A Costly Misinterpretation: The Failure of the U.S. to Recognize the Defining Role of Nationalism in Vietnam
by Eric Shapiro - 4-28-09
On April 30, 1975, the last helicopter bearing U.S. personnel evacuated South Vietnam as the forces of the Army of North Vietnam and their Viet Cong comrades-in-arms swarmed the capital of Saigon. A shattered country lay in its wake. Since the intensification of the of the war in the 1963-65 timeframe, poison in the form or agent organge defoliant, bombs and bullets had claimed the lives of some 3 million Vietnamese. The U.S. armed forces had incurred its own loss of treasure and lives with 58,209 soldiers killed in action and 1,948 missing. Many more on both sides were left burned and limbless. With the nation now under full communist control and the conditions of the Paris Peace accord in shambles, it was clear that the U.S. had failed to accomplish its objectives.
In the years since, the Vietnam War has largely come to be recognized the signature failure of one U.S. foreign policy up until that point – the best that could be said about it was that it was a “noble”, but failed, effort. The world’s foremost superpower had lost more soldiers in prior conflicts, but never before had it so totally failed to accomplish its goals.
However, much less agreed upon is the reason for the U.S. defeat. The question of how the world’s foremost superpower could be thwarted by an impoverished, technologically primitive nation has been a subject of heated debate. Historians on the right and left have posited many theories. However, the U.S. failure in Indochina primarily stemmed from an adherence to a Cold War policy incompatible with the political and social forces at work in Vietnam, and many other developing countries for that matter. The distorting lens of the Cold War, and the trauma of domestic politics and division related to McCarthyism, the Korean war, and “Who lost China” debate caused the US administrations of both parties to lose touch with the grim reality on the ground – the Communists were more popular, more motivated, and better at fighting, and in the final analysis, they won the war. Furthermore, instead of examining Vietnam as an individual nation with its own complex history and motivations, the Johnson Administration attempted a one-size-fits all solution based on a flawed interpretation of ideas put forth in George F. Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” a document with considerable flaws to begin with.
The single biggest misconception that plagued Cold War Policy was the assumption on the part of the U.S. that every faction that identified itself as communist possessed similar or identical aims. The conflation of the Vietnamese Communists with “World Communism”, and the idea that Russia, China, and the rest of the Communist World was acting in concert blinded the US to the realities on the ground – the future would reveal the tensions of the Sino-Soviet Conflict, as well as the Vietnamese-Chinese tensions.
This belief in a vast enemy alliance was an unfortunate remnant of World War II, when the U.S. did in fact face a vast empire of evil that was very real (the Axis Powers). The tendency of the US and its leaders to view its engagement as a Manichean struggle was reinforced by the experience of the Second World War particularly given the way it ended with the tensions between the US and the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, however, the realities of communal discord in the Communist Bloc were hard for the US and its leaders to discern, and the danger of the Nuclear Age made the stakes and fears very real. However, the potential for losing track of events in the real world was vast. The factions that the U.S., in its paranoia, identified as united against it were much more of a threat to each other. Any antipathy they bore towards the West may have had less to do with Marxist ideology and a lot more to do with the fact that the nations of the West had colonized and oppressed them for centuries. Above all, the developing nations of the world, whether in Latin America or Asia, wanted nothing more than for the West to follow through on its promises and principles and grant them self-determination. The U.S. had a commitment dating back to Woodrow Wilson and the 14 Points, running through FDR and the Atlantic Charter during World War II, of being on record as supporting self-determination for the peoples of the World, and being opponents of European Colonialism. To rally support, the Viet Minh spoke not communism, but of nationalism:
[1]“The American imperialists, who had in the past helped the French colonialists to massacre our people, have now replaced the French in enslaving the southern part of our country through a disguised colonial regime.” Nationalism, not Marxism, communism or socialism, was the single biggest force at play during the Cold War and the entire 20th century and the above quote reflects that reality.
The United States has used its long-standing history and devotion to freedom and human rights as a justification and rallying cry historically for its interventions abroad, both to gain support among its own people, and to appeal to the downtrodden and oppressed abroad. In order to convince U.S. citizens (and perhaps themselves) to intervene in what they initially saw as Europe’s business, presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson painted their adversaries (the Central and Axis Powers respectively) as opposed to the principles of self-determination. President Bush has likewise sounded the Clarion Call in recent adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The United States was far-sighted and effective in doing this, as both its allies and opponents in the 20th Century had a lot to live down in the eyes of most of the developing world – including Vietnam and Asia. Germany and its allies in both conflicts were determined to extend their empires (Germany and its “Lebensraum” policy, Japan with its “East Asia Co-properity Sphere”, and Italy in Africa) in time-honored Colonial fashion across the world.
U.S. allies (and to a lesser extent the U.S. itself e.g. the Phillipnes) did not have flawless track records when it came to recognizing weaker nations rights to self-determination. Great Britain, until World War I the world’s greatest superpower, had derived its wealth from the colonies it occupied, often against the will of the locals. In fact, its economy completely depended on smaller nations, as evidenced by its decline when it was forced to give up most of its colonies after its decimation at the hands of Germany. France was not much better. The French colonial record in Algeria, the Middle East, and South East Asia is a matter of historical record and often brutal domination and economic exploitation.
When World War II ended in 1945, the small nation in Southeast Asia was free from foreign dominion for the first time in over a hundred years. From the recently seized capital of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Minh, a nationalist resistance movement that had helped expel the Japanese, declared Vietnam an independent country and himself its highly popular leader. The people of Vietnam had no reason to suspect that France, which had itself been recently occupied, would return to reclaim its former colony. France returned, instigating a conflict that would later become known as the First Indochina War, which lasted until the Geneva Accords of 1954.
It is understandable to see how countries like Vietnam got the idea that they had a natural right to govern themselves. In his speech on the 14 points, Woodrow Wilson demanded as point V: [2]“A free, open‑minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, ‑based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.” Similarly, FDR insisted that the Atlantic Charter, which stated the Allies aims in World War II, emphasize every nation’s right to self-determination. World War I and World War II themselves were both caused by rampant nationalism on the part of the major world powers.
The fact that two of the most influential and respected U.S. presidents of the 20th century explains why Ho Chi Minh quoted the U.S. declaration of independence in Vietnam’s. If the Viet Minh were motivated by communism, as U.S. government officials claim, then why not quote Karl Marx, or at the very least, a well-known revolutionary figure? This also suggests that the Viet Minh would have been open to diplomatic outreach by the U.S.
The trauma of the onset of the Cold War, including disagreements with Russia that led to the end of the Allied Coalition and the conflicts in post war Europe, as well as the explosive events in Asia both in the “loss” of China to Mao’s Communists, and the struggle of the Korean War had so warped U.S. judgments that the Administrations of Eishenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson deemphasized the long standing commitements to anti-colonialism in favor of a stark Anti-Communism.. This would lead to the U.S. contradicteing its past promises and backing France, the colonial power. Every U.S. administration (as well as most of congress) was hamstrung by a simplistic worldview that put too much faith in the importance of communism. This worldview lent itself well to a priori reasoning. Rather than taking the time to understand the history of the Third World, they relied on abstractions like the domino theory to determine foreign policy.
Walt W. Rostow, one of JFK’s national security advisors, articulated this flawed way of thinking: [3]“It is on the weakest nations… that the Communists concentrated their attention. They are the scavengers of the modernization process… They believe… projected image of Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress… Will persuade hesitant men… That [their] model… Should be adopted.”Granted, this notion of a unified communist conspiracy to take over small, vulnerable nations was based in reality. Like every powerful nation, China and Russia sought to project their power outside of their own borders. The flaw in Rostow’s argument lay in the assumption that all governments identifying as communists were working together and made natural allies. His odd choice to capitalize the word communist reflects his faith in a united communist effort.
Proponents of the above view were not wrong to oppose the spread of communism, which was indeed contrary to the interests of the U.S. and the developing nations in question. However, they were wrong to act as if communism was the only, or even the most important factor in dealing with the third world. They saw current events in Manichean terms, with Western capitalist democracies on the side of good and communists on the side of evil and naturally, fighting evil took precedence over everything else. Ironically, this close-minded approach to foreign policy may have strengthened Soviet Russia and China. At the very least, it closed many diplomatic doors, including in Vietnam.
U.S. failings in Vietnam did not begin with Lyndon Johnson. By opting to side with France in its war to retake the country, the Eisenhower administration made the U.S. look hypocritical, linking it to colonialism and thereby forever tarnishing its image in a nation strove for self-determination. As mentioned before, the Viet Minh’s initial willingness to work with the U.S. was made evident in part by its citation of the Declaration of Independence. By backing the French, the Eisenhower Administration left the Viet Minh no option but to turn to China for aid.
This was by no means inevitable. Sentiment in Vietnam was predominantly anti-Chinese and more favorable towards the U.S. After all, the latter was the ultimate success story for a people determined to overthrow their colonial oppressors. The US by the inception of the Vietnam War had a history of working with Communist Powers – Tito in Yugoslavia, and even Russia in World War II. It was a lack of vision and clarity, and most importantly, realism, in US policy that would lead to disaster and defeat. And, Vietnam and China would fight a major war in the post-Vietnam War era, which was proof of the antagonisms between Vietnam and China, an enmity stretching back many years. The U.S. could have formed an alliance with Vietnamese communists to undermine Chinese influence in the region. The resulting gratitude on the part of Vietnam’s people would have indebted the new government to the U.S. and made an alliance with China extremely unlikely. Perhaps the people could have even been persuaded to adopt elements of capitalism and/or eventually choose a government more in keeping with American values.
By imprudently turning the Viet Minh into enemies, the U.S. lost its single best chance of stabilizing the nation, instead accomplishing the opposite creating two opposing factions by propping up a government that the majority of the people despised. The one thing Ngo Dinh Diem had going for him was that he was not affiliated with the French. He was a corrupt, incompetent and brutal leader whose failings naturally reflected badly on the nation that supported him.
Yet again, the U.S. neglected to weigh local factors in its decisions, operating on a priori principles; that communists are bad and non-communists are automatically better. In fact, the opposite was true. Diem was a Christian (the majority of the country was Buddhist) member of the elite with no government experience who had spent the past several years in New Jersey. The people knew little about him and naturally had doubts about his nationalism. Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, was a patriot and a nationalist, revered for repelling the French and the Japanese.
These were not only academic differences. In their fight against the colonialists and invaders, the Viet Minh had formed a well-organized, effective movement. More importantly, they had won over the hearts and minds of many Vietnamese citizens, while Diem and his administration were perceived as permanent outsiders and tools of the foreign power. It is no wonder that the former had a devoted following in the North and South, while the latter received tepid support at best. Communism does not factor into the equation. Most of the population was poorly educated and did not understand the relative merits of the Cold War ideological disputes – the nationalist sentiments dominated. In the words of Doan Van Hoc, a 45-year-old farmer and a supporter of the Viet Minh:
[4]“They [the Viet Minh] seized the rice and shared it out among the neediest… I didn’t really know what the Vietminh was.” The average Vietnamese citizen was motivated by the need to feed his or her family, not some abstract ideological struggle between world powers. Lyndon Johnson did not see things that way. According to him, Vietnam was not a jungle war, but a “struggle for freedom.” In reality, the leader he supported was for anything but freedom (Diem and his U.S. backers in the C.I.A. famously refused to hold an election because they knew the communists would win).
The notion that the technologically inferior guerilla fighters of the NLF miraculously triumphed over the most powerful nation in the world is not as incredible as one might think. From a military standpoint, the U.S. was “winning” the war. That said, given that the entire enterprise was predicated on a fraud (the Gulf of Tonkin incident) and sustained by abstract principles that only resonated with Americans superficially, there is retrospect no way they would have been willing to sacrifice their wages and their children to achieve a lasting victory (if victory was possible at all). The Tet offensive is remembered as a disaster for the U.S. and its South Vietnamese allies. Objectively though, they came out on top. The NLF sustained heavy, potentially crippling losses, while the South Vietnamese and U.S. forces escaped relatively unscathed. Nevertheless, the Tet offensive caused U.S. citizens to question the constant barrage of good news that the government was throwing at them. At the urging of the independent U.S. press, began to consider whether the sacrifices the war demanded on their part were worth it and how much it would take to win.
This sudden shift in public opinion in regards to the Vietnam War called attention to the shaky reasoning the U.S. government used to justify its involvement. It was only a matter of time before citizens ran out of patience in the absence of any compelling reason to keep fighting. The NLF had all the time in the world; they had fought for independence against the French and the Japanese for many years, and, with nationalism to sustain them, they would keep fighting. Bottom line – these were a ruthless, ideologically committed, and battletested vanguard that would take the long view and do whatever it took to win in the end. Americans, on the other had, with many other interests and concerns in that period, including Europe, the Middle East, and China, would not keep pouring blood and treasure without a conclusive victory in a short time. In the final analysis, Vietnam and what happened there – even a Communist Victory, was a sideshow and not decisive. The US lost the battle, the Vietnam War, but won the Cold War in the long term anyway. This is proof that the US could have avoided this disaster with a more realistic policy, and saved our country and the people of Vietnam a lot of grief. The whole conflict was an avoidable tragedy.
The U.S. displayed a willful ignorance in all of its decisions pertaining to Vietnam. Author stephen Vizinczey aptly described the conflict as [5]“the ghastliest manifestation of what I’d call imperial provincialism, which afflicts America’s whole culture-aware only of its own history, insensible to everything which isn’t part of the local atmosphere.” Secure in its own statehood, the U.S. forgot the very principle of self-determination that had led to its existence. From the shelter of the oval office, its presidents relegated a nation with a complex history defined by nationalist struggle to a domino, choosing abstract theory above educated decision making. In reality, the only thing “contained” in Vietnam was the people’s wish to control their own destiny. The US would be well-advised to keep these lessons in mind as it pursues its goals today.
Bibliography
Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi), no. 23 (1970), 247-54
Chailand, Peasants of North Vietnam, 141-143
Stephan Vizinczey, 1968
Walt W. Rostow, “Guerilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas, 7 August 1961
Woodrow Wilson, Speech on the 14 Points
[1] Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi), no. 23 (1970), 247-54
[2] Woodrow Wilson, Speech on the 14 Points
[3] Rostow, “Guerilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas, 7 August 1961
[4] Chailand, Peasants of North Vietnam, 141-143
[5] Stephan Vizinczey, 1968
In the years since, the Vietnam War has largely come to be recognized the signature failure of one U.S. foreign policy up until that point – the best that could be said about it was that it was a “noble”, but failed, effort. The world’s foremost superpower had lost more soldiers in prior conflicts, but never before had it so totally failed to accomplish its goals.
However, much less agreed upon is the reason for the U.S. defeat. The question of how the world’s foremost superpower could be thwarted by an impoverished, technologically primitive nation has been a subject of heated debate. Historians on the right and left have posited many theories. However, the U.S. failure in Indochina primarily stemmed from an adherence to a Cold War policy incompatible with the political and social forces at work in Vietnam, and many other developing countries for that matter. The distorting lens of the Cold War, and the trauma of domestic politics and division related to McCarthyism, the Korean war, and “Who lost China” debate caused the US administrations of both parties to lose touch with the grim reality on the ground – the Communists were more popular, more motivated, and better at fighting, and in the final analysis, they won the war. Furthermore, instead of examining Vietnam as an individual nation with its own complex history and motivations, the Johnson Administration attempted a one-size-fits all solution based on a flawed interpretation of ideas put forth in George F. Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” a document with considerable flaws to begin with.
The single biggest misconception that plagued Cold War Policy was the assumption on the part of the U.S. that every faction that identified itself as communist possessed similar or identical aims. The conflation of the Vietnamese Communists with “World Communism”, and the idea that Russia, China, and the rest of the Communist World was acting in concert blinded the US to the realities on the ground – the future would reveal the tensions of the Sino-Soviet Conflict, as well as the Vietnamese-Chinese tensions.
This belief in a vast enemy alliance was an unfortunate remnant of World War II, when the U.S. did in fact face a vast empire of evil that was very real (the Axis Powers). The tendency of the US and its leaders to view its engagement as a Manichean struggle was reinforced by the experience of the Second World War particularly given the way it ended with the tensions between the US and the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, however, the realities of communal discord in the Communist Bloc were hard for the US and its leaders to discern, and the danger of the Nuclear Age made the stakes and fears very real. However, the potential for losing track of events in the real world was vast. The factions that the U.S., in its paranoia, identified as united against it were much more of a threat to each other. Any antipathy they bore towards the West may have had less to do with Marxist ideology and a lot more to do with the fact that the nations of the West had colonized and oppressed them for centuries. Above all, the developing nations of the world, whether in Latin America or Asia, wanted nothing more than for the West to follow through on its promises and principles and grant them self-determination. The U.S. had a commitment dating back to Woodrow Wilson and the 14 Points, running through FDR and the Atlantic Charter during World War II, of being on record as supporting self-determination for the peoples of the World, and being opponents of European Colonialism. To rally support, the Viet Minh spoke not communism, but of nationalism:
[1]“The American imperialists, who had in the past helped the French colonialists to massacre our people, have now replaced the French in enslaving the southern part of our country through a disguised colonial regime.” Nationalism, not Marxism, communism or socialism, was the single biggest force at play during the Cold War and the entire 20th century and the above quote reflects that reality.
The United States has used its long-standing history and devotion to freedom and human rights as a justification and rallying cry historically for its interventions abroad, both to gain support among its own people, and to appeal to the downtrodden and oppressed abroad. In order to convince U.S. citizens (and perhaps themselves) to intervene in what they initially saw as Europe’s business, presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson painted their adversaries (the Central and Axis Powers respectively) as opposed to the principles of self-determination. President Bush has likewise sounded the Clarion Call in recent adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The United States was far-sighted and effective in doing this, as both its allies and opponents in the 20th Century had a lot to live down in the eyes of most of the developing world – including Vietnam and Asia. Germany and its allies in both conflicts were determined to extend their empires (Germany and its “Lebensraum” policy, Japan with its “East Asia Co-properity Sphere”, and Italy in Africa) in time-honored Colonial fashion across the world.
U.S. allies (and to a lesser extent the U.S. itself e.g. the Phillipnes) did not have flawless track records when it came to recognizing weaker nations rights to self-determination. Great Britain, until World War I the world’s greatest superpower, had derived its wealth from the colonies it occupied, often against the will of the locals. In fact, its economy completely depended on smaller nations, as evidenced by its decline when it was forced to give up most of its colonies after its decimation at the hands of Germany. France was not much better. The French colonial record in Algeria, the Middle East, and South East Asia is a matter of historical record and often brutal domination and economic exploitation.
When World War II ended in 1945, the small nation in Southeast Asia was free from foreign dominion for the first time in over a hundred years. From the recently seized capital of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Minh, a nationalist resistance movement that had helped expel the Japanese, declared Vietnam an independent country and himself its highly popular leader. The people of Vietnam had no reason to suspect that France, which had itself been recently occupied, would return to reclaim its former colony. France returned, instigating a conflict that would later become known as the First Indochina War, which lasted until the Geneva Accords of 1954.
It is understandable to see how countries like Vietnam got the idea that they had a natural right to govern themselves. In his speech on the 14 points, Woodrow Wilson demanded as point V: [2]“A free, open‑minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, ‑based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.” Similarly, FDR insisted that the Atlantic Charter, which stated the Allies aims in World War II, emphasize every nation’s right to self-determination. World War I and World War II themselves were both caused by rampant nationalism on the part of the major world powers.
The fact that two of the most influential and respected U.S. presidents of the 20th century explains why Ho Chi Minh quoted the U.S. declaration of independence in Vietnam’s. If the Viet Minh were motivated by communism, as U.S. government officials claim, then why not quote Karl Marx, or at the very least, a well-known revolutionary figure? This also suggests that the Viet Minh would have been open to diplomatic outreach by the U.S.
The trauma of the onset of the Cold War, including disagreements with Russia that led to the end of the Allied Coalition and the conflicts in post war Europe, as well as the explosive events in Asia both in the “loss” of China to Mao’s Communists, and the struggle of the Korean War had so warped U.S. judgments that the Administrations of Eishenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson deemphasized the long standing commitements to anti-colonialism in favor of a stark Anti-Communism.. This would lead to the U.S. contradicteing its past promises and backing France, the colonial power. Every U.S. administration (as well as most of congress) was hamstrung by a simplistic worldview that put too much faith in the importance of communism. This worldview lent itself well to a priori reasoning. Rather than taking the time to understand the history of the Third World, they relied on abstractions like the domino theory to determine foreign policy.
Walt W. Rostow, one of JFK’s national security advisors, articulated this flawed way of thinking: [3]“It is on the weakest nations… that the Communists concentrated their attention. They are the scavengers of the modernization process… They believe… projected image of Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress… Will persuade hesitant men… That [their] model… Should be adopted.”Granted, this notion of a unified communist conspiracy to take over small, vulnerable nations was based in reality. Like every powerful nation, China and Russia sought to project their power outside of their own borders. The flaw in Rostow’s argument lay in the assumption that all governments identifying as communists were working together and made natural allies. His odd choice to capitalize the word communist reflects his faith in a united communist effort.
Proponents of the above view were not wrong to oppose the spread of communism, which was indeed contrary to the interests of the U.S. and the developing nations in question. However, they were wrong to act as if communism was the only, or even the most important factor in dealing with the third world. They saw current events in Manichean terms, with Western capitalist democracies on the side of good and communists on the side of evil and naturally, fighting evil took precedence over everything else. Ironically, this close-minded approach to foreign policy may have strengthened Soviet Russia and China. At the very least, it closed many diplomatic doors, including in Vietnam.
U.S. failings in Vietnam did not begin with Lyndon Johnson. By opting to side with France in its war to retake the country, the Eisenhower administration made the U.S. look hypocritical, linking it to colonialism and thereby forever tarnishing its image in a nation strove for self-determination. As mentioned before, the Viet Minh’s initial willingness to work with the U.S. was made evident in part by its citation of the Declaration of Independence. By backing the French, the Eisenhower Administration left the Viet Minh no option but to turn to China for aid.
This was by no means inevitable. Sentiment in Vietnam was predominantly anti-Chinese and more favorable towards the U.S. After all, the latter was the ultimate success story for a people determined to overthrow their colonial oppressors. The US by the inception of the Vietnam War had a history of working with Communist Powers – Tito in Yugoslavia, and even Russia in World War II. It was a lack of vision and clarity, and most importantly, realism, in US policy that would lead to disaster and defeat. And, Vietnam and China would fight a major war in the post-Vietnam War era, which was proof of the antagonisms between Vietnam and China, an enmity stretching back many years. The U.S. could have formed an alliance with Vietnamese communists to undermine Chinese influence in the region. The resulting gratitude on the part of Vietnam’s people would have indebted the new government to the U.S. and made an alliance with China extremely unlikely. Perhaps the people could have even been persuaded to adopt elements of capitalism and/or eventually choose a government more in keeping with American values.
By imprudently turning the Viet Minh into enemies, the U.S. lost its single best chance of stabilizing the nation, instead accomplishing the opposite creating two opposing factions by propping up a government that the majority of the people despised. The one thing Ngo Dinh Diem had going for him was that he was not affiliated with the French. He was a corrupt, incompetent and brutal leader whose failings naturally reflected badly on the nation that supported him.
Yet again, the U.S. neglected to weigh local factors in its decisions, operating on a priori principles; that communists are bad and non-communists are automatically better. In fact, the opposite was true. Diem was a Christian (the majority of the country was Buddhist) member of the elite with no government experience who had spent the past several years in New Jersey. The people knew little about him and naturally had doubts about his nationalism. Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, was a patriot and a nationalist, revered for repelling the French and the Japanese.
These were not only academic differences. In their fight against the colonialists and invaders, the Viet Minh had formed a well-organized, effective movement. More importantly, they had won over the hearts and minds of many Vietnamese citizens, while Diem and his administration were perceived as permanent outsiders and tools of the foreign power. It is no wonder that the former had a devoted following in the North and South, while the latter received tepid support at best. Communism does not factor into the equation. Most of the population was poorly educated and did not understand the relative merits of the Cold War ideological disputes – the nationalist sentiments dominated. In the words of Doan Van Hoc, a 45-year-old farmer and a supporter of the Viet Minh:
[4]“They [the Viet Minh] seized the rice and shared it out among the neediest… I didn’t really know what the Vietminh was.” The average Vietnamese citizen was motivated by the need to feed his or her family, not some abstract ideological struggle between world powers. Lyndon Johnson did not see things that way. According to him, Vietnam was not a jungle war, but a “struggle for freedom.” In reality, the leader he supported was for anything but freedom (Diem and his U.S. backers in the C.I.A. famously refused to hold an election because they knew the communists would win).
The notion that the technologically inferior guerilla fighters of the NLF miraculously triumphed over the most powerful nation in the world is not as incredible as one might think. From a military standpoint, the U.S. was “winning” the war. That said, given that the entire enterprise was predicated on a fraud (the Gulf of Tonkin incident) and sustained by abstract principles that only resonated with Americans superficially, there is retrospect no way they would have been willing to sacrifice their wages and their children to achieve a lasting victory (if victory was possible at all). The Tet offensive is remembered as a disaster for the U.S. and its South Vietnamese allies. Objectively though, they came out on top. The NLF sustained heavy, potentially crippling losses, while the South Vietnamese and U.S. forces escaped relatively unscathed. Nevertheless, the Tet offensive caused U.S. citizens to question the constant barrage of good news that the government was throwing at them. At the urging of the independent U.S. press, began to consider whether the sacrifices the war demanded on their part were worth it and how much it would take to win.
This sudden shift in public opinion in regards to the Vietnam War called attention to the shaky reasoning the U.S. government used to justify its involvement. It was only a matter of time before citizens ran out of patience in the absence of any compelling reason to keep fighting. The NLF had all the time in the world; they had fought for independence against the French and the Japanese for many years, and, with nationalism to sustain them, they would keep fighting. Bottom line – these were a ruthless, ideologically committed, and battletested vanguard that would take the long view and do whatever it took to win in the end. Americans, on the other had, with many other interests and concerns in that period, including Europe, the Middle East, and China, would not keep pouring blood and treasure without a conclusive victory in a short time. In the final analysis, Vietnam and what happened there – even a Communist Victory, was a sideshow and not decisive. The US lost the battle, the Vietnam War, but won the Cold War in the long term anyway. This is proof that the US could have avoided this disaster with a more realistic policy, and saved our country and the people of Vietnam a lot of grief. The whole conflict was an avoidable tragedy.
The U.S. displayed a willful ignorance in all of its decisions pertaining to Vietnam. Author stephen Vizinczey aptly described the conflict as [5]“the ghastliest manifestation of what I’d call imperial provincialism, which afflicts America’s whole culture-aware only of its own history, insensible to everything which isn’t part of the local atmosphere.” Secure in its own statehood, the U.S. forgot the very principle of self-determination that had led to its existence. From the shelter of the oval office, its presidents relegated a nation with a complex history defined by nationalist struggle to a domino, choosing abstract theory above educated decision making. In reality, the only thing “contained” in Vietnam was the people’s wish to control their own destiny. The US would be well-advised to keep these lessons in mind as it pursues its goals today.
Bibliography
Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi), no. 23 (1970), 247-54
Chailand, Peasants of North Vietnam, 141-143
Stephan Vizinczey, 1968
Walt W. Rostow, “Guerilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas, 7 August 1961
Woodrow Wilson, Speech on the 14 Points
[1] Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi), no. 23 (1970), 247-54
[2] Woodrow Wilson, Speech on the 14 Points
[3] Rostow, “Guerilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas, 7 August 1961
[4] Chailand, Peasants of North Vietnam, 141-143
[5] Stephan Vizinczey, 1968