On TR, Wilson and Taft ...
By Eric Shapiro - October 2011 - Professor Delton - US History from 1945 to the Present
For all its alleged significance, the election of 1912, a three-way contest between Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, was in many ways quite ordinary. Woodrow Wilson, the victor, won by a comfortable margin. The Republican and Democratic Party establishments that dominated politics before the race emerged seemingly more powerful than before. Regional voting trends held for the most part, with the Democrats capturing the usual Southern states while the Republicans (as well as their Progressive Party offshoot) reigned in the North.
Despite the intensity of their rivalry, Roosevelt and Wilson had much in common. They were both devoted to countering the excessive influence of trusts and monopolies in a newly industrialized U.S. However, for the purpose of campaigning, the candidates strove to draw distinctions between their policies and philosophies. To be sure, there were some significant differences, but they had more to do with emphasis than substance. The real foil to both candidates was William Howard Taft, who, despite some worthy efforts at progressive reform, largely stood for an old, arguably antiquated form of laissez faire government that went out of vogue in the Progressive Era.
Beginning in the late 1800s and continuing throughout the early 20th century, industrialism forever altered the nature of the American economy. Widespread urbanization exacerbated the problems of poverty and sharpened class tensions. The unprecedented success of the Socialist Party during this period (Socialist candidate Eugene Debbs won 900,000 votes in the 1912 election) roused fears of revolution in the Democratic and Republican parties (Cornog 184). A contemporary editorial in the New Republic described how “the conquering march of industrialism had destroyed the balance of the traditional social and legal system” (“Wilson and Roosevelt” 4). It was clear that the presidents of the day, regardless of political persuasion, had to fundamentally reform government in order to avert disaster. In the election of 1912, candidates that embodied different approaches to this monumental task vied to win over the electorate.
Roosevelt was in many ways the archetypal “big government” progressive. He accepted the inevitability of trusts and monopolies, and saw federal regulation of conduct rather than size as the ideal means of solving the problem. Despite his reputation as a liberal, Roosevelt was far from a doctrinaire leftist. He was extremely wary of the socialist elements in society and the radical elements in both major political parties that sought to exploit popular disenchantment with big industry to their own ends. He advocated “limited, sensible reform measures to forestall class polarization, which might result in revolution” (Cooper 146).
Roosevelt’s fear of rapid change placed him firmly in the establishment camp. He was only “radical” in comparison to the conservatives that held sway at the time. Roosevelt saw himself as a moderate, straddling the line between the insurgents and the reactionaries within the Republican Party: “Distrust the demagogue and the mere visionary as you distrust that hidebound conservative” (Cooper 146). Roosevelt was undoubtedly progressive next to the Republican Party establishment, but his motives were, in a sense, conservative; he was devoted to preserving the basic structure of a society that permitted, indeed even relied on, income inequality by reforming government just enough to stave off popular revolution.
Roosevelt’s aversion to radicalism was not only practical; it was also deeply rooted in ideological conviction. In contrast with the insurgents in his party, Roosevelt was not a materialist. He asserted: “material well-being is a great good, but it is a great good chiefly as a means for the upbuilding upon it of a high and fine type of character, private and public. Upon our national well-being as a foundation we must upbuild the structure of a lofty national life” (Cooper 146). In other words, Roosevelt believed that, in a healthy society, basic values must transcend material wealth. The U.S. was more than a mere collection of factions concerned with issues of class. The people were more than just a sum of their class differences. Above all, they were bound together by a kinship of values and spirit that made them distinctly American.
Roosevelt’s ardent nationalism compelled him to advocate a robust, sometimes imperialist foreign policy. He argued that disengagement from international affairs would work against U.S. interests, expressing “fears about the dangers to the balance of power and had reinforced his convictions about the need for strong American armed forces” (Cooper 155). These concerns would prove founded with the eruption of World War I a few years later, but at the time they clashed with the widespread isolationist tendencies in the U.S. William Howard Taft stated: “The truth is… he [Roosevelt] believes in war and wishes to be a Napoleon and to die on the battle field. He has the spirit of the old berserkers” (Cooper 154).
Roosevelt’s progressive tendencies, coupled with his aggressive demeanor, brought him into conflict with his fellow Republicans. Upon returning from his adventures abroad in 1910, Roosevelt criticized his party and government in general for its cozy relationship with big business. He particularly took issue with a series of Supreme Court decisions, approved of by the Republican Old Guard, on the grounds that they “‘lagged behind’ new industrial conditions and spawned a series of ‘negative decisions to create a sphere in which neither nation nor state has effective control” (Cooper 150). Roosevelt’s open defiance alienated the party establishment, sabotaging his chance for victory in the upcoming presidential election, which depended greatly on the support of the party bosses at the convention (Cooper 150). The powers that be in the Republican Party determined that it was better to go with Taft, an almost sure loser, than to select a candidate that defied their most sacred values.
In the primary contest leading up to the 1912 election, Roosevelt clashed with former protégé and current presidential incumbent William Howard Taft on a variety of issues. A combination of philosophical differences and personal resentment fueled the one-time friends’ now-bitter rivalry. Roosevelt “blamed his successor for joining the Old Guard, toward whom he felt unassuaged bitterness” (Cooper 143). This accusation is not entirely fair, considering Taft’s own progressive accomplishments, which consisted of many policies that Roosevelt had unsuccessfully lobbied for as president.
That being said, it was not for no reason that Taft was the favorite of the Republican Party establishment. For one, he took a much more limited view of the government’s role in regulating monopolies than his primary opponent. He was much less willing to surpass what he saw as the responsibilities of the executive according to the Constitution. He felt that, in calling for an expanded regulatory apparatus, Roosevelt was “going quite beyond anything that he advocated while he was in the White House, and has proposed a program which is absolutely impossible to carry out except by a revision of the federal Constitution’” (Cooper 151). Taft’s belief in strict adherence to the Constitution placed him squarely in the camp of post-Civil War (and to a lesser extent antebellum) presidents that favored minimal intervention in the economy. Roosevelt, in contrast, sought to restructure the government as a counterweight to big business: “All we wish to do on behalf of the people… is to meet the nationalization of big business by the nationalized government control” (Cooper 146).
Ostensibly, Roosevelt and Wilson’s visions were quite similar. Their basic goals, namely to regulate trusts and adapt to the changing needs of U.S. society in light of industrialization, seemed to differ more in emphasis than in practice (“Wilson and Roosevelt” 4). A New Republic editorial written in 1916 goes so far as describing the presidency of the latter as a “continuation” of the former’s (“Wilson and Roosevelt” 4). However, they diverged significantly when it came to their underlying philosophies on the appropriate role of government in protecting the interest of the people. Overall, Wilson was less wary of rapid change, even when such change was not explicitly supported by the Constitution. Unlike his rival, who saw himself as a middle ground between the progressive and conservative strains of American policies, Wilson referred to himself as a “radical” (179). In his campaign for New Jersey governor, he tellingly claimed that he would be an “unconstitutional governor” (Cooper 167). By this, he did not mean that he would violate the underlying principles of the Constitution. On the contrary, Wilson had a great respect for the founders and their intentions, particularly Thomas Jefferson. Rather, he sought to adapt government to the needs of a society that had evolved and was continuing to evolve into something very different from what the Constitution’s framers faced when they devised the document.
Like Roosevelt, Wilson spoke to the need for expanded government in order to address the problem of trusts. That said, while Roosevelt saw big business as an inevitable result of industrialism best dealt with through careful regulation, Wilson was far more aggressive, speaking of the need to “rein in big business” (Cooper 183). He was convinced of the need to restore “unfettered competition” to the marketplace (Cooper 183). In Wilson’s view, the dominance of trusts staunched the competition and innovation that fueled U.S. prosperity in the past (Cooper 180). Even as he advocated government intervention as a necessity, Wilson stressed the primacy of the individual, posing the question: “Do you want big business beneficently taking care of you, or do you want to take care of yourselves?” (Cooper 174). Underpinning Wilson’s reformist goals was the belief that long-term economic success is best promoted by catering to the entrepreneurial spirit of small businesses, not lavishing endless favors on the monolithic power of corporate collectives. Trusts were not only unfair; they were also counterproductive.
Wilson and Roosevelt agreed that government must play a role in regulating the economy, but they had different ideas about the implications of such an approach. Wilson criticized Roosevelt for an alleged paternalistic attitude that favored a “government of experts” operating above and apart from the people (Cooper 196). Wilson professed a belief in government by the people, “a release of popular energy, social renewal from below” (Cooper 199). Clear the way by breaking up or shrinking the trusts, Wilson reasoned, and the popular energy of the people would be unlocked. He thought that if, as Roosevelt proposed, government institutions sought to regulate the trusts without dealing with their excessive size and influence, they would simply be bought off. Thus, Wilson warned that Roosevelt and the Progressives supported what would amount to “a consummation of the partnership between monopoly and government” (Cooper 194). For his part, Roosevelt accused Wilson of echoing the “ultra-conservative” approach to dealing with trusts (regulating size rather than conduct) and called his policy a “make-believe assault on monopoly” (Cooper 196).
For all their differences, Roosevelt and Wilson both embodied an approach to the presidency that simultaneously harkened back to the strong executive of Abraham Lincoln and presented a new vision of the office that would, over the course of the 20th century, coalesce into a new conventional wisdom, a “second constitution.” The embarrassing defeat of the comparatively conventional William Howard Taft represented a repudiation of the kind of passive, behind-the-scenes president that held office since the Civil War. While he did pass some reforms, his philosophy placed him firmly in the camp of small-government conservatives, and therefore, on the wrong side of history. Roosevelt, on the other hand, would have had a good chance of beating Wilson if he had the support of a united party. As things stand, it is Woodrow Wilson who transformed the presidency into what it resembles today.
For all its alleged significance, the election of 1912, a three-way contest between Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, was in many ways quite ordinary. Woodrow Wilson, the victor, won by a comfortable margin. The Republican and Democratic Party establishments that dominated politics before the race emerged seemingly more powerful than before. Regional voting trends held for the most part, with the Democrats capturing the usual Southern states while the Republicans (as well as their Progressive Party offshoot) reigned in the North.
Despite the intensity of their rivalry, Roosevelt and Wilson had much in common. They were both devoted to countering the excessive influence of trusts and monopolies in a newly industrialized U.S. However, for the purpose of campaigning, the candidates strove to draw distinctions between their policies and philosophies. To be sure, there were some significant differences, but they had more to do with emphasis than substance. The real foil to both candidates was William Howard Taft, who, despite some worthy efforts at progressive reform, largely stood for an old, arguably antiquated form of laissez faire government that went out of vogue in the Progressive Era.
Beginning in the late 1800s and continuing throughout the early 20th century, industrialism forever altered the nature of the American economy. Widespread urbanization exacerbated the problems of poverty and sharpened class tensions. The unprecedented success of the Socialist Party during this period (Socialist candidate Eugene Debbs won 900,000 votes in the 1912 election) roused fears of revolution in the Democratic and Republican parties (Cornog 184). A contemporary editorial in the New Republic described how “the conquering march of industrialism had destroyed the balance of the traditional social and legal system” (“Wilson and Roosevelt” 4). It was clear that the presidents of the day, regardless of political persuasion, had to fundamentally reform government in order to avert disaster. In the election of 1912, candidates that embodied different approaches to this monumental task vied to win over the electorate.
Roosevelt was in many ways the archetypal “big government” progressive. He accepted the inevitability of trusts and monopolies, and saw federal regulation of conduct rather than size as the ideal means of solving the problem. Despite his reputation as a liberal, Roosevelt was far from a doctrinaire leftist. He was extremely wary of the socialist elements in society and the radical elements in both major political parties that sought to exploit popular disenchantment with big industry to their own ends. He advocated “limited, sensible reform measures to forestall class polarization, which might result in revolution” (Cooper 146).
Roosevelt’s fear of rapid change placed him firmly in the establishment camp. He was only “radical” in comparison to the conservatives that held sway at the time. Roosevelt saw himself as a moderate, straddling the line between the insurgents and the reactionaries within the Republican Party: “Distrust the demagogue and the mere visionary as you distrust that hidebound conservative” (Cooper 146). Roosevelt was undoubtedly progressive next to the Republican Party establishment, but his motives were, in a sense, conservative; he was devoted to preserving the basic structure of a society that permitted, indeed even relied on, income inequality by reforming government just enough to stave off popular revolution.
Roosevelt’s aversion to radicalism was not only practical; it was also deeply rooted in ideological conviction. In contrast with the insurgents in his party, Roosevelt was not a materialist. He asserted: “material well-being is a great good, but it is a great good chiefly as a means for the upbuilding upon it of a high and fine type of character, private and public. Upon our national well-being as a foundation we must upbuild the structure of a lofty national life” (Cooper 146). In other words, Roosevelt believed that, in a healthy society, basic values must transcend material wealth. The U.S. was more than a mere collection of factions concerned with issues of class. The people were more than just a sum of their class differences. Above all, they were bound together by a kinship of values and spirit that made them distinctly American.
Roosevelt’s ardent nationalism compelled him to advocate a robust, sometimes imperialist foreign policy. He argued that disengagement from international affairs would work against U.S. interests, expressing “fears about the dangers to the balance of power and had reinforced his convictions about the need for strong American armed forces” (Cooper 155). These concerns would prove founded with the eruption of World War I a few years later, but at the time they clashed with the widespread isolationist tendencies in the U.S. William Howard Taft stated: “The truth is… he [Roosevelt] believes in war and wishes to be a Napoleon and to die on the battle field. He has the spirit of the old berserkers” (Cooper 154).
Roosevelt’s progressive tendencies, coupled with his aggressive demeanor, brought him into conflict with his fellow Republicans. Upon returning from his adventures abroad in 1910, Roosevelt criticized his party and government in general for its cozy relationship with big business. He particularly took issue with a series of Supreme Court decisions, approved of by the Republican Old Guard, on the grounds that they “‘lagged behind’ new industrial conditions and spawned a series of ‘negative decisions to create a sphere in which neither nation nor state has effective control” (Cooper 150). Roosevelt’s open defiance alienated the party establishment, sabotaging his chance for victory in the upcoming presidential election, which depended greatly on the support of the party bosses at the convention (Cooper 150). The powers that be in the Republican Party determined that it was better to go with Taft, an almost sure loser, than to select a candidate that defied their most sacred values.
In the primary contest leading up to the 1912 election, Roosevelt clashed with former protégé and current presidential incumbent William Howard Taft on a variety of issues. A combination of philosophical differences and personal resentment fueled the one-time friends’ now-bitter rivalry. Roosevelt “blamed his successor for joining the Old Guard, toward whom he felt unassuaged bitterness” (Cooper 143). This accusation is not entirely fair, considering Taft’s own progressive accomplishments, which consisted of many policies that Roosevelt had unsuccessfully lobbied for as president.
That being said, it was not for no reason that Taft was the favorite of the Republican Party establishment. For one, he took a much more limited view of the government’s role in regulating monopolies than his primary opponent. He was much less willing to surpass what he saw as the responsibilities of the executive according to the Constitution. He felt that, in calling for an expanded regulatory apparatus, Roosevelt was “going quite beyond anything that he advocated while he was in the White House, and has proposed a program which is absolutely impossible to carry out except by a revision of the federal Constitution’” (Cooper 151). Taft’s belief in strict adherence to the Constitution placed him squarely in the camp of post-Civil War (and to a lesser extent antebellum) presidents that favored minimal intervention in the economy. Roosevelt, in contrast, sought to restructure the government as a counterweight to big business: “All we wish to do on behalf of the people… is to meet the nationalization of big business by the nationalized government control” (Cooper 146).
Ostensibly, Roosevelt and Wilson’s visions were quite similar. Their basic goals, namely to regulate trusts and adapt to the changing needs of U.S. society in light of industrialization, seemed to differ more in emphasis than in practice (“Wilson and Roosevelt” 4). A New Republic editorial written in 1916 goes so far as describing the presidency of the latter as a “continuation” of the former’s (“Wilson and Roosevelt” 4). However, they diverged significantly when it came to their underlying philosophies on the appropriate role of government in protecting the interest of the people. Overall, Wilson was less wary of rapid change, even when such change was not explicitly supported by the Constitution. Unlike his rival, who saw himself as a middle ground between the progressive and conservative strains of American policies, Wilson referred to himself as a “radical” (179). In his campaign for New Jersey governor, he tellingly claimed that he would be an “unconstitutional governor” (Cooper 167). By this, he did not mean that he would violate the underlying principles of the Constitution. On the contrary, Wilson had a great respect for the founders and their intentions, particularly Thomas Jefferson. Rather, he sought to adapt government to the needs of a society that had evolved and was continuing to evolve into something very different from what the Constitution’s framers faced when they devised the document.
Like Roosevelt, Wilson spoke to the need for expanded government in order to address the problem of trusts. That said, while Roosevelt saw big business as an inevitable result of industrialism best dealt with through careful regulation, Wilson was far more aggressive, speaking of the need to “rein in big business” (Cooper 183). He was convinced of the need to restore “unfettered competition” to the marketplace (Cooper 183). In Wilson’s view, the dominance of trusts staunched the competition and innovation that fueled U.S. prosperity in the past (Cooper 180). Even as he advocated government intervention as a necessity, Wilson stressed the primacy of the individual, posing the question: “Do you want big business beneficently taking care of you, or do you want to take care of yourselves?” (Cooper 174). Underpinning Wilson’s reformist goals was the belief that long-term economic success is best promoted by catering to the entrepreneurial spirit of small businesses, not lavishing endless favors on the monolithic power of corporate collectives. Trusts were not only unfair; they were also counterproductive.
Wilson and Roosevelt agreed that government must play a role in regulating the economy, but they had different ideas about the implications of such an approach. Wilson criticized Roosevelt for an alleged paternalistic attitude that favored a “government of experts” operating above and apart from the people (Cooper 196). Wilson professed a belief in government by the people, “a release of popular energy, social renewal from below” (Cooper 199). Clear the way by breaking up or shrinking the trusts, Wilson reasoned, and the popular energy of the people would be unlocked. He thought that if, as Roosevelt proposed, government institutions sought to regulate the trusts without dealing with their excessive size and influence, they would simply be bought off. Thus, Wilson warned that Roosevelt and the Progressives supported what would amount to “a consummation of the partnership between monopoly and government” (Cooper 194). For his part, Roosevelt accused Wilson of echoing the “ultra-conservative” approach to dealing with trusts (regulating size rather than conduct) and called his policy a “make-believe assault on monopoly” (Cooper 196).
For all their differences, Roosevelt and Wilson both embodied an approach to the presidency that simultaneously harkened back to the strong executive of Abraham Lincoln and presented a new vision of the office that would, over the course of the 20th century, coalesce into a new conventional wisdom, a “second constitution.” The embarrassing defeat of the comparatively conventional William Howard Taft represented a repudiation of the kind of passive, behind-the-scenes president that held office since the Civil War. While he did pass some reforms, his philosophy placed him firmly in the camp of small-government conservatives, and therefore, on the wrong side of history. Roosevelt, on the other hand, would have had a good chance of beating Wilson if he had the support of a united party. As things stand, it is Woodrow Wilson who transformed the presidency into what it resembles today.