providing a basic understanding of the event itself. Thus, it is necessary to briefly summarize the Yom Kippur War before moving on to discuss the circumstances that led up to it.
On October 5th, 1973, less than a day before the start of the Yom Kippur War, 450 Israeli troops were stationed along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. On the other side stood 5 Egyptian divisions, which together consisted of “100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks, and 2,000 artillery pieces and heavy mortars.”[9] Meanwhile, Syrian forces massing in the Golan Heights outnumbered Israeli defenders 8 to 1.[10] In the face of these overwhelming odds, the Israeli government was convinced that the Arab armies were merely conducting exercises. This was not the case.
On the morning of October 6th, 1973, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and drove 15 kilometers into the Sinai Peninsula, easily penetrating the Bar-Lev line, “A huge manmade sand dune on the east bank of the canal containing strategically placed artillery and tanks that were intended to impede any cross-canal invasion long enough for the reserves to mobilize.”[11] With the majority of its military personnel at home or in synagogue for the Jewish high holiday of Yom Kippur, Israel’s meager defenses were woefully inadequate to contend with simultaneous offensives from the north and south.[12]
Faced with the options of pushing further or consolidating its gains, Egypt’s generals chose to consolidate its gains by establishing fortifications in the territory it already held. In doing so, the Egyptian army avoided “the mobile type of war at which Israel excels.”[13] Israel, eager to gain some momentum, launched a counterattack on October 8th, dispatching its air force to bombard enemy positions. However, the Egyptian forces used their state-of-the-art SAMs (surface-to-air-missiles), which Sadat had acquired from the Soviet Union, to knock the attacking planes out of the sky and force a retreat.[14]
The Egyptians’ new “missile umbrella,” in conjunction with fighter jets also furnished by the Soviet Union, effectively neutralized Israel’s formidable air advantage. Israel, overconfident and over-reliant on the capacity of its air force to repel any threat, had not invested sufficiently in other military assets. Egypt might have achieved even greater success had it not been for several factors. First, the very conditions in Israel that helped foster the Arabs’ initial gains proved to be something of a double-edged sword. In choosing the day of Yom Kippur to launch their offensive, the Arab states had correctly counted on the fact that a substantial portion of Israeli military personnel would be absent from their posts. However, because the roads were virtually empty, the IDF was able to quickly move troops and supplies to the Sinai and Golan fronts, partially compensating for the Arab armies’ element of surprise.
Second, on October 10th, in response to the continual Soviet provision of aid to the Arab states, U.S. president Richard Nixon authorized a massive airlift of supplies to Israel. This timely intervention allowed Israel to launch a decisive counterattack that would turn the tides of the conflict decisively in its favor. The airlift underscored Israel’s reliance on its powerful ally, without which it may well have lost the war.
Finally, faced with pressure from the Soviet Union, Anwar Sadat fatefully chose to launch a new offensive against Israel in an attempt to relieve the Syrians, who were currently in danger of being routed on the northern front. The Egyptian president’s decision, undertaken reluctantly at the behest of his allies, had disastrous consequences. Upon leaving the safety of its missile umbrella, the attackers faced the full fury of Israeli air bombardment. Subsequently, with Egypt’s forces hopelessly overextended, the Israelis launched a devastating counterattack, easily shattering Egypt’s undermanned defensive positions in the western Sinai.[15] Before long, Israeli troops under the command of General Ariel Sharon were advancing virtually unimpeded towards Cairo, and Egypt’s Third Army, stationed on the eastern side of the Suez Canal, was surrounded and at its enemy’s mercy.
In a panic, the Soviet Union threatened to deploy its forces to reinforce overwhelmed Egyptian and Syrian forces. If this had occurred, the U.S. would have been obligated to come to Israel’s assistance, transforming a regional conflict into a superpower war. Unwilling to risk a nuclear holocaust so that Israel could make an example of Egypt’s Third Army, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger successfully pressured Israel into accepting a second ceasefire. With that, the last war between Israel and Egypt came to an end, and both sides were left to lick their wounds and ponder its implications.
As had been the case in all other Arab-Israeli Wars up until that point, the Jewish state had emerged victorious. Unlike before, though, it was clear that Israel, previously known for maintaining constant vigilance and overwhelming would-be conquerors with lightning-quick preemptive strikes, had made a terrible error. Meanwhile, the Egyptian and Syrian forces, widely perceived before the war as lacking the requisite training and hardware to challenge Israel’s military, had successfully executed a daring, risky operation that required meticulous planning and considerable skill to pull off.
The fact that the Arab states were, in the end, soundly defeated, did not detract from the emotional and technical significance of their early achievements on the battlefield. Lesch explains that: “With intense U.S. pressure, the Israelis finally ceased fire on October 25, thus ending the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Syria and Egypt lost considerably more men and material; but Israel was bloodied, and the Arabs could claim at least a psychological victory.”[16] The perceived success of the Yom Kippur War, whatever the tactical military conclusions, gave Sadat the political latitude and credibility, at least within Egypt, to pursue what he felt was his nation’s self-interest at the expense of the wider pan-Arab world.
Chapter 2: The Egyptian Perspective
Whether motivated by political considerations, a sincerely held vision for Egypt, or, as is most likely, a combination of the two, Anwar Sadat forged a bold new path for Egypt that culminated in a lasting peace with Israel. The Yom Kippur War was a necessary step on the road to this peace, rectifying an asymmetrical bargaining situation that made peace diplomatically unfeasible for Egypt. Given that plans for a new Arab offensive originated with Sadat and his closest confidants in government and were largely kept secret from the public, an individual level analysis is an appropriate explanatory tool for assessing Egypt’s role in the Yom Kippur War.
Anwar Sadat’s success as Egypt’s president is a testament to the capacity of one man to change the diplomatic path of a state. In seeking peace with Israel in a manner that preserved Arab dignity, Sadat established a new framework for Arab-Israeli relations in which endless war was no longer the only option. To be sure, he did not do so by himself. Sadat’s signature foreign policy achievements – seeking rapprochement with the U.S., making peace with Israel, freeing Egypt from Moscow’s influence, decentralization the Egyptian economy – were in part the culmination of domestic and regional forces that had been at work since long before he came to power. Nevertheless, Sadat may not have chosen the conditions under which he entered office, but his response to these conditions was predicated on a realist approach and a set of priorities that were uniquely his own. There is a reason that Sadat, rather than Nasser, was the one to make peace with Israel.
Sadat’s personality and leadership were instrumental in the success of the Egyptian campaign early in the Yom Kippur War. Israel and much of the international community did not see Sadat as the type of leader who would commit to a risky, large-scale military offensive, especially so soon after the debacle of the Six-Day War.[17] Aside from indulging in the requisite fist pumping, as would have been expected of any Egyptian leader, Sadat provided little inkling of his willingness to re-acquire the Sinai by military means, if necessary.
Even as Israel reaped the benefits of its decisive victory over its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War, Egypt was afflicted by the loss of key national assets. This had incalculable effects in terms of national pride, economics, and internal domestic politics that were directly related to its defeat and, until addressed, were a barrier to the long-term development of the country. Egypt relied on the Sinai Peninsula for its abundant supply of oil and the Suez Canal for exporting/importing goods and collecting tolls. Without these assets, Egypt’s economy suffered greatly.[18]
Anwar Sadat did not rise to power on the basis of any grand ideological designs that would suggest ambitions to start a war against a regional power recognized for its superior military. On the contrary, Egypt’s powerbrokers had favored Sadat for the presidency largely due to their perception that he was an innocuous figure who would be easy to control. Sachar explains: “Sadat was known essentially as Nasser’s obsequious lackey, a ‘yes-man’ who filled a number of honorific roles with little color or real influence.”[19] According to this conventional wisdom, Sadat’s main assets were his lack of enemies and capacity for compromise.[20] They surmised that as a leader without any real overriding vision, he would be pliant and easily manipulated. Most simply expected Sadat to maintain the status quo until a new, more dynamic leader seized the reigns of power.[21]
In truth, however, Sadat entered office with an explicit set of foreign policy goals that were, in their own way, as ambitious as those of Nasser. First and foremost, he was eager to improve relations with the United States and, provided certain preconditions were met, Israel. Sadat saw that continued antagonism with one of the world’s major superpowers and its client state was not profitable for Egypt. Sadat announced his willingness to make peace with the Jewish state provided that Israel withdraw to its pre-1967 borders and agree to address the Palestinian refugee question.[22]
It is worth emphasizing that although Sadat was well aware that the Israeli government would reject his conditions for peace, based as they were on demands that the Jewish state had already declared unacceptable, the mere fact that he professed an interest in peace at all was a major development. Rabinovich notes that the Egyptian president’s words marked “a courageous departure from Arab political rhetoric.”[23] At the Khartoum summit in 1967, the Arab states in attendance had passed the “three noes” resolution: “no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no peace with Israel”[24] Sadat’s overture, while largely symbolic, foreshadowed his later decision to defy this consensus and pursue a bilateral peace agreement with Israel. Expressing his willingness to make peace with Israel, Sadat broke with the pan-Arab ideological consensus to serve Egypt’s national interest. Thus, early on in his tenure, the Egyptian president signaled his intention to adopt a more unilateral approach to foreign policy, reflecting a realist understanding of foreign policy.
When Israel inevitably rejected Sadat’s conditions for negotiation, the Egyptian president concluded that only military action could break the diplomatic stalemate. Problematically, the Soviet Union was far from eager to launch a new offensive. Of late, the superpower had proven reluctant to provide its surrogate with the weapons it would require for a successful campaign. The Kremlin was not ready to do whatever it took to reclaim Egypt’s lost territory if it entailed risking its fragile détente with the United States. To Sadat, “[The Soviet Union’s] advocacy of military relaxation in the Middle East meant to him one thing–perpetuation of Israeli occupation of Arab land”[25]
The Soviet Union had backed an Arab invasion of Israel in 1967, and it had ended in disaster. For the time being, its leaders were content to preserve the status quo by preventing the U.S. and Israel from claiming even more of an advantage.[26] Sadat even judged it likely that if Egypt planned an attack, Soviet personnel within the country would inform the U.S. and/or Israel in order to preempt it, thereby eliminating the possibility of a surprise attack.
Following the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit, in which the leaders of both major superpowers formalized their strong advocacy of détente, Sadat concluded that the costs of an intimate relationship with the U.S.S.R. outweighed the benefits.[27] And so, in the first of a series of surprising, game-changing diplomatic decisions, Sadat expelled the Soviet personnel from Egypt, in effect announcing its intent to function as a nominally independent player in the Middle East.[28] Surprisingly, there was very little to lose from such a course of action. The Egyptian president was well aware that the Soviet Union could not afford to take serious umbrage, at the risk of driving one of its key allies right into the arms of the U.S. and shifting the regional balance of power in its rival’s favor. Sadat could continue to count on substantial military and economic aid from the Soviets with or without their presence in Egypt.
Israel’s intransigent position made it clear to Sadat that a successful show of force would be necessary to break the diplomatic stalemate and force Israel into a more accommodating position.[29] Additionally, Herzog writes that “Sadat’s internal political problems” also encouraged him to decide in favor of an attack on Israel.[30] The Six-Day War had sent the Egyptian economy into a downward spiral, and the demoralized population would only endure so much hardship before seeking an outlet for their discontent.[31] That outlet could be Sadat, or it could be Israel, depending on how the Egyptian president played his cards.
For the sake of his country and his own political survival, Sadat knew that it was both a political and a practical necessity to take decisive action. On the other hand, there was no reason to expect that a new offensive would be any more successful than the last. For different results, Sadat would need to try a different approach, one with far more limited, attainable objectives. First, he would need to find some means of neutralizing Israeli bombers long enough for Egyptian forces to penetrate into the Sinai and establish a secure position. Second, he would need to prevent Israel from finding out about the attack in advance.
To solve the first problem, Sadat turned to the U.S.S.R. With the newfound leverage the Egyptian president had gained by expelling Soviet advisors and expressing a willingness to work with the U.S., the Kremlin was far more willing to accommodate Sadat’s request for weapons. As mentioned in the first section of this paper, the SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) Sadat acquired from the Soviets were successful in neutralizing Israel’s air force long enough for Egyptian troops to make headway in the Sinai.[32]
As for keeping the upcoming attack secret, Herzog writes: “[Sadat] mounted a classic ‘misinformation’ campaign… based on a careful analysis of the preconceived ideas obtaining in Israel and expressed from time to time by Israeli military leaders”[33] To this end, Sadat had the Egyptian press publish deliberately false reports that Egypt was encountering technical difficulties with its military equipment and was vastly unprepared to launch an attack.[34] In addition, Sadat frequently made speeches announcing that “the year of decision” was at hand, encouraging Israel to believe that his threats were empty.[35] All the while, Egyptian troops frequently conducted exercises along the Suez Canal, forcing Israel to squander resources and political will on pointless mobilizations. Besides providing valuable training for Egyptian troops that would come in handy when the attack went forward, these constant false alarms persuaded Israel that Sadat was not serious about launching an attack in the near future and was only feigning belligerency for political purposes.[36]
Sadat’s campaign of misdirection paid off, rendering Israel totally unprepared for a joint Egyptian and Syrian assault on June 6th, 1973. The Arab armies’ early successes in the Yom Kippur War, while thoroughly reversed by subsequent Israeli counterattacks, were sufficient to jolt the Jewish state out of its false sense of security. If the balance of power in the Middle East was not altogether equal following Israel’s costly victory, Egypt, Syria, and by extension the Arab world, had symbolically proven itself capable of challenging Israel, restoring a measure of lost dignity that had lingered from a string of far more one-sided defeats.
Israel, meanwhile, knew that it could no longer afford to drag its feet on the matter of relinquishing the territories it had acquired in the Six-Day War; its leaders would have to consider what had previously been unthinkable: negotiating with the Arab states, in general, and Egypt, in particular, as relative equals. This, rather than absolute victory, had been what Sadat was seeking all along. In an interview with an Israeli newspaper in 1987, Sadat’s wife Jehan said: “[He] needed one more war in order to win and enter into negotiations from a position of equality.”[37] By these standards, if not by those of hardened ideologues, he was successful.
Chapter 3: The Israeli Perspective
For reasons discussed at the beginning of the prior chapter of this paper, an individual level of analysis focusing on Sadat’s motivations and reasoning is best suited to explaining Egypt’s conduct leading up to the Yom Kippur War. In the autocratic, dictatorial system in place in Egypt at that time, his actions were decisive. However, the decision-making process in Israel requires a different approach, as Israel’s leadership is one of a messy democracy where many parties and interest groups influence the direction and management of the country.
Israeli leaders such as Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan played a substantial role in guiding policy following the Six-Day War, and deserve to be held accountable for Israel’s failure to adequately prepare for another attack. However, Israel is a democracy with a parliamentary system, with governing power dispersed throughout multiple institutions and parties, all of which are subject periodically to the will of the people in the form of parliamentary elections. Given the multiplicity of internal factors involved in this decentralized decision-making process, a domestic level of analysis is more appropriate for explaining Israel’s conduct in the Yom Kippur War.
Far from simply representing the misjudgment of a few powerful government officials, the Jewish state’s lack of sufficient precautionary measures was also a product of a dangerous attitude afflicting the Israeli population as a whole, one that underestimated the military capabilities of the Arab states and placed too much faith in the capacity of the IDF to defend against any attack. Martin Van Creveld describes how, in the wake of the Six Day War, “even many secular minded people were swept along by a wave of messianic feeling.”[38]
One particularly dangerous sentiment that took hold was the notion that Israel’s victory was a triumph of will and spirit rather than superior military strategy and tactics. Although the commitment of Israel’s soldiers cannot be discounted as a valuable asset, it was only one of many factors that contributed to victory. Israel also triumphed due to its superior weaponry, disciplined military, powerful allies, and, above all, its painstaking preparations for the event of an Arab attack. Instead, Israelis viewed their victory as primarily a testament to the worthiness of their cause and the determination of their soldiers.
However, the ease of victory in the Six-Day War led to some dangerous conclusions. Instead of acting as a sober voice of reason amidst all the hyperbolic elation, Israel’s military leaders contributed to it. In a speech at Hebrew university, Yitzhak Rabin told a fawning crowd: “[Our victory] is entirely a result of the spirit. Our fighters surpassed themselves not because they have better weapons, but because they are supremely conscious of their sacred mission. They recognize the justice of our cause; they deeply love the fatherland; and they are deeply aware of their task.”[39] Rabin (later to recognize the necessity of forging a lasting peace with the Palestinians) was not alone in his appraisal.
One of the many misconceptions held by the Israeli general staff was that it could continue to rely on the same strategies that had resulted in such a resounding victory. Sachar writes that: “The Israeli general staff emerged from the Six-Day War convinced of its ability to wage future battles through the identical techniques of a skilled, well-equipped air force and armored corps.”[40] This came at the expense of focusing on such modern wartime necessities as artillery and infrared equipment, “forfeiting Israel’s much admired infantry traditions of night attack and surprise.”[41] Israel had achieved many of its victories due to its capacity to inflict devastating preemptive strikes on its enemies, and the latest conflict was no exception.
The difference, in the case of the Six-Day War, was the overwhelming role of the Israeli air force in inflicting massive damage on the Arab armies before they could so much as fire a shot. Given this unprecedented success, the Israeli general staff made the fateful determination that it need not invest as greatly in infantry and armor going forward. In addition to saving a great deal of money, an approach that relied heavily on aerial bombardments would not place as many soldiers’ lives at risk. Thus, it is clear that the relative ease by which Israel won the Six-Day War, owing in no small part to it air superiority, had the unforeseen effect of weakening its defensive position in 1973.
Israel’s military errors between 1967 and 1973 were not limited to the domains of weaponry and technology. Sachar writes that following the Six-Day War: “the virus of politicization was allowed to infect the officer corps.”[42] Owing to the constant tensions and periodic eruptions into all-out war that had been a reality since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, the military had always enjoyed a high level of popularity. Israel’s most prominent founder, David Ben Gurion, possessed no small knowledge of military matters and played an instrumental role in ensuring that the War of Independence ended in Israeli victory.
That said, until 1978 there had always existed a clear demarcation between Israel’s military and political spheres. This owed in no small part to Ben Gurion’s deliberate effort to erect barriers between military and political power. He feared, justifiably as it would turn out, that Israel’s military, by necessity an extremely powerful and active institution, could wrest undue power from the Israeli parliament. To be sure, Ben Gurion never intended to prevent military officers from ever holding political power. While serving in the military, however, they were expected to place Israel’s security interests above any future political ambitions. Therefore, it was generally frowned upon for generals to express allegiance to a particular party.[43]
Following the Six-Day War, however, the line between political and military power became increasingly blurred. Sachar explains:
Since the 1967 victory, generals had become Israel’s new heroes, and the objects increasingly of an emergent personality cult… In this fashion, the barriers to political influence that Ben-Gurion had painstakingly erected throughout his years as defense minister were allowed to collapse.”[44]
While not immediately apparent, this new development encouraged military officers to make decisions in part based on political calculation rather than what was best for Israel’s long-term security.
Even as Israel’s military became increasingly politicized, parliamentary oversight grew increasingly lax. Case in point, when Moshe Dayan, a renowned general in the Six-Day War, was named Minister of Defense in June of 1967, he did his best to exclude the government from the military. Sachar writes that: “[Dayan’s] prestige was such that the cabinet and Knesset made no attempt thereafter to control or even to understand military thought and policy.”[45]
The Israeli public was similarly unconcerned with the border situation. The economy was booming, in part from the new territories acquired from the Arabs in 1967, namely the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Faced with pressure from business interests and the public to develop these acquisitions, and without much concern for how the Arabs would respond, the Knesset granted its approval. Anyone who resisted the narrative of unbridled expansion without risk suffered the political consequences. Lesch writes: “Ebullient in its strength, any politicians who talked about a return of territory to the Arabs were vehemently attacked politically; and with elections scheduled for November, the Labor party talked more and more of annexation of the territories rather than returning them for peace”[46]
No one wanted to be perceived as expressing undue skepticism when it came to settling the lands that were until recently in Arab hands. If the combined might of the Arab armies could be vanquished in a mere six days, what was the cause for concern? As for moral justification, Israel’s enemies had committed themselves to the complete destruction of the Jewish homeland, and had set about to do just that. In the wake of their defeat, the Arab governments were if anything more bellicose in their anti-Israel rhetoric. From the Israelis’ perspective, why waste time seeking the good will of neighboring states that did not recognize your own right to exist?
With the economy booming and the Arab threat seemingly neutralized, Israel’s leaders enjoyed great popularity. Prime Minister Golda Meir’s approval rating stood at 76 percent, and Moshe Dayan “remained the nation’s single most admired figure.”[47] In light of such overwhelming public support, Israel’s leaders were reluctant to say or do anything that might cause voters to doubt their continued security and prosperity. When Syrian and Egyptian forces began massing their forces near the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal respectively, the Israeli government downplayed the risk of a future attack, lulling the populace into a false sense of security.
To be fair, this was not necessarily deliberate misdirection. Available evidence suggests that the powers that be in the Israeli intelligence and military communities genuinely believed that an Arab attack in the immediate future was highly unlikely. Herzog writes that Israeli leaders “became captives of a preconceived concept that the Egyptians would not and could not go to war until certain preconditions had been satisfied.”[48] Accordingly, in reference to the Arab states’ inability to pose a credible military challenge to Israel, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan himself stated: “[Arab] weakness… derives from factors that I don’t believe will change quickly: the low level of their soldiers in education, technology, and integrity; and inter-Arab divisiveness which is papered over from time to time but superficially and for short spans.”[49]
Technically, the picture Dayan painted was accurate; the Arab troops did indeed lack the training and sophistication necessary for a full-fledged campaign and had suffered as a result in the Six-Day War. The sight of the Arab legions scattering under the onslaught of Israel’s disciplined soldiers and air force had functioned as a supreme humiliation for the would-be conquerors. However, Dayan drew exactly the wrong conclusions from his enemies’ defeat. Even if so inclined, Arab leaders could not afford to accept such losses to their nation’s territory and prestige, especially when endured in such a humiliating fashion.[50]
The Israeli military was similarly optimistic in its appraisal: “[the] evaluation all along was that the possibility of a major Egyptian attack across the Canal existed, but it was assumed that having learned the lessons of the 1967 War, the Egyptians would not embark upon a new war until they felt capable of… neutralizing the Israeli Air Force[51]” There were some in the IDF, however, who took more seriously the prospect of a new Arab offensive. For the most part, their words of warning were met with heavy resistance.
On one occasion, however, the Israeli government heeded the call for vigilance. When Egyptian troops began massing and conducting war games on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, General David Elezar demanded a partial mobilization in spite of the conventional wisdom that Sadat was merely engaging in brinkmanship for political purposes.[52] An attack did not materialize, embarrassing those in Israeli intelligence who had favored taking precautionary measures and rendering the Israeli government even more confident that an Egyptian attack was not on the horizon.[53]
It is worth noting that mobilization is no small matter in Israel. Lesch writes: “practically the whole country mobilizes as reservists because of its small population base. The process is very disruptive to normal societal operation and quite expensive.”[54] Therefore, the Israeli government was reluctant to expend political capital on such a costly, disruptive process, especially given that it was an election year.[55] Accordingly when the Egyptians began conducting additional large-scale deployments and exercises along the Suez in October and November, Israel did not bother with a response.[56]
The U.S. and Israel interpreted Egypt’s expulsion of the Soviet advisors as a sign that its hard-line bargaining position was achieving good results.[57] Without the unqualified support of the U.S.S.R., they reasoned, Egypt would not dare launch an attack on the Jewish sate. Surely, this new development was a sign that Sadat had ruled out reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez by military means. In fact, although the Egyptian president did conceive of peace as his ultimate goal, he was by that point heavily considering a military campaign.[58]
For its part, Israel saw no need to make any new concessions. Explaining Israel’s rejection of Sadat and the international community’s terms, Rabinovich writes: “[Israel] had twice in one generation–in 1948 and 1967–been forced into wars of survival by Arab states which wished to destroy it. Israel believed it had the moral right, the strategic need, and the military strength to demand border changes”[59]
A number of factors led Israel to believe that keeping some of the acquired territories was in its national interest. First, the land in question was of undeniably high value; the Sinai Peninsula was rich in oil, East Jerusalem held significant cultural/religious importance for the Jewish people, and the Suez Canal was one of the Middle East’s key trade routes. Second, the territories also provided the geographically insubstantial Jewish State with strategic depth in the event of a future Arab invasion. More land in between Israel and its neighbors meant that it would take Arab forces that much longer to reach Jerusalem and other major cities. Allow Syria and Egypt to have their borders in striking distance of such tempting targets, and war would be inevitable.[60]
Finally, the Jewish state felt morally justified in insisting as a precondition for talks that diplomats from the Arab states agree to face-toface negotiation. Israeli leaders were not inclined to negotiate with states that did not respect its basic sovereignty and right to exist. The Arab regimes had repeatedly refused to sit at the table with Israel because doing so could be perceived as a tacit recognition of the Jewish state’s legitimacy.[61] Although willing, at times even eager, to make peace, Israel felt that the unqualified backing of the U.S., coupled with its own military superiority, afforded it the luxury of waiting for the Arab states to agree to its negotiating terms.
Regardless of whether its claims to the acquired territories were justified, Israel was unwise to adopt such an uncompromising position towards its Arab neighbors. Perhaps most critically, Israel’s political and military establishments viewed the Arab states as incapable of pursuing shrewd and self-limited objectives. They failed to consider that that balance of power politics and cold, calculated interest might move its neighbors to pursue limited objectives that had a much higher probability of success than all-out invasion. The Israelis’ messianic euphoria and hubris, byproducts of its one-sided victory in the Six-Day War, caused them to lose track of their of their inherent vulnerability as a small state dependent on the good will and support of its allies in the wider world. Barring the timely intervention of the U.S., Israeli losses would likely have been far greater, if not fatal. In short, a lack of realism and pragmatic judgment of power and interests by the Israeli leadership, aided and abetted by the attitude of the general population, led to the greatest failure since the founding of the Jewish state.
Conclusion
Over the course of long and arduous negotiations following the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli and Egyptian governments made unprecedented concessions that ostensibly defied their political and security interests. All of these risky compromises were made in pursuit of a diplomatic agreement that could very well have been violated at any moment, with disastrous consequences for one or both sides. Yet, the prospect of peace, however implausible, for enemies that had expended vast amounts of blood and treasure in inconclusive wars, trumped any lingering desires for absolute victory.
Thus, it is apparent that states adhering to a pragmatic, realist-oriented approach to foreign policy need not submit to an endless cycle of aggression on the presumption that making meaningful concessions for the sake of peace is tantamount to forsaking their national its interests. On the contrary, the Yom Kippur War and the ensuing peace between Israel and Egypt demonstrates that states can turn to reciprocity and cooperation, traditionally hallmarks of a liberal theoretic framework, to achieve mutually beneficial results, especially when a dominance approach has been thoroughly exhausted.
Utilizing individual and domestic levels of analysis for Egypt and Israel respectively, this research paper has demonstrated how both states eventually reached just such a conclusion. In looking beyond the Arab Nationalist ideology so prevalent throughout the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s, Sadat was able to conceive of a military solution to Egypt’s problems that would not have been possible otherwise. He realized that wasting lives and resources trying to wipe out Israel was counterproductive and futile. Instead, he set out to accomplish more limited objectives that would improve Egypt’s bargaining position sufficiently to make peace negotiations possible. Sadat’s Sinai campaign was a modest venture with modest goals, in which even limited success more than made up for the humiliation of Nasser’s Arab Nationalist disaster.
Egypt’s successes early on in the Sinai campaign served as a wakeup call for Israel. No longer could its leaders drag their feet when it came to addressing the grievances of the Arab states, which had now proven themselves capable of posing a legitimate existential to the Jewish State. After the heady victory of the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War brought Israelis back to reality, reminding them of the dangerous environment they lived in and persuading them of the need to make reasonable concessions even when they seemed to be bargaining from a position of power.
Many of Israel’s current enemies can learn from the Yom Kippur War. Opportunistic demagogues and out-of-touch ideologues have been going on for decades about obliterating Israel, yet the Jewish state has proven perpetually resilient. A cursory look at the condition of some of its most bitter enemies provides sufficient evidence that a hard-line approach has few benefits. Over half a century after the 1948 War of Independence, the Palestinian people still do not have a homeland, in part because their leaders refuse to recognize Israel’s right to exist and negotiate accordingly. Meanwhile, Lebanon and Syria’s periodic attacks on the Jewish homeland have done them far more harm than good. Numerous instances of ideologically driven belligerence have yielded only massive casualties, crippled infrastructure, and unnecessary economic losses.
Israelis would also do well to remember the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. The current Netanyahu government has adopted an intransigent attitude in regards to the occupied territories that recalls the ill-fated arrogance of Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan. Much like in 1973, Israel seems to be in a position where it can afford to be recalcitrant, seeing as many of its enemies including Syria are busy dealing with their own internal upheavals. However, history should serve as a reminder that security for a tiny Jewish state in a sea of hostile nations can be as temporary as its borders. With the prospect of a nuclear Iran on the horizon and new terrorist groups dedicated to its destruction forming every day, Israel would do well to pursue peace, lest it be shaken by another, far more deadly wakeup call.
Bibliography
Allen, Peter. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982).
Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. (Pearson, 2011).
Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982).
Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008).
Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004).
Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007).
Van Creveld, Martin. The Land of Blood and Honey. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010).
[1] Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. (Pearson, 2011), 13
[2] Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. (Pearson, 2011), 43
[3] Ibid., 51
[4] Ibid., 5
[5] Ibid., 52
[6] Ibid., 50
[7] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 242
[8] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 11
[9] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 3
[10] Ibbid., 3
[11] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 245
[12] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 4
[13] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 248
[14] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 749
[15] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 248
[16] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 251
[17] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 12
[18] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008).
240
[19] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 747
[20] Ibbid., 747
[21] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 12
[22] Ibbid., 11
[23] Ibbid., 13
[24] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 191
[25] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 14
[26] Ibbid., 14
[27] Ibbid., 14
[28] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 14
[29] Ibbid., 13
[30] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982), 227
[31] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 13
[32] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 749
[33] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 228
[34] Ibbid., 228
[35] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 13
[36] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004). 13
[37] Ibid., 12
[38] Van Creveld, Martin. The Land of Blood and Honey. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010), 133
[39] Ibbid., 135
[40] Sachar 745
[41] Ibbid., 745
[42] Ibbid., 746
[43] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 746
[44] Ibbid., 746
[45] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 746
[46] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 243
[47] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 741
[48] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 228
[49] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 242
[50] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 7
[51] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 227
[52] Ibbid., 228
[53] Ibbid., 228
[54] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 245
[55] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 752
[56] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 240
[57] Ibbid., 240
[58] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 14
[59] Ibbid., 12
[60] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004).12
[61] Ibbid., 11
Contemporary International Politics Professor Roy Ginsberg
War as Politics by Other Means: Israel, Egypt, And The Yom Kippur War As a Vindication of Political Realism
Introduction
Over the course of its generation-spanning history, the Arab-Israeli conflict has given rise to a myriad of historical grievances and cultural animosities that have manifested themselves in different ideologies. Zionism and pan-Arabism, while extant prior to 1948, developed new military implications in the wake of what Israelis refer to as the War of Independence and what Arabs call the “Nakhba”, or Great Disaster. In light of this bitter, emotionally charged history, it is temping to examine this most intractable of conflicts through the prism of ideology. However, it is also necessary to weigh appropriately the cold calculus of national self interest, great power politics, and other well-established theories that have influenced events in the modern era. It is these factors that are most relevant to understanding the topic of this paper, the Yom Kippur War.
While reflecting on the clash of nationalisms underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict can be useful in explaining the animosities that reside at the heart of the conflict, it can also be limiting in its assumption that the actors involved lack the capacity for rational decision making. For all of their well-publicized cultural and ideological differences, Israel and the Arab states do not differ fundamentally in their goals from all other states in the international system. It is the contention of this paper that it is useful to analyze the decisions of its participants according to the same rules and standards that one would apply to any other states or events in the international system[1].
Neoclassical realism is an ideal theoretical framework by which to analyze the Yom Kippur War. Like neorealism, it is predicated on the assumption that every state actor is governed primarily by self-interest, and that it is subject to the same uniform “rules” that apply to all other state actors. However, unlike neorealism, neoclassical liberalism allows for an in-depth exploration of the specific internal factors at play in the decision-making processes of state actors. According to this framework, all are ultimately motivated by the same underlying concerns, but societal and/or political differences can dictate how they go about pursuing their objectives.
Examining Arab-Israeli relations through the lens of realism[2], neoliberal or otherwise, is not only useful for scholars. History supports the contention that attempts to solve the security dilemma[3] at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been most successful when the mediators and participating actors have adopted a pragmatic approach. It might follow that such an approach would necessarily be a peaceful one, predicated on a mutual agreement by participating actors to refrain from military action. In an ideal world, two or more states with opposing interests could set down their arms and gather around the negotiating table to iron out the conditions for a lasting peace according to the principle of reciprocity[4] in its positive form.
However, a variety of complicating factors have the potential to make this impossible. At times, military action is the only viable way for states to break a diplomatic stalemate when the current balance of power makes negotiations impossible.[5] Granted, international norms[6] dictate that the use of force is only justifiable when all other options have been exhausted, and it is incumbent on any state considering such a drastic step to do so with clear, attainable goals in mind, rather than acting on transient political passions and/or ideological impulses. Provided that these preconditions are met, however, it is possible that decisive military action might be the only way to achieve conditions that favor a lasting peace.
In the long run, pressuring states to negotiate when they are at an impasse could serve to prolong a conflict by neglecting to address the fundamental issues that are obstructing peace. This is especially true when there exists an asymmetrical bargaining position, in which one state, operating from a position of perceived strength, refuses to make concessions that would allow another state to accept peace. In such cases, a successful military operation on the part of the disadvantaged state might serve to level the diplomatic playing field so as to foster a situation in which a mutually acceptable agreement is possible.[7]
There is perhaps no greater example of war laying the groundwork for peace than the Yom Kippur War. The years leading up to the conflict were marked by a series of ineffectual attempts at peacemaking on the part of the U.N. and the superpowers.[8] As a result of conditions stemming both directly and indirectly from the outcome of the war, Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement at the 1978 Camp David Accords. To be sure, this peace has been categorized fairly as a “cold” one, but it has also been enduring; neither state has explicitly violated the terms of the Camp David Accords since 1978. As a result, no additional wars have taken place. Given the unprecedented success of the peace between Israel and Egypt, it is useful for scholars of international relations to study the historical event that made it possible.
The Yom Kippur War proved to be a game-changer in the Middle East. Despite marking yet another Israeli victory over its Arab neighbors, the conflict nevertheless altered an asymmetrical bargaining situation in which Israel and its benefactor, the United States, held an untenable advantage over Egypt. The Jewish state’s tangible gains were greater, since it suffered relatively minor losses in comparison to its enemies and kept much of the territory it had acquired in prior wars, but Egypt’s successes early in the Sinai campaign shattered Israel’s sense of invulnerability. Chastened by setbacks early in the war, Israel accepted negotiating terms it had deemed unacceptable prior to 1973. Following over half a decade of tough diplomacy, the conditions established by the Yom Kippur War would eventually yield the 1978 Camp David Accords.
The Six-Day War had the unforeseen effect of moving Egypt’s leadership towards a more realist conception of foreign policy, one that was ultimately more conducive to serving its national interest than Nasser’s pan-Arab concerns. For Israel, on the other hand, victory gave rise to a fatal sense of overconfidence that allowed nationalism and ideology to distort its formerly sober assessment of balance of power in the region. This shift in approaches goes some way towards explaining the surprising outcome of the Yom Kippur War.
Chapter 1: The Sinai Campaign
When it comes to addressing a topic as complex and multifaceted as the Yom Kippur War, 25 pages is barely enough to scratch the surface. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on some elements of the conflict at the expense of others. This research paper is concerned first and foremost with explaining how an Egyptian campaign against Israel was the inevitable result of the diplomatic stalemate that existed between 1967 and 1973. Consequently, it will focus most heavily on the time before the conflict actually began. It would be difficult if not impossible, however, to discuss the prelude of a major historical event without first providing a basic understanding of the event itself. Thus, it is necessary to briefly summarize the Yom Kippur War before moving on to discuss the circumstances that led up to it.
On October 5th, 1973, less than a day before the start of the Yom Kippur War, 450 Israeli troops were stationed along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. On the other side stood 5 Egyptian divisions, which together consisted of “100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks, and 2,000 artillery pieces and heavy mortars.”[9] Meanwhile, Syrian forces massing in the Golan Heights outnumbered Israeli defenders 8 to 1.[10] In the face of these overwhelming odds, the Israeli government was convinced that the Arab armies were merely conducting exercises. This was not the case.
On the morning of October 6th, 1973, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and drove 15 kilometers into the Sinai Peninsula, easily penetrating the Bar-Lev line, “A huge manmade sand dune on the east bank of the canal containing strategically placed artillery and tanks that were intended to impede any cross-canal invasion long enough for the reserves to mobilize.”[11] With the majority of its military personnel at home or in synagogue for the Jewish high holiday of Yom Kippur, Israel’s meager defenses were woefully inadequate to contend with simultaneous offensives from the north and south.[12]
Faced with the options of pushing further or consolidating its gains, Egypt’s generals chose to consolidate its gains by establishing fortifications in the territory it already held. In doing so, the Egyptian army avoided “the mobile type of war at which Israel excels.”[13] Israel, eager to gain some momentum, launched a counterattack on October 8th, dispatching its air force to bombard enemy positions. However, the Egyptian forces used their state-of-the-art SAMs (surface-to-air-missiles), which Sadat had acquired from the Soviet Union, to knock the attacking planes out of the sky and force a retreat.[14]
The Egyptians’ new “missile umbrella,” in conjunction with fighter jets also furnished by the Soviet Union, effectively neutralized Israel’s formidable air advantage. Israel, overconfident and over-reliant on the capacity of its air force to repel any threat, had not invested sufficiently in other military assets. Egypt might have achieved even greater success had it not been for several factors. First, the very conditions in Israel that helped foster the Arabs’ initial gains proved to be something of a double-edged sword. In choosing the day of Yom Kippur to launch their offensive, the Arab states had correctly counted on the fact that a substantial portion of Israeli military personnel would be absent from their posts. However, because the roads were virtually empty, the IDF was able to quickly move troops and supplies to the Sinai and Golan fronts, partially compensating for the Arab armies’ element of surprise.
Second, on October 10th, in response to the continual Soviet provision of aid to the Arab states, U.S. president Richard Nixon authorized a massive airlift of supplies to Israel. This timely intervention allowed Israel to launch a decisive counterattack that would turn the tides of the conflict decisively in its favor. The airlift underscored Israel’s reliance on its powerful ally, without which it may well have lost the war.
Finally, faced with pressure from the Soviet Union, Anwar Sadat fatefully chose to launch a new offensive against Israel in an attempt to relieve the Syrians, who were currently in danger of being routed on the northern front. The Egyptian president’s decision, undertaken reluctantly at the behest of his allies, had disastrous consequences. Upon leaving the safety of its missile umbrella, the attackers faced the full fury of Israeli air bombardment. Subsequently, with Egypt’s forces hopelessly overextended, the Israelis launched a devastating counterattack, easily shattering Egypt’s undermanned defensive positions in the western Sinai.[15] Before long, Israeli troops under the command of General Ariel Sharon were advancing virtually unimpeded towards Cairo, and Egypt’s Third Army, stationed on the eastern side of the Suez Canal, was surrounded and at its enemy’s mercy.
In a panic, the Soviet Union threatened to deploy its forces to reinforce overwhelmed Egyptian and Syrian forces. If this had occurred, the U.S. would have been obligated to come to Israel’s assistance, transforming a regional conflict into a superpower war. Unwilling to risk a nuclear holocaust so that Israel could make an example of Egypt’s Third Army, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger successfully pressured Israel into accepting a second ceasefire. With that, the last war between Israel and Egypt came to an end, and both sides were left to lick their wounds and ponder its implications.
As had been the case in all other Arab-Israeli Wars up until that point, the Jewish state had emerged victorious. Unlike before, though, it was clear that Israel, previously known for maintaining constant vigilance and overwhelming would-be conquerors with lightning-quick preemptive strikes, had made a terrible error. Meanwhile, the Egyptian and Syrian forces, widely perceived before the war as lacking the requisite training and hardware to challenge Israel’s military, had successfully executed a daring, risky operation that required meticulous planning and considerable skill to pull off.
The fact that the Arab states were, in the end, soundly defeated, did not detract from the emotional and technical significance of their early achievements on the battlefield. Lesch explains that: “With intense U.S. pressure, the Israelis finally ceased fire on October 25, thus ending the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Syria and Egypt lost considerably more men and material; but Israel was bloodied, and the Arabs could claim at least a psychological victory.”[16] The perceived success of the Yom Kippur War, whatever the tactical military conclusions, gave Sadat the political latitude and credibility, at least within Egypt, to pursue what he felt was his nation’s self-interest at the expense of the wider pan-Arab world.
Chapter 2: The Egyptian Perspective
Whether motivated by political considerations, a sincerely held vision for Egypt, or, as is most likely, a combination of the two, Anwar Sadat forged a bold new path for Egypt that culminated in a lasting peace with Israel. The Yom Kippur War was a necessary step on the road to this peace, rectifying an asymmetrical bargaining situation that made peace diplomatically unfeasible for Egypt. Given that plans for a new Arab offensive originated with Sadat and his closest confidants in government and were largely kept secret from the public, an individual level analysis is an appropriate explanatory tool for assessing Egypt’s role in the Yom Kippur War.
Anwar Sadat’s success as Egypt’s president is a testament to the capacity of one man to change the diplomatic path of a state. In seeking peace with Israel in a manner that preserved Arab dignity, Sadat established a new framework for Arab-Israeli relations in which endless war was no longer the only option. To be sure, he did not do so by himself. Sadat’s signature foreign policy achievements – seeking rapprochement with the U.S., making peace with Israel, freeing Egypt from Moscow’s influence, decentralization the Egyptian economy – were in part the culmination of domestic and regional forces that had been at work since long before he came to power. Nevertheless, Sadat may not have chosen the conditions under which he entered office, but his response to these conditions was predicated on a realist approach and a set of priorities that were uniquely his own. There is a reason that Sadat, rather than Nasser, was the one to make peace with Israel.
Sadat’s personality and leadership were instrumental in the success of the Egyptian campaign early in the Yom Kippur War. Israel and much of the international community did not see Sadat as the type of leader who would commit to a risky, large-scale military offensive, especially so soon after the debacle of the Six-Day War.[17] Aside from indulging in the requisite fist pumping, as would have been expected of any Egyptian leader, Sadat provided little inkling of his willingness to re-acquire the Sinai by military means, if necessary.
Even as Israel reaped the benefits of its decisive victory over its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War, Egypt was afflicted by the loss of key national assets. This had incalculable effects in terms of national pride, economics, and internal domestic politics that were directly related to its defeat and, until addressed, were a barrier to the long-term development of the country. Egypt relied on the Sinai Peninsula for its abundant supply of oil and the Suez Canal for exporting/importing goods and collecting tolls. Without these assets, Egypt’s economy suffered greatly.[18]
Anwar Sadat did not rise to power on the basis of any grand ideological designs that would suggest ambitions to start a war against a regional power recognized for its superior military. On the contrary, Egypt’s powerbrokers had favored Sadat for the presidency largely due to their perception that he was an innocuous figure who would be easy to control. Sachar explains: “Sadat was known essentially as Nasser’s obsequious lackey, a ‘yes-man’ who filled a number of honorific roles with little color or real influence.”[19] According to this conventional wisdom, Sadat’s main assets were his lack of enemies and capacity for compromise.[20] They surmised that as a leader without any real overriding vision, he would be pliant and easily manipulated. Most simply expected Sadat to maintain the status quo until a new, more dynamic leader seized the reigns of power.[21]
In truth, however, Sadat entered office with an explicit set of foreign policy goals that were, in their own way, as ambitious as those of Nasser. First and foremost, he was eager to improve relations with the United States and, provided certain preconditions were met, Israel. Sadat saw that continued antagonism with one of the world’s major superpowers and its client state was not profitable for Egypt. Sadat announced his willingness to make peace with the Jewish state provided that Israel withdraw to its pre-1967 borders and agree to address the Palestinian refugee question.[22]
It is worth emphasizing that although Sadat was well aware that the Israeli government would reject his conditions for peace, based as they were on demands that the Jewish state had already declared unacceptable, the mere fact that he professed an interest in peace at all was a major development. Rabinovich notes that the Egyptian president’s words marked “a courageous departure from Arab political rhetoric.”[23] At the Khartoum summit in 1967, the Arab states in attendance had passed the “three noes” resolution: “no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no peace with Israel”[24] Sadat’s overture, while largely symbolic, foreshadowed his later decision to defy this consensus and pursue a bilateral peace agreement with Israel. Expressing his willingness to make peace with Israel, Sadat broke with the pan-Arab ideological consensus to serve Egypt’s national interest. Thus, early on in his tenure, the Egyptian president signaled his intention to adopt a more unilateral approach to foreign policy, reflecting a realist understanding of foreign policy.
When Israel inevitably rejected Sadat’s conditions for negotiation, the Egyptian president concluded that only military action could break the diplomatic stalemate. Problematically, the Soviet Union was far from eager to launch a new offensive. Of late, the superpower had proven reluctant to provide its surrogate with the weapons it would require for a successful campaign. The Kremlin was not ready to do whatever it took to reclaim Egypt’s lost territory if it entailed risking its fragile détente with the United States. To Sadat, “[The Soviet Union’s] advocacy of military relaxation in the Middle East meant to him one thing–perpetuation of Israeli occupation of Arab land”[25]
The Soviet Union had backed an Arab invasion of Israel in 1967, and it had ended in disaster. For the time being, its leaders were content to preserve the status quo by preventing the U.S. and Israel from claiming even more of an advantage.[26] Sadat even judged it likely that if Egypt planned an attack, Soviet personnel within the country would inform the U.S. and/or Israel in order to preempt it, thereby eliminating the possibility of a surprise attack.
Following the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit, in which the leaders of both major superpowers formalized their strong advocacy of détente, Sadat concluded that the costs of an intimate relationship with the U.S.S.R. outweighed the benefits.[27] And so, in the first of a series of surprising, game-changing diplomatic decisions, Sadat expelled the Soviet personnel from Egypt, in effect announcing its intent to function as a nominally independent player in the Middle East.[28] Surprisingly, there was very little to lose from such a course of action. The Egyptian president was well aware that the Soviet Union could not afford to take serious umbrage, at the risk of driving one of its key allies right into the arms of the U.S. and shifting the regional balance of power in its rival’s favor. Sadat could continue to count on substantial military and economic aid from the Soviets with or without their presence in Egypt.
Israel’s intransigent position made it clear to Sadat that a successful show of force would be necessary to break the diplomatic stalemate and force Israel into a more accommodating position.[29] Additionally, Herzog writes that “Sadat’s internal political problems” also encouraged him to decide in favor of an attack on Israel.[30] The Six-Day War had sent the Egyptian economy into a downward spiral, and the demoralized population would only endure so much hardship before seeking an outlet for their discontent.[31] That outlet could be Sadat, or it could be Israel, depending on how the Egyptian president played his cards.
For the sake of his country and his own political survival, Sadat knew that it was both a political and a practical necessity to take decisive action. On the other hand, there was no reason to expect that a new offensive would be any more successful than the last. For different results, Sadat would need to try a different approach, one with far more limited, attainable objectives. First, he would need to find some means of neutralizing Israeli bombers long enough for Egyptian forces to penetrate into the Sinai and establish a secure position. Second, he would need to prevent Israel from finding out about the attack in advance.
To solve the first problem, Sadat turned to the U.S.S.R. With the newfound leverage the Egyptian president had gained by expelling Soviet advisors and expressing a willingness to work with the U.S., the Kremlin was far more willing to accommodate Sadat’s request for weapons. As mentioned in the first section of this paper, the SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) Sadat acquired from the Soviets were successful in neutralizing Israel’s air force long enough for Egyptian troops to make headway in the Sinai.[32]
As for keeping the upcoming attack secret, Herzog writes: “[Sadat] mounted a classic ‘misinformation’ campaign… based on a careful analysis of the preconceived ideas obtaining in Israel and expressed from time to time by Israeli military leaders”[33] To this end, Sadat had the Egyptian press publish deliberately false reports that Egypt was encountering technical difficulties with its military equipment and was vastly unprepared to launch an attack.[34] In addition, Sadat frequently made speeches announcing that “the year of decision” was at hand, encouraging Israel to believe that his threats were empty.[35] All the while, Egyptian troops frequently conducted exercises along the Suez Canal, forcing Israel to squander resources and political will on pointless mobilizations. Besides providing valuable training for Egyptian troops that would come in handy when the attack went forward, these constant false alarms persuaded Israel that Sadat was not serious about launching an attack in the near future and was only feigning belligerency for political purposes.[36]
Sadat’s campaign of misdirection paid off, rendering Israel totally unprepared for a joint Egyptian and Syrian assault on June 6th, 1973. The Arab armies’ early successes in the Yom Kippur War, while thoroughly reversed by subsequent Israeli counterattacks, were sufficient to jolt the Jewish state out of its false sense of security. If the balance of power in the Middle East was not altogether equal following Israel’s costly victory, Egypt, Syria, and by extension the Arab world, had symbolically proven itself capable of challenging Israel, restoring a measure of lost dignity that had lingered from a string of far more one-sided defeats.
Israel, meanwhile, knew that it could no longer afford to drag its feet on the matter of relinquishing the territories it had acquired in the Six-Day War; its leaders would have to consider what had previously been unthinkable: negotiating with the Arab states, in general, and Egypt, in particular, as relative equals. This, rather than absolute victory, had been what Sadat was seeking all along. In an interview with an Israeli newspaper in 1987, Sadat’s wife Jehan said: “[He] needed one more war in order to win and enter into negotiations from a position of equality.”[37] By these standards, if not by those of hardened ideologues, he was successful.
Chapter 3: The Israeli Perspective
For reasons discussed at the beginning of the prior chapter of this paper, an individual level of analysis focusing on Sadat’s motivations and reasoning is best suited to explaining Egypt’s conduct leading up to the Yom Kippur War. In the autocratic, dictatorial system in place in Egypt at that time, his actions were decisive. However, the decision-making process in Israel requires a different approach, as Israel’s leadership is one of a messy democracy where many parties and interest groups influence the direction and management of the country.
Israeli leaders such as Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan played a substantial role in guiding policy following the Six-Day War, and deserve to be held accountable for Israel’s failure to adequately prepare for another attack. However, Israel is a democracy with a parliamentary system, with governing power dispersed throughout multiple institutions and parties, all of which are subject periodically to the will of the people in the form of parliamentary elections. Given the multiplicity of internal factors involved in this decentralized decision-making process, a domestic level of analysis is more appropriate for explaining Israel’s conduct in the Yom Kippur War.
Far from simply representing the misjudgment of a few powerful government officials, the Jewish state’s lack of sufficient precautionary measures was also a product of a dangerous attitude afflicting the Israeli population as a whole, one that underestimated the military capabilities of the Arab states and placed too much faith in the capacity of the IDF to defend against any attack. Martin Van Creveld describes how, in the wake of the Six Day War, “even many secular minded people were swept along by a wave of messianic feeling.”[38]
One particularly dangerous sentiment that took hold was the notion that Israel’s victory was a triumph of will and spirit rather than superior military strategy and tactics. Although the commitment of Israel’s soldiers cannot be discounted as a valuable asset, it was only one of many factors that contributed to victory. Israel also triumphed due to its superior weaponry, disciplined military, powerful allies, and, above all, its painstaking preparations for the event of an Arab attack. Instead, Israelis viewed their victory as primarily a testament to the worthiness of their cause and the determination of their soldiers.
However, the ease of victory in the Six-Day War led to some dangerous conclusions. Instead of acting as a sober voice of reason amidst all the hyperbolic elation, Israel’s military leaders contributed to it. In a speech at Hebrew university, Yitzhak Rabin told a fawning crowd: “[Our victory] is entirely a result of the spirit. Our fighters surpassed themselves not because they have better weapons, but because they are supremely conscious of their sacred mission. They recognize the justice of our cause; they deeply love the fatherland; and they are deeply aware of their task.”[39] Rabin (later to recognize the necessity of forging a lasting peace with the Palestinians) was not alone in his appraisal.
One of the many misconceptions held by the Israeli general staff was that it could continue to rely on the same strategies that had resulted in such a resounding victory. Sachar writes that: “The Israeli general staff emerged from the Six-Day War convinced of its ability to wage future battles through the identical techniques of a skilled, well-equipped air force and armored corps.”[40] This came at the expense of focusing on such modern wartime necessities as artillery and infrared equipment, “forfeiting Israel’s much admired infantry traditions of night attack and surprise.”[41] Israel had achieved many of its victories due to its capacity to inflict devastating preemptive strikes on its enemies, and the latest conflict was no exception.
The difference, in the case of the Six-Day War, was the overwhelming role of the Israeli air force in inflicting massive damage on the Arab armies before they could so much as fire a shot. Given this unprecedented success, the Israeli general staff made the fateful determination that it need not invest as greatly in infantry and armor going forward. In addition to saving a great deal of money, an approach that relied heavily on aerial bombardments would not place as many soldiers’ lives at risk. Thus, it is clear that the relative ease by which Israel won the Six-Day War, owing in no small part to it air superiority, had the unforeseen effect of weakening its defensive position in 1973.
Israel’s military errors between 1967 and 1973 were not limited to the domains of weaponry and technology. Sachar writes that following the Six-Day War: “the virus of politicization was allowed to infect the officer corps.”[42] Owing to the constant tensions and periodic eruptions into all-out war that had been a reality since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, the military had always enjoyed a high level of popularity. Israel’s most prominent founder, David Ben Gurion, possessed no small knowledge of military matters and played an instrumental role in ensuring that the War of Independence ended in Israeli victory.
That said, until 1978 there had always existed a clear demarcation between Israel’s military and political spheres. This owed in no small part to Ben Gurion’s deliberate effort to erect barriers between military and political power. He feared, justifiably as it would turn out, that Israel’s military, by necessity an extremely powerful and active institution, could wrest undue power from the Israeli parliament. To be sure, Ben Gurion never intended to prevent military officers from ever holding political power. While serving in the military, however, they were expected to place Israel’s security interests above any future political ambitions. Therefore, it was generally frowned upon for generals to express allegiance to a particular party.[43]
Following the Six-Day War, however, the line between political and military power became increasingly blurred. Sachar explains:
Since the 1967 victory, generals had become Israel’s new heroes, and the objects increasingly of an emergent personality cult… In this fashion, the barriers to political influence that Ben-Gurion had painstakingly erected throughout his years as defense minister were allowed to collapse.”[44]
While not immediately apparent, this new development encouraged military officers to make decisions in part based on political calculation rather than what was best for Israel’s long-term security.
Even as Israel’s military became increasingly politicized, parliamentary oversight grew increasingly lax. Case in point, when Moshe Dayan, a renowned general in the Six-Day War, was named Minister of Defense in June of 1967, he did his best to exclude the government from the military. Sachar writes that: “[Dayan’s] prestige was such that the cabinet and Knesset made no attempt thereafter to control or even to understand military thought and policy.”[45]
The Israeli public was similarly unconcerned with the border situation. The economy was booming, in part from the new territories acquired from the Arabs in 1967, namely the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Faced with pressure from business interests and the public to develop these acquisitions, and without much concern for how the Arabs would respond, the Knesset granted its approval. Anyone who resisted the narrative of unbridled expansion without risk suffered the political consequences. Lesch writes: “Ebullient in its strength, any politicians who talked about a return of territory to the Arabs were vehemently attacked politically; and with elections scheduled for November, the Labor party talked more and more of annexation of the territories rather than returning them for peace”[46]
No one wanted to be perceived as expressing undue skepticism when it came to settling the lands that were until recently in Arab hands. If the combined might of the Arab armies could be vanquished in a mere six days, what was the cause for concern? As for moral justification, Israel’s enemies had committed themselves to the complete destruction of the Jewish homeland, and had set about to do just that. In the wake of their defeat, the Arab governments were if anything more bellicose in their anti-Israel rhetoric. From the Israelis’ perspective, why waste time seeking the good will of neighboring states that did not recognize your own right to exist?
With the economy booming and the Arab threat seemingly neutralized, Israel’s leaders enjoyed great popularity. Prime Minister Golda Meir’s approval rating stood at 76 percent, and Moshe Dayan “remained the nation’s single most admired figure.”[47] In light of such overwhelming public support, Israel’s leaders were reluctant to say or do anything that might cause voters to doubt their continued security and prosperity. When Syrian and Egyptian forces began massing their forces near the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal respectively, the Israeli government downplayed the risk of a future attack, lulling the populace into a false sense of security.
To be fair, this was not necessarily deliberate misdirection. Available evidence suggests that the powers that be in the Israeli intelligence and military communities genuinely believed that an Arab attack in the immediate future was highly unlikely. Herzog writes that Israeli leaders “became captives of a preconceived concept that the Egyptians would not and could not go to war until certain preconditions had been satisfied.”[48] Accordingly, in reference to the Arab states’ inability to pose a credible military challenge to Israel, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan himself stated: “[Arab] weakness… derives from factors that I don’t believe will change quickly: the low level of their soldiers in education, technology, and integrity; and inter-Arab divisiveness which is papered over from time to time but superficially and for short spans.”[49]
Technically, the picture Dayan painted was accurate; the Arab troops did indeed lack the training and sophistication necessary for a full-fledged campaign and had suffered as a result in the Six-Day War. The sight of the Arab legions scattering under the onslaught of Israel’s disciplined soldiers and air force had functioned as a supreme humiliation for the would-be conquerors. However, Dayan drew exactly the wrong conclusions from his enemies’ defeat. Even if so inclined, Arab leaders could not afford to accept such losses to their nation’s territory and prestige, especially when endured in such a humiliating fashion.[50]
The Israeli military was similarly optimistic in its appraisal: “[the] evaluation all along was that the possibility of a major Egyptian attack across the Canal existed, but it was assumed that having learned the lessons of the 1967 War, the Egyptians would not embark upon a new war until they felt capable of… neutralizing the Israeli Air Force[51]” There were some in the IDF, however, who took more seriously the prospect of a new Arab offensive. For the most part, their words of warning were met with heavy resistance.
On one occasion, however, the Israeli government heeded the call for vigilance. When Egyptian troops began massing and conducting war games on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, General David Elezar demanded a partial mobilization in spite of the conventional wisdom that Sadat was merely engaging in brinkmanship for political purposes.[52] An attack did not materialize, embarrassing those in Israeli intelligence who had favored taking precautionary measures and rendering the Israeli government even more confident that an Egyptian attack was not on the horizon.[53]
It is worth noting that mobilization is no small matter in Israel. Lesch writes: “practically the whole country mobilizes as reservists because of its small population base. The process is very disruptive to normal societal operation and quite expensive.”[54] Therefore, the Israeli government was reluctant to expend political capital on such a costly, disruptive process, especially given that it was an election year.[55] Accordingly when the Egyptians began conducting additional large-scale deployments and exercises along the Suez in October and November, Israel did not bother with a response.[56]
The U.S. and Israel interpreted Egypt’s expulsion of the Soviet advisors as a sign that its hard-line bargaining position was achieving good results.[57] Without the unqualified support of the U.S.S.R., they reasoned, Egypt would not dare launch an attack on the Jewish sate. Surely, this new development was a sign that Sadat had ruled out reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez by military means. In fact, although the Egyptian president did conceive of peace as his ultimate goal, he was by that point heavily considering a military campaign.[58]
For its part, Israel saw no need to make any new concessions. Explaining Israel’s rejection of Sadat and the international community’s terms, Rabinovich writes: “[Israel] had twice in one generation–in 1948 and 1967–been forced into wars of survival by Arab states which wished to destroy it. Israel believed it had the moral right, the strategic need, and the military strength to demand border changes”[59]
A number of factors led Israel to believe that keeping some of the acquired territories was in its national interest. First, the land in question was of undeniably high value; the Sinai Peninsula was rich in oil, East Jerusalem held significant cultural/religious importance for the Jewish people, and the Suez Canal was one of the Middle East’s key trade routes. Second, the territories also provided the geographically insubstantial Jewish State with strategic depth in the event of a future Arab invasion. More land in between Israel and its neighbors meant that it would take Arab forces that much longer to reach Jerusalem and other major cities. Allow Syria and Egypt to have their borders in striking distance of such tempting targets, and war would be inevitable.[60]
Finally, the Jewish state felt morally justified in insisting as a precondition for talks that diplomats from the Arab states agree to face-toface negotiation. Israeli leaders were not inclined to negotiate with states that did not respect its basic sovereignty and right to exist. The Arab regimes had repeatedly refused to sit at the table with Israel because doing so could be perceived as a tacit recognition of the Jewish state’s legitimacy.[61] Although willing, at times even eager, to make peace, Israel felt that the unqualified backing of the U.S., coupled with its own military superiority, afforded it the luxury of waiting for the Arab states to agree to its negotiating terms.
Regardless of whether its claims to the acquired territories were justified, Israel was unwise to adopt such an uncompromising position towards its Arab neighbors. Perhaps most critically, Israel’s political and military establishments viewed the Arab states as incapable of pursuing shrewd and self-limited objectives. They failed to consider that that balance of power politics and cold, calculated interest might move its neighbors to pursue limited objectives that had a much higher probability of success than all-out invasion. The Israelis’ messianic euphoria and hubris, byproducts of its one-sided victory in the Six-Day War, caused them to lose track of their of their inherent vulnerability as a small state dependent on the good will and support of its allies in the wider world. Barring the timely intervention of the U.S., Israeli losses would likely have been far greater, if not fatal. In short, a lack of realism and pragmatic judgment of power and interests by the Israeli leadership, aided and abetted by the attitude of the general population, led to the greatest failure since the founding of the Jewish state.
Conclusion
Over the course of long and arduous negotiations following the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli and Egyptian governments made unprecedented concessions that ostensibly defied their political and security interests. All of these risky compromises were made in pursuit of a diplomatic agreement that could very well have been violated at any moment, with disastrous consequences for one or both sides. Yet, the prospect of peace, however implausible, for enemies that had expended vast amounts of blood and treasure in inconclusive wars, trumped any lingering desires for absolute victory.
Thus, it is apparent that states adhering to a pragmatic, realist-oriented approach to foreign policy need not submit to an endless cycle of aggression on the presumption that making meaningful concessions for the sake of peace is tantamount to forsaking their national its interests. On the contrary, the Yom Kippur War and the ensuing peace between Israel and Egypt demonstrates that states can turn to reciprocity and cooperation, traditionally hallmarks of a liberal theoretic framework, to achieve mutually beneficial results, especially when a dominance approach has been thoroughly exhausted.
Utilizing individual and domestic levels of analysis for Egypt and Israel respectively, this research paper has demonstrated how both states eventually reached just such a conclusion. In looking beyond the Arab Nationalist ideology so prevalent throughout the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s, Sadat was able to conceive of a military solution to Egypt’s problems that would not have been possible otherwise. He realized that wasting lives and resources trying to wipe out Israel was counterproductive and futile. Instead, he set out to accomplish more limited objectives that would improve Egypt’s bargaining position sufficiently to make peace negotiations possible. Sadat’s Sinai campaign was a modest venture with modest goals, in which even limited success more than made up for the humiliation of Nasser’s Arab Nationalist disaster.
Egypt’s successes early on in the Sinai campaign served as a wakeup call for Israel. No longer could its leaders drag their feet when it came to addressing the grievances of the Arab states, which had now proven themselves capable of posing a legitimate existential to the Jewish State. After the heady victory of the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War brought Israelis back to reality, reminding them of the dangerous environment they lived in and persuading them of the need to make reasonable concessions even when they seemed to be bargaining from a position of power.
Many of Israel’s current enemies can learn from the Yom Kippur War. Opportunistic demagogues and out-of-touch ideologues have been going on for decades about obliterating Israel, yet the Jewish state has proven perpetually resilient. A cursory look at the condition of some of its most bitter enemies provides sufficient evidence that a hard-line approach has few benefits. Over half a century after the 1948 War of Independence, the Palestinian people still do not have a homeland, in part because their leaders refuse to recognize Israel’s right to exist and negotiate accordingly. Meanwhile, Lebanon and Syria’s periodic attacks on the Jewish homeland have done them far more harm than good. Numerous instances of ideologically driven belligerence have yielded only massive casualties, crippled infrastructure, and unnecessary economic losses.
Israelis would also do well to remember the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. The current Netanyahu government has adopted an intransigent attitude in regards to the occupied territories that recalls the ill-fated arrogance of Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan. Much like in 1973, Israel seems to be in a position where it can afford to be recalcitrant, seeing as many of its enemies including Syria are busy dealing with their own internal upheavals. However, history should serve as a reminder that security for a tiny Jewish state in a sea of hostile nations can be as temporary as its borders. With the prospect of a nuclear Iran on the horizon and new terrorist groups dedicated to its destruction forming every day, Israel would do well to pursue peace, lest it be shaken by another, far more deadly wakeup call.
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[1] Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. (Pearson, 2011), 13
[2] Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. (Pearson, 2011), 43
[3] Ibid., 51
[4] Ibid., 5
[5] Ibid., 52
[6] Ibid., 50
[7] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 242
[8] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 11
[9] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 3
[10] Ibbid., 3
[11] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 245
[12] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 4
[13] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 248
[14] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 749
[15] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 248
[16] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 251
[17] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 12
[18] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008).
240
[19] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 747
[20] Ibbid., 747
[21] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 12
[22] Ibbid., 11
[23] Ibbid., 13
[24] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 191
[25] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 14
[26] Ibbid., 14
[27] Ibbid., 14
[28] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 14
[29] Ibbid., 13
[30] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982), 227
[31] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 13
[32] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 749
[33] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 228
[34] Ibbid., 228
[35] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 13
[36] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004). 13
[37] Ibid., 12
[38] Van Creveld, Martin. The Land of Blood and Honey. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010), 133
[39] Ibbid., 135
[40] Sachar 745
[41] Ibbid., 745
[42] Ibbid., 746
[43] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 746
[44] Ibbid., 746
[45] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 746
[46] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 243
[47] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 741
[48] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 228
[49] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 242
[50] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 7
[51] Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. (New York: Random House, 1982), 227
[52] Ibbid., 228
[53] Ibbid., 228
[54] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 245
[55] Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2007), 752
[56] Lesch, David W. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), 240
[57] Ibbid., 240
[58] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 14
[59] Ibbid., 12
[60] Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004).12
[61] Ibbid., 11