Politics in the Middle East: Mid-Term Exam Draft
October 2010
By Eric Shapiro
I. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Colonial Middle East
For better and for worse, the Middle East has remained at the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda for over half a century. This is in part for practical reasons of self-interest; the region is home to large oil deposits that serve as an important source of energy in the U.S. In addition, centuries of European colonialism prior to World War II created massive instability in the region. Rogue states, such as Iran and until recently Iraq, pose a major danger to U.S. interests.
Non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas also threaten the well being of the U.S. and its allies in the region. Ostensibly to combat these threats, the U.S. has maintained military bases throughout the Middle East and, from time to time, dispatched its military to quell conflicts or assert its interests. It has also maintained a network of alliances with sympathetic states, especially Israel.
However, the U.S. interest in the Middle East is not purely practical; ideology also plays a significant, if not greater role. Take, for instance, U.S. support of Israel. The U.S. arguably loses more than it gains in its support of a state widely condemned by not only the Arab World, but also Europe and the United Nations. Support of Israel has inflamed anti-U.S. sentiment and arguably resulted in a backlash that culminated with 9/11. [Other examples] Nevertheless, the U.S. has constantly maintained strong diplomatic ties with Israel due to common values rooted in Western democracy and capitalism. Despite many questionable policies towards its Palestinian population (for instance, the Israeli parliament just passed legislation requiring all non-Jewish immigrants to recite a loyalty oath), Israel remains committed to the tenets of democracy to a greater or lesser extent, especially in comparison to other states in the region.
In addition, certain notions have taken hold in the U.S. that render intervention in the region an ideological necessity. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. became obsessed with containing the spread of communism. The Middle East, stricken by poverty and controlled by unstable totalitarian governments, seemed an ideal place for a proletarian revolution that would result in increased Soviet influence, not to mention access to oil. Maintaining strong ties with friendly or somewhat friendly states in the Middle East, particularly with the staunchly capitalist Israel, seemed an ideal way to fight Soviet interests.
To some extent, U.S. fears of USSR encroachments were valid; The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, although unforgiving conditions and strong resistance prevented success. Soviets had purported interests in preventing the downfall of a "fraternal" Communist State; giving it leverage in the Middle East, and setting a coercive example for its own far-flung Islamic Soviet Republics.. However, even after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the U.S. continued to play a major role in Middle-Eastern affairs. Again, this was for both practical and ideological reasons. In many instances, the U.S. intervened to maintain a favorable balance of power in the region. When Iraq threatened Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the U.S. intervened on behalf of the former to prevent Saddam Hussein’s genocidal regime from gaining too much power. George Bush, Sr. dispatched troops to prevent Saddam Hussein from seizing Kuwait.
Following the turn of the century, interventions that were at least partially undertaken to further U.S. interests began to take on ideological undertones. The neo-conservative movement, begun by former liberals who shifted right in response to the excesses of communism, had been around for a while and no doubt played a role in shaping U.S. policy in the Middle East decades before the start of 21st century. However, the election of George W. Bush in 2000 provided them with an administration particularly open to their ideas.
When hijackers, mostly from Saudi Arabia, crashed airplanes into the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001, killing nearly 3,000 Americans, a wave of belligerent patriotic fervor swept across the nation. At the urging of the president, Congress unanimously voted to invade Afghanistan to capture or kill those who planned the devastating terrorist attacks. U.S. troops met fierce resistance from the Taliban, a local group of Islamic extremists that rule most of Afghanistan, as well as Al-Qaeda, the Islamist organization responsible for planning 9/11.
Meanwhile, at the urging of his neo-conservative advisors, the Bush administration began to build a case for invading Iraq. The President, perhaps eager to finish the work his father started with the Gulf War (namely deposing Saddam Hussein) and gain access to Iraqi oil, capitalized on the patriotic mood in America and gained support for the invasion. When the administration was unable to come up with any solid evidence that Saddam Hussein had anything to do with 9/11, he based his argument on the pretext that the dictator was building weapons of mass destruction that could potentially fall into terrorist hands.
Although the aforementioned factors (national security, personal vendettas and oil) likely played a role in the decision to invade Iraq, it was oft-overlooked neo-conservative ideology pervading the Bush Administration that provided the main motivation. Neo-conservatism is quite complicated, but in simplistic terms it calls for the spread of democracy through a sort of “domino effect.” Turn one state in a totalitarian region into a democracy, and the other states, impressed by the economic liberalization and greater freedoms of the transformed state will follow suit. 9/11 presented neo-conservatives in the Bush administration with the perfect opportunity to try out democracy building. With Saddam Hussein out of power and a fragile democratic government in some semblance of control, it remains to be seen whether sectarian differences will triumph over the natural tendency towards freedom that neo-conservatism holds as universal.
The ideological factors that shape U.S. policy in the Middle East don’t only come from inside the U.S. On the contrary, the ever-changing ideological views amongst Middle Eastern regimes and non-state actors have just as much of an impact. For much of the 20th century, Arab nationalism constituted the dominant ideology in the region. Arab nationalism is the belief that all Arab states are bound together by shared roots, common religion and a unique Arabic culture, and that the universal “Arab nation” is entitled to self-determination and freedom from Western interference.
Arab nationalism arose partially in response to centuries of European colonialism in the Middle East. Domination by foreign powers, especially Great Britain, solidified a sense of nationhood among the disenfranchised Arab tribes. It is important to note that although the West played a substantial role in igniting Arab nationalism in the mid-20th century, there was a sense of solidarity in the Middle East long before the colonial period. Although Turkish and not Arab, the Ottoman Empire unified the Arab tribes to an extent, as did a common belief in Islam (although minor differences in Islamic belief also resulted in many bloody wars).
Regardless of its origins, Arab nationalism presents an ongoing challenge to U.S. foreign policy (although this is not to say it always or even often poses a security threat). In some cases, the U.S. maintained friendly relations with Arab nationalist states such as Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. However, in some cases Arab nationalists expressed open hostility to the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Although it was the European powers that colonized the region in the 20th century, many Arabs viewed the U.S. as merely the latest manifestation of Western imperialism. Sometimes, Arab nationalist anger resulted in terrorist attacks against U.S. civilians and military bases in the region.
However, more often than not, Arab nationalist organizations directed their hostility towards a more accessible target: Israel. Despite its status as an independent Jewish state following the 1948 War of Independence – or “Great Disaster” (nakba), if you ask a Palestinian – many Arabs saw Israel as a U.S. proxy occupying land that rightly belongs to Arabs. Much of this Arab hostility stemmed from the Palestinian refugee situation.
Arab nationalist movements made significant gains over the course of the 20th century. The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), headed by Yasser Arafat, legitimized the Palestinian cause by providing the people with an assertive, coherent voice that earned the respect of the international community. Arafat endorsed and arguably helped plan many deadly terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, but he was also willing to use diplomacy as a tool to gain support for the Palestinian cause. Gamal Abdel Nasser (in power from 1956-70) presided over a strong, independent Egypt that posed a major challenge to Israel before the two states made peace. Saddam Hussein, for all his genocidal tendencies, used Iraqi rent (oil money not balanced by overhead) to build a powerful and aggressive state that, for a time, represented the success of Arab nationalism.
In order to maintain stability in the Middle East, the U.S. has allied itself with numerous Arab regimes. This has given us access to oil in the Middle East, but also had the unintended consequence of not only inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment, but also turning citizens against governments they see as being puppets of the U.S. One famous example of an alliance gone spectacularly wrong occurred when Iranian revolutionaries, enraged at American support of the unpopular Shah, kidnapped 52 U.S. citizens from the local embassy and held them hostage for over a year. This incident, known as the Iranian hostage crisis, played a major role in bringing about the end of the Carter administration.
Despite these successes, Arab nationalism would give way to a new ideology that would come to dominate the Middle East. Two major factors contributed to this transition. To begin with, Arab nationalist regimes frequently resorted to brutal, murderous tactics in order to maintain totalitarian control. In addition, although they claimed to represent their people, Arab nationalist regimes tended to keep wealth concentrated with an elite few, who held disproportionate power over everyone else. Even as the wealth and influence of many Arab states continued to grow, the common people saw few to no benefits.
Meanwhile, Western values began to take root in Arab states as a natural by-product of globalization. Ironically, economic changes initiated by regimes purporting to represent Arab nationalism served to dilute traditional Arab culture. Particularly disturbing to some was rampant secularization. Some Arabs, most of them from the middle to upper classes, devised a new ideology of Islamic fanaticism that was both absolutist and aggressive in its interpretation of the Quran. The rise of radical Islam radically altered the political landscape of the Middle East and continues to influence U.S. foreign policy in the region.
In summary, the challenges to U.S. foreign policy presented by Arab nationalism and radical Islam are in large part a consequence of European (especially British) colonial influences in the Middle East. The former arose out of a sense of indignation at being ruled by foreign powers. Although Arab nationalist regimes did much to build up Arab states, their introduction of Western values and attempts to modernize their economies without granting democratic rights to citizens caused a backlash in the form of radical Islam.
Presented with the threat posed by these ideologies, the U.S. responded with a foreign policy that has fluctuated between pragmatic and ideological, with the latter often taking precedence. Periodic interventions in Middle Eastern affairs, combined with support for Israel, have accomplished short-term U.S. foreign policy goals. However, they have also resulted in blowback, inflaming Arab sentiment against the West in general and the U.S. in particular.
II. Colonialism in the Middle East and The Israeli=Palestinian Conflict
The current instability in the Middle East is in many ways a result of European colonialism that did not cease until after the Second World War, when France, Great Britain and others did not have the economic means or popular support to maintain a presence in the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in part a result of British colonial policy. However, the conflict has since taken on a life of its own. Palestinians and Israelis have been at each other’s throats over a variety of issues from contested territory to violent actions undertaken by both sides.
Israelis and Palestinians both have legitimate historical claims to the land that now constitutes the state of Israel. The Jews inhabited the land until they were expelled by the Romans following the destruction of the First Temple in the 8th-6th centuries BCE. However, following centuries of persecution in Europe, a Zionist organization emerged whose goal was to return the Jews to Israel (although only a small number of Jews were Zionists). There have always been Jews in Israel, but the Zionist-organized immigration reached its peak following the Holocaust, in which over 6 million Jews were murdered by the Nazis in death camps.
The Jewish settlers, many of whom were left=leaning socialists, developed land purchased from local Arab elites by wealthy European Zionists. This brought them into conflict with the Palestinians, the Arab population consisting mostly of farmers that occupied the British mandate of Palestine. The Palestinians, having inhabited the land since the 1800s, did not at first come into conflict with the Jewish settlers. However, as the Jews immigrated in larger numbers and occupied more land, tensions began to arise between the two groups.
Both people also have a legal claim to Israel/Palestine. Attempting to gain support in the Middle East against their opponents during World War I, Great Britain sought out both Jewish and Palestinian support. British foreign secretary Arthur J. Balfour issued the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917, which “’viewed with favor’ the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” (Bickerton 39). However, in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the British high commissioner in Egypt courted Sherif Hussein of Mecca, an Arab leader with perhaps “the greatest prestige and potential power,” in an attempt to organize an Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire. In the letters exchanged between the two, McMahon claimed to support the establishment of independent Arab control over lands that included Palestine. By promising both the Jews and the Palestinians dominion over what was then known as Palestine, the British helped spark a conflict that would result in massive losses on both sides and present a major challenge to U.S. foreign policy in the future.
Despite the initial role of Great Britain in laying the foundation for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both groups deserve responsibility for prolonging and exacerbating it. In the 1948 War of Independence (or “Great Disaster,” as Palestinians call it), armies from the neighboring Arab states, with the help of some Palestinians, attempted to drive Israel out. Over the course of the war, which the Jews would win with some help from the U.S., many Palestinians were displaced from their homes. Some were kicked out by Jewish troops and others fled at the request of the Arab armies. At any rate, this resulted in a massive refugee problem in the aftermath of the war. The surrounding Arab states refused to take in the refugees, and the state of Israel continues to deny many of them the right of return. This has been a major cause of hostility between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Subsequent conflicts exacerbated tensions between the two groups. Oftentimes, these conflicts were between Israel and Arab states that claimed as one of their objectives the restoration of sovereignty to the Palestinians over Israel. The Six Day War, with Israel on one side and the neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria on the other, resulted in the former gaining territories occupied by Palestinians: The West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The aforementioned Arab states deserve some blame for continuing the conflict, as they repeatedly provoked Israeli and discouraged Palestinians from negotiating based on the false promise that they could take back Palestine by military force. Regardless, Palestinians, with the support of the international community, have demanded the return of the contested territories. However, Israeli settlers who built settlements on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank refuse to leave what they have come to consider their homes.
Violence on both sides has served to fuel the fires of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli military has staged operations that have led to the deaths of many Palestinian civilians. On the other hand, Palestinians have engaged in terrorist attacks, such as suicide bombing, against Israeli civilians.
To this day, fanatics on both sides are doing all in their power to prevent a lasting peace. In Israel, much of this fanaticism stems from religion; many religious Israelis, represented by the Chas Party, are convinced that God intends for the entire land of Israel to belong to the Jews. They place particular emphasis on Jerusalem, Judaism’s most holy city. They also continue to build settlements on the West Bank, despite condemnation by the international community as well as much of Israel, who support a return to the pre-1967 borders.
Palestinian religious fanatics make a similarly unreasonable argument. Hamas, which wrested control of the Gaza strip from the secular and nationalist Fatah, has continually launched attacks on Israel, resulting in conflicts (such as that which ended in the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip) that make reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians more difficult. Ultranationalist forces on both sides are also serious obstacles. In Israel, the Israel Beteinu party, headed by Avigdor Lieberman, supports inflammatory, arguably racist policies that turn Palestinian sentiment further against Israel. The considerable power of these radical elements in the Israeli government has stunted the peace process for some time. Case in point, current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is beholden to Chas and Israel Beteinu to maintain his fragile coalition in the Knesset (Israeli parliament). On the Palestinian side, nationalist organizations of the PLO, led in its heyday by Yasser Arafat, at times sponsored terrorist attacks on civilians.
The best hope for lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians rests on two-state solutions. As mentioned before, both sides have legitimate claims to the land; it is a case of right against right. From a purely practical perspective, a growing Palestinian population in Israel means that it is in Israel’s interest to grant the Palestinians a state. In addition, self-determination will give Palestinians the opportunity to establish infrastructure and bolster their slowly progressing economy; increased access to healthcare and education would benefit many. Also, a Palestinian state would give the many refugees a home to return to.
A two-state solution would also benefit the U.S. considerably. For one thing, it would remove a major source of anti-American sentiment in the Middle East that terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda use as a recruitment tool. Osama Bin-Laden tellingly cited U.S. support for Israel as a major motivation for 9/11. A U.S. role in brokering peace would constitute a major PR victory and may well lessen the influence of terrorists. Most importantly, a two-state solution would grant both sides the peace and freedom they have been deprived of for so long.
By Eric Shapiro
I. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Colonial Middle East
For better and for worse, the Middle East has remained at the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda for over half a century. This is in part for practical reasons of self-interest; the region is home to large oil deposits that serve as an important source of energy in the U.S. In addition, centuries of European colonialism prior to World War II created massive instability in the region. Rogue states, such as Iran and until recently Iraq, pose a major danger to U.S. interests.
Non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas also threaten the well being of the U.S. and its allies in the region. Ostensibly to combat these threats, the U.S. has maintained military bases throughout the Middle East and, from time to time, dispatched its military to quell conflicts or assert its interests. It has also maintained a network of alliances with sympathetic states, especially Israel.
However, the U.S. interest in the Middle East is not purely practical; ideology also plays a significant, if not greater role. Take, for instance, U.S. support of Israel. The U.S. arguably loses more than it gains in its support of a state widely condemned by not only the Arab World, but also Europe and the United Nations. Support of Israel has inflamed anti-U.S. sentiment and arguably resulted in a backlash that culminated with 9/11. [Other examples] Nevertheless, the U.S. has constantly maintained strong diplomatic ties with Israel due to common values rooted in Western democracy and capitalism. Despite many questionable policies towards its Palestinian population (for instance, the Israeli parliament just passed legislation requiring all non-Jewish immigrants to recite a loyalty oath), Israel remains committed to the tenets of democracy to a greater or lesser extent, especially in comparison to other states in the region.
In addition, certain notions have taken hold in the U.S. that render intervention in the region an ideological necessity. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. became obsessed with containing the spread of communism. The Middle East, stricken by poverty and controlled by unstable totalitarian governments, seemed an ideal place for a proletarian revolution that would result in increased Soviet influence, not to mention access to oil. Maintaining strong ties with friendly or somewhat friendly states in the Middle East, particularly with the staunchly capitalist Israel, seemed an ideal way to fight Soviet interests.
To some extent, U.S. fears of USSR encroachments were valid; The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, although unforgiving conditions and strong resistance prevented success. Soviets had purported interests in preventing the downfall of a "fraternal" Communist State; giving it leverage in the Middle East, and setting a coercive example for its own far-flung Islamic Soviet Republics.. However, even after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the U.S. continued to play a major role in Middle-Eastern affairs. Again, this was for both practical and ideological reasons. In many instances, the U.S. intervened to maintain a favorable balance of power in the region. When Iraq threatened Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the U.S. intervened on behalf of the former to prevent Saddam Hussein’s genocidal regime from gaining too much power. George Bush, Sr. dispatched troops to prevent Saddam Hussein from seizing Kuwait.
Following the turn of the century, interventions that were at least partially undertaken to further U.S. interests began to take on ideological undertones. The neo-conservative movement, begun by former liberals who shifted right in response to the excesses of communism, had been around for a while and no doubt played a role in shaping U.S. policy in the Middle East decades before the start of 21st century. However, the election of George W. Bush in 2000 provided them with an administration particularly open to their ideas.
When hijackers, mostly from Saudi Arabia, crashed airplanes into the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001, killing nearly 3,000 Americans, a wave of belligerent patriotic fervor swept across the nation. At the urging of the president, Congress unanimously voted to invade Afghanistan to capture or kill those who planned the devastating terrorist attacks. U.S. troops met fierce resistance from the Taliban, a local group of Islamic extremists that rule most of Afghanistan, as well as Al-Qaeda, the Islamist organization responsible for planning 9/11.
Meanwhile, at the urging of his neo-conservative advisors, the Bush administration began to build a case for invading Iraq. The President, perhaps eager to finish the work his father started with the Gulf War (namely deposing Saddam Hussein) and gain access to Iraqi oil, capitalized on the patriotic mood in America and gained support for the invasion. When the administration was unable to come up with any solid evidence that Saddam Hussein had anything to do with 9/11, he based his argument on the pretext that the dictator was building weapons of mass destruction that could potentially fall into terrorist hands.
Although the aforementioned factors (national security, personal vendettas and oil) likely played a role in the decision to invade Iraq, it was oft-overlooked neo-conservative ideology pervading the Bush Administration that provided the main motivation. Neo-conservatism is quite complicated, but in simplistic terms it calls for the spread of democracy through a sort of “domino effect.” Turn one state in a totalitarian region into a democracy, and the other states, impressed by the economic liberalization and greater freedoms of the transformed state will follow suit. 9/11 presented neo-conservatives in the Bush administration with the perfect opportunity to try out democracy building. With Saddam Hussein out of power and a fragile democratic government in some semblance of control, it remains to be seen whether sectarian differences will triumph over the natural tendency towards freedom that neo-conservatism holds as universal.
The ideological factors that shape U.S. policy in the Middle East don’t only come from inside the U.S. On the contrary, the ever-changing ideological views amongst Middle Eastern regimes and non-state actors have just as much of an impact. For much of the 20th century, Arab nationalism constituted the dominant ideology in the region. Arab nationalism is the belief that all Arab states are bound together by shared roots, common religion and a unique Arabic culture, and that the universal “Arab nation” is entitled to self-determination and freedom from Western interference.
Arab nationalism arose partially in response to centuries of European colonialism in the Middle East. Domination by foreign powers, especially Great Britain, solidified a sense of nationhood among the disenfranchised Arab tribes. It is important to note that although the West played a substantial role in igniting Arab nationalism in the mid-20th century, there was a sense of solidarity in the Middle East long before the colonial period. Although Turkish and not Arab, the Ottoman Empire unified the Arab tribes to an extent, as did a common belief in Islam (although minor differences in Islamic belief also resulted in many bloody wars).
Regardless of its origins, Arab nationalism presents an ongoing challenge to U.S. foreign policy (although this is not to say it always or even often poses a security threat). In some cases, the U.S. maintained friendly relations with Arab nationalist states such as Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. However, in some cases Arab nationalists expressed open hostility to the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Although it was the European powers that colonized the region in the 20th century, many Arabs viewed the U.S. as merely the latest manifestation of Western imperialism. Sometimes, Arab nationalist anger resulted in terrorist attacks against U.S. civilians and military bases in the region.
However, more often than not, Arab nationalist organizations directed their hostility towards a more accessible target: Israel. Despite its status as an independent Jewish state following the 1948 War of Independence – or “Great Disaster” (nakba), if you ask a Palestinian – many Arabs saw Israel as a U.S. proxy occupying land that rightly belongs to Arabs. Much of this Arab hostility stemmed from the Palestinian refugee situation.
Arab nationalist movements made significant gains over the course of the 20th century. The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), headed by Yasser Arafat, legitimized the Palestinian cause by providing the people with an assertive, coherent voice that earned the respect of the international community. Arafat endorsed and arguably helped plan many deadly terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, but he was also willing to use diplomacy as a tool to gain support for the Palestinian cause. Gamal Abdel Nasser (in power from 1956-70) presided over a strong, independent Egypt that posed a major challenge to Israel before the two states made peace. Saddam Hussein, for all his genocidal tendencies, used Iraqi rent (oil money not balanced by overhead) to build a powerful and aggressive state that, for a time, represented the success of Arab nationalism.
In order to maintain stability in the Middle East, the U.S. has allied itself with numerous Arab regimes. This has given us access to oil in the Middle East, but also had the unintended consequence of not only inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment, but also turning citizens against governments they see as being puppets of the U.S. One famous example of an alliance gone spectacularly wrong occurred when Iranian revolutionaries, enraged at American support of the unpopular Shah, kidnapped 52 U.S. citizens from the local embassy and held them hostage for over a year. This incident, known as the Iranian hostage crisis, played a major role in bringing about the end of the Carter administration.
Despite these successes, Arab nationalism would give way to a new ideology that would come to dominate the Middle East. Two major factors contributed to this transition. To begin with, Arab nationalist regimes frequently resorted to brutal, murderous tactics in order to maintain totalitarian control. In addition, although they claimed to represent their people, Arab nationalist regimes tended to keep wealth concentrated with an elite few, who held disproportionate power over everyone else. Even as the wealth and influence of many Arab states continued to grow, the common people saw few to no benefits.
Meanwhile, Western values began to take root in Arab states as a natural by-product of globalization. Ironically, economic changes initiated by regimes purporting to represent Arab nationalism served to dilute traditional Arab culture. Particularly disturbing to some was rampant secularization. Some Arabs, most of them from the middle to upper classes, devised a new ideology of Islamic fanaticism that was both absolutist and aggressive in its interpretation of the Quran. The rise of radical Islam radically altered the political landscape of the Middle East and continues to influence U.S. foreign policy in the region.
In summary, the challenges to U.S. foreign policy presented by Arab nationalism and radical Islam are in large part a consequence of European (especially British) colonial influences in the Middle East. The former arose out of a sense of indignation at being ruled by foreign powers. Although Arab nationalist regimes did much to build up Arab states, their introduction of Western values and attempts to modernize their economies without granting democratic rights to citizens caused a backlash in the form of radical Islam.
Presented with the threat posed by these ideologies, the U.S. responded with a foreign policy that has fluctuated between pragmatic and ideological, with the latter often taking precedence. Periodic interventions in Middle Eastern affairs, combined with support for Israel, have accomplished short-term U.S. foreign policy goals. However, they have also resulted in blowback, inflaming Arab sentiment against the West in general and the U.S. in particular.
II. Colonialism in the Middle East and The Israeli=Palestinian Conflict
The current instability in the Middle East is in many ways a result of European colonialism that did not cease until after the Second World War, when France, Great Britain and others did not have the economic means or popular support to maintain a presence in the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in part a result of British colonial policy. However, the conflict has since taken on a life of its own. Palestinians and Israelis have been at each other’s throats over a variety of issues from contested territory to violent actions undertaken by both sides.
Israelis and Palestinians both have legitimate historical claims to the land that now constitutes the state of Israel. The Jews inhabited the land until they were expelled by the Romans following the destruction of the First Temple in the 8th-6th centuries BCE. However, following centuries of persecution in Europe, a Zionist organization emerged whose goal was to return the Jews to Israel (although only a small number of Jews were Zionists). There have always been Jews in Israel, but the Zionist-organized immigration reached its peak following the Holocaust, in which over 6 million Jews were murdered by the Nazis in death camps.
The Jewish settlers, many of whom were left=leaning socialists, developed land purchased from local Arab elites by wealthy European Zionists. This brought them into conflict with the Palestinians, the Arab population consisting mostly of farmers that occupied the British mandate of Palestine. The Palestinians, having inhabited the land since the 1800s, did not at first come into conflict with the Jewish settlers. However, as the Jews immigrated in larger numbers and occupied more land, tensions began to arise between the two groups.
Both people also have a legal claim to Israel/Palestine. Attempting to gain support in the Middle East against their opponents during World War I, Great Britain sought out both Jewish and Palestinian support. British foreign secretary Arthur J. Balfour issued the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917, which “’viewed with favor’ the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” (Bickerton 39). However, in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the British high commissioner in Egypt courted Sherif Hussein of Mecca, an Arab leader with perhaps “the greatest prestige and potential power,” in an attempt to organize an Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire. In the letters exchanged between the two, McMahon claimed to support the establishment of independent Arab control over lands that included Palestine. By promising both the Jews and the Palestinians dominion over what was then known as Palestine, the British helped spark a conflict that would result in massive losses on both sides and present a major challenge to U.S. foreign policy in the future.
Despite the initial role of Great Britain in laying the foundation for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both groups deserve responsibility for prolonging and exacerbating it. In the 1948 War of Independence (or “Great Disaster,” as Palestinians call it), armies from the neighboring Arab states, with the help of some Palestinians, attempted to drive Israel out. Over the course of the war, which the Jews would win with some help from the U.S., many Palestinians were displaced from their homes. Some were kicked out by Jewish troops and others fled at the request of the Arab armies. At any rate, this resulted in a massive refugee problem in the aftermath of the war. The surrounding Arab states refused to take in the refugees, and the state of Israel continues to deny many of them the right of return. This has been a major cause of hostility between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Subsequent conflicts exacerbated tensions between the two groups. Oftentimes, these conflicts were between Israel and Arab states that claimed as one of their objectives the restoration of sovereignty to the Palestinians over Israel. The Six Day War, with Israel on one side and the neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria on the other, resulted in the former gaining territories occupied by Palestinians: The West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The aforementioned Arab states deserve some blame for continuing the conflict, as they repeatedly provoked Israeli and discouraged Palestinians from negotiating based on the false promise that they could take back Palestine by military force. Regardless, Palestinians, with the support of the international community, have demanded the return of the contested territories. However, Israeli settlers who built settlements on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank refuse to leave what they have come to consider their homes.
Violence on both sides has served to fuel the fires of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli military has staged operations that have led to the deaths of many Palestinian civilians. On the other hand, Palestinians have engaged in terrorist attacks, such as suicide bombing, against Israeli civilians.
To this day, fanatics on both sides are doing all in their power to prevent a lasting peace. In Israel, much of this fanaticism stems from religion; many religious Israelis, represented by the Chas Party, are convinced that God intends for the entire land of Israel to belong to the Jews. They place particular emphasis on Jerusalem, Judaism’s most holy city. They also continue to build settlements on the West Bank, despite condemnation by the international community as well as much of Israel, who support a return to the pre-1967 borders.
Palestinian religious fanatics make a similarly unreasonable argument. Hamas, which wrested control of the Gaza strip from the secular and nationalist Fatah, has continually launched attacks on Israel, resulting in conflicts (such as that which ended in the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip) that make reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians more difficult. Ultranationalist forces on both sides are also serious obstacles. In Israel, the Israel Beteinu party, headed by Avigdor Lieberman, supports inflammatory, arguably racist policies that turn Palestinian sentiment further against Israel. The considerable power of these radical elements in the Israeli government has stunted the peace process for some time. Case in point, current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is beholden to Chas and Israel Beteinu to maintain his fragile coalition in the Knesset (Israeli parliament). On the Palestinian side, nationalist organizations of the PLO, led in its heyday by Yasser Arafat, at times sponsored terrorist attacks on civilians.
The best hope for lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians rests on two-state solutions. As mentioned before, both sides have legitimate claims to the land; it is a case of right against right. From a purely practical perspective, a growing Palestinian population in Israel means that it is in Israel’s interest to grant the Palestinians a state. In addition, self-determination will give Palestinians the opportunity to establish infrastructure and bolster their slowly progressing economy; increased access to healthcare and education would benefit many. Also, a Palestinian state would give the many refugees a home to return to.
A two-state solution would also benefit the U.S. considerably. For one thing, it would remove a major source of anti-American sentiment in the Middle East that terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda use as a recruitment tool. Osama Bin-Laden tellingly cited U.S. support for Israel as a major motivation for 9/11. A U.S. role in brokering peace would constitute a major PR victory and may well lessen the influence of terrorists. Most importantly, a two-state solution would grant both sides the peace and freedom they have been deprived of for so long.