James Madison and the Perils of Factionalism
By Eric Shapiro May 1, 2009
Contrary to popular mythology, the American Revolution was not a period of complete harmony amongst the revolutionaries. Many colonists (known as Tories or Loyalists) sided with Great Britain out of self-interest or lingering loyalty to the crown. Colonists who opposed Britain did so only after numerous failed attempts at reaching a compromise with Parliament and the Monarchy. Oftentimes, they were more motivated by loyalty to their states and opposition to the British than the romantic (not to mention implausible) notion of a union between separate entities with vastly different interests. Nevertheless, the colonists, with crucial assistance from abroad, managed to rally into a force of sufficient strength and organization to repel the British and win their independence. (Brinkley 112-118)
In the aftermath of the Revolution, the United States of America (then plural) were faced with the momentous task of maintaining some semblance of credibility in the face of the militarily and economically superior European powers. Lingering bitterness, resentment and economic self-interest drove Great Britain to deliberately antagonize the colonies, most notably by refusing to allow them to trade with the West Indies and impressing their ships The French, with whom America entered into an alliance out of necessity, were not much more respectful. Spain, eager to regain power on the continent, courted the loyalty of Western settlers with assurances of protection from Native Americans that the ramshackle Federal government could not provide. (Brogan 186-198)
The new country desperately needed a structure of government that would allow it to protect its interests in a hostile international environment. In light of these formidable challenges from abroad, the colonies had a short-term incentive to stand united. However, as economic pressure mounted, class and regional tensions began to manifest themselves. At a time when oversight was desperately needed, the anemic Articles of Confederation were unable to mediate disputes between opposing factions. The Confederation was referred to as a "firm league of friendship" and more closely resembled a "league of sovereign states" than a nation. Article II stipulated:
"Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly Delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." (Wood 146) Furthermore, the federal government was not permitted to impose mandatory taxes and tariffs on imports; instead, they had to rely on voluntary donations.
(Wood 146)
It is not difficult to understand the reasoning behind the Articles of Confederation. America had been at the mercy of a tyrannical overseas monarchy that considered the interests of the people secondary to its own. Years of unfair regulations and decrees left the colonists naturally suspicious of any entity with the power to infringe on their hard-fought liberties. Regardless of any abstract merit this argument might have possessed, the Federal government’s inability to raise funds and maintain order convinced many politicians that it needed to be overhauled. The Articles of Confederation had been effective in convincing all of the states, at least in theory, to unite under one government, but long-term survival forced the bestAmerican politicians to look beyond glamorous notions of pure democracy in favor of a practical solution to the problems facing the nation. Fortunately for our country, the Founding Fathers’ long experience in self-government, and their pragmatic recognition of the weaknesses in the Articles of Confederation and the problems inherent in the States’ parochial view of their own powers and sovereignty, would allow them to rise to the challenge of independence.
No man played a greater roll in shaping the Constitution than James Madison, who made the greatest contribution to it as a cohesive political and governing document, although certainly the other Founders played substantial roles It is true that George Washington used his enormous influence (a byproduct of his military successes in the Revolution and the enormous credibility and respect he had earned as the Nation’s winning commander-in-chief) to ensure it inception and thus left others to iron out the nuts and bolts of the document. Alexander Hamilton supplied crucial input on economic matters and commerce, although many of his views, such as his desire to turn the U.S. into a fiscal-military state to "rival the great monarchies of Europe" went too far in limiting democracy. (Wood 48) Although Jefferson’s huge contribution in spirit through the Declaration was evident in the Constitution’s spirit,, he initially opposed the constitution. Eventually he would come to recognize it as a necessity, but this indicated his pragmatism more than endorsement of the document's republican philosophy, as his later actions would prove. A stalwart democrat, Jefferson was always wary of giving the federal government too much power, fearing that doing so would open the door for tyrants to deprive the common people of their hard-fought civil liberties and right to self-govern. (Wood 107) According to a traditional understanding of late 18th- to early 19th-century politics, James Madison fell somewhere in between "Hamilton the authoritarian republican" and "Jefferson the democratic populist."
It is perhaps unfair to judge men with such nuanced ideologies according to the political jargon of the day. All three individuals espoused opinions that at one point or another defied the narrow ideologies they are associated with. That said, Hamilton and Jefferson did possess a certain consistency when it came to their political leanings. In simple terms, the former usually supported a stronger federal government and policies that favored the moneyed interests, as his conception of a strong government put an emphasis on its economic well-being as a means of ensuring its success and freedom, while Jefferson more often than not stood up for the rights of common folk along the lines of “We the People.” Madison went back and forth. In 1787, he contributed heavily to the Constitution (he is often referred to as the document's "father"), which called for a more republican government, and in 1795 reluctantly addedthe Bill of Rights to win over Anti-Federalists who were concerned that it gave the government too much power. For years following its ratification, he remained "A great friend to strong government." (Madison 153) In 1785, he defected to Thomas Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party. Some historians have taken to pointing out a so-called “Madison problem” (Wood 151) However, at his core, Madison was a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He was no doubt capable of great conviction and indeed fought hard for various causes in his lifetime, but he did so according to his own reasoning, not a specific political party. By his own standards, he was incredibly consistent. Madison was the nuts and bolts, pragmatic architect who put into black and white the language that could make the document work in real life.
Madison may have taken to jumping back and forth across the aisle (a convenient term for a species that loves categories), but he always acted to mitigate factionalism. In Federalist #10, widely regarded as his most famous and influential work, Madison discussed the need for a “well-constructed union” to control the “violence of faction.” Madison defined a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” (Madison) Madison did not see factionalism as a product of time and circumstance, but rather as an irrepressible aspect of human nature. Even in the absence of a “substantial occasion” to provoke dissent, humans would nevertheless find “frivolous and fanciful distinctions” to divide them. Because factionalism is embedded in the human condition, Madison reasoned that to eradicate it would require a cure more harmful than the disease. Instead, the key was to mitigate its effects. His acceptance of faction and disagreement as a key and universal aspect of political discourse, and building a system that would take it into account and balance this in a way that would allow the country to hold together, is his unique insight and contribution to our Constitution.
In addition to being Madison's most explicit theoretical writing on the dangers of factionalism, Federalist #10 also had a practical purpose. Recognizing the need to replace the Confederation with a strong government capable of dealing with the nation’s many crises, he and several others authored a series of essays called the Federalist Papers and submitted them to the Daily Advertiser. Federalist #10 was published on November 22 1787. Madison argued in favor of a constitution that would structure government in such a way as to control and create a system of checks and balances that would limit the ability of factions to wreak havoc as they had for years in the form of state and class conflicts.
In a writing titled Vices of the Political System of the United States, Madison addressed the former:
"This evil has been so fully experienced both during the war and since the peace, results so naturally from the number and independent authority of the States and has been so uniformly exemplified in every similar Confederacy, that it may be considered as not less radically and permanently inherent in, than it is fatal to the object of the, the present system."
(Rakove 69)
Indeed, sectional conflicts were becoming increasingly common, with state politicians proving time and time again their inability to look beyond their own narrow self-interest. For example, in ________ New York erected customs barriers and taxed all trade ships traveling to ports in New Jersey and Connecticut, eliciting great anger from those states and leading some to "expect an inter-state war in the near future.” Meanwhile, Virginia and Maryland clashed over conflicting claims to the river Potomac, the navigation of which was essential to both of their economies. The States also refused to abide by treaties with other nations, severely undermining the nation's credibility. Such irresponsible, reckless behavior destroyed Madison's faith in the ability of states to self-govern and Congress's ability to enforce its laws. In an 1877 letter to Thomas Jefferson he spoke of the need for federal oversight:
"Over & above the positive power of regulating trade... to arm the federal head with a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local Legislatures... The effects of this provision would be not only to guard the national rights... against invasion, but also to restrain the States from thwarting and molesting each other." (Letter to Thomas Jefferson, 65)
That the measures proposed in the Constitution went against the democratic ideals of the Revolution did not go unnoticed by Madison. However, by that point, he was so thoroughly disillusioned by the states’ behavior that he was prepared to strip away their power to virtually nothing. The key phrase in the above quote is “in all cases whatsoever”.. Democrats such as Thomas Jefferson, already wary of any law that infringed in any way on states’ rights, were naturally horrified at the notion of a Federal veto. Madison would come to sympathize with their position later on, but at the time he accepted the Bill of Rights reluctantly, although he did play a major role in its composition.
In addition to geo-political conflicts, Madison cited the unequal distribution of wealth and property as one of, if not the most critical, causes of factionalism. According to his reasoning, men of greater intelligence and ability would naturally coalesce into an upper class with interests that ran counter to those of their less able countrymen. This was all too apparent at the time.
Madison’s proposed government unquestionably favored the elite in the short term in that it neutered states’ authority and concentrated power in a smaller number of positions and government structures in which only the wealthiest citizens with sufficient money and property could participate. This is understandable considering he and the other founding fathers all belonged to this aristocracy. Madison took it as a given that the poor were poor because they lacked the intellectual means (he mentions certain “faculties of acquiring property”) to advance in society. Although he was not as strident as his then-ally Alexander Hamilton in condemning the folly of the masses, he was certainly more afraid of them than he was of aristocrats abusing their authority. It would be easier to criticize Madison for his elitism if contemporary events did not so clearly necessitate the change he was proposing.
In the midst of the rampant state-on-state bickering (and to a large extent deriving from it) discussed above, America was caught in an economic predicament, at the center of which lay conflicts stemming from enormous domestic and foreign debts left over from the Revolutionary War. Abundant natural resources were not sufficient to pay off these debts, partially due to British trade restrictions designed to maintain their dominance on the Atlantic and perhaps even convince New England to rejoin the Empire. Congress approved the printing of paper money in an attempt to remedy the situation, but creditors, mindful of the fact that a weak government undermined the value of currency, demanded gold and silver (also known as specie) as payment. Farmers and merchants were cut off from key foreign markets, most notably the West Indies, and could not afford to import specie. As the economy worsened, the moneyed interests became more and more desperate and the debtors more defensive. In 1786, army veteran Daniel Shay led an uprising of farmers in Virginia, managing to capture several courthouses before being defeated by the state militia. Unsuccessful though it may have been, Shay’s Rebellion highlighted the Federal government’s inability to quell even minor uprisings due to lack of military funding and, to Madison, represented another instance of factionalism threatening the prospects of the new country.
Although organized religion was relegated to a single mention in Federalist #10, its tendency to foster division in the masses was a source of great concern for Madison. In a letter to his friend William Bradford, drafted on April 1st, 1774, he wrote: "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion... inflamed them [citizens] much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to cooperate for the common good" (Rakove 7) Years after this correspondence, Madison would be compelled to act on this conviction. In 1785, fellow Virginia assemblyman Patrick Henry proposed a mandatory tax for the support of the Christian religion. Madison took issue with the legislation, not only on the grounds that it excluded non-Christian faiths, but also because it represented an attempt by the Episcopalian clergy to receive preferential treatment over other sects. Madison resolved to prevent the Bill at all costs.
For all his high-minded rhetoric about controlling factionalism, Madison was a man of action and in order to get things done in the world of politics, he occasionally engaged in tactics that on the surface appear to violate his ethics. Case in point, Madison practiced a strategy of what historian Brooke Allen referred to as "divide and rule" in order to protect the realm of government from the potentially divisive intrusion of organized religion. In other words, he played the sects against each other, which may seem hypocritical for such a strong critic of factionalism. While it would be preposterous to suggest that every controversial political maneuver of James Madison was motivated by the abstract notion of combating factionalism, like everyone else, he was subject to error and sometimes acted according to his own self-interest.
That said, his efforts to defeat Patrick Henry's Bill, while technically not consistent with Federalist #10, were nevertheless faithful to the spirit of the document. Underpinning Madison's actions was a resolve to prevent the majority from trampling over the rights of the minority, a concern he shared with Thomas Jefferson even when they disagreed on the most effective way to prevent it from occurring.
It is true that Madison criticized the "violence of faction" in part because it often entailed interest groups inflicting harm on other groups and undermining the best interests of the nation as a whole (which is where his methods in opposing the religious assessment bill seem hypocritical). But more importantly, he feared one faction gaining too much influence; that is, a sufficient amount to infringe on the rights of others. He was particularly obsessed with the idea that States governments needed to be held in check lest they suppress individual liberties and inflict grievous harm on the rest of the Union with their selfish actions. According to Gordon S. Wood: "He [Madison] envisioned a very strange kind of national government. He wanted one that was principally designed to evade popular majoritarian politics in the states in order to protect individual liberties and minority rights" (Wood 158-159) Hence, one might say that Madison sought to control factionalism (especially amongst the states) via the Constitution so that in effect, no faction (be it a state or social class) would ever become all-powerful. Destroying factionalism was exactly the opposite of what he wanted – he wanted faction against faction to counter each other, and in effect be self-limiting with none gaining a permanent advantage, the ultimate result being to protect the freedom and livelihood of all.
It is with this aversion to an untrammeled majority in mind that one should examine James Madison’s support of and subsequent departure from the Federalist Party. He admitted to George Washington in 1787: : "[I] scarcely ventured as yet to form my own opinion either of the manner in which [the executive] ought to be cloathed" (Wood 158)
It is in this area that his views diverged from those of Hamilton and Washington. The first major point of contention came in 1790 when Hamilton proposed buying war bonds from wealthy speculators (many of whom were not even American). The final straw came when Hamilton proposed a National Bank. This was simply more influence than Madison intended one entity to wield – it would throw his concept of checks and balances out of kilter by granting one institution too much power. Madison's original version of the Constitution granted Congress absolute veto power over the states based on the logic that with too much power, they would trample over individual liberties. When he realized that Hamilton intended to give the executive almost unlimited influence over the economy via a National Bank (as Secretary of the Treasury, he would have benefited greatly), it is no wonder that he "switched sides." Power and ambition must be made to counter power and ambition, and Hamilton’s conception of power to the national government in economic policy was too much for him.
Conclusion
It seems ironic that James Madison, the same man who so adamantly spoke out against factions in Federalist #10, ended up as the face (along with Thomas Jefferson) of a political party, the ultimate embodiment of factions. However, it is apparent in his temperament, political writings, and actions that he possessed a core consistency in his belief that the factionalism inherent in free men must be balanced one against another, for the benefit of all.
Perhaps more so than any of his contemporaries, Madison defied political definition. He had a unique sense of what was good for the nation, based around a central goal of ensuring that the individual liberties of minority factions were protected against the excesses of the majority. When class and State conflicts, exacerbated by foreign meddling, threatened to tear the United States asunder, Madison saw the need for a strong Constitution that empowered Congress to manage the conflicts between factions. When Hamilton endeavored to turn the Federal government itself (especially the Executive Branch) into a dominant faction representing the moneyed interests, he did everything in his power to impose limits and give States (whom he saw as more direct representations of popular will) the means to defend themselves against infringements on their rights. He played the leading role in creating an organic document – the Constitution – that embedded in its structure protections against any one faction rising above any other.
Yet, even as he navigated the labyrinth of politics, Madison remained fiercely independent, confident enough in his convictions to change parties despite the risk of criticism for being an opportunist. Ideologues like Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, fairly or not, have come to embody the two major political philosophies of their time, but James Madison embodies only his own.
Bibliography Works Cited
Brinkley, Alan. The Unfinished Nation : A Concise History of the American People. New York, New York: Knopf, 1993. 112-18.
Brogan, Hugh. History of the U. S. A. Second ed. New York: Penguin Books, Limited, 2001. 186+.
James Madison, "Federalist #10," in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961)
Madison, James. James Madison : Writings 1772-1836. Ed. Jack N. Rakove. New York: Library of America, The, 1999.
Madison, James. "To Thomas Jefferson." Letter to Thomas Jefferson. 19 Mar. 1787. New York.
Madison, James. Vices of the Political System of the United States, April 1787
Wood, Gordon S. Revolutionary Characters : What Made the Founders Different. New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2007. 143+.
Zinn, Howard. People's History of the United States : 1492 to Present. Second ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2005. 77-102.
In the aftermath of the Revolution, the United States of America (then plural) were faced with the momentous task of maintaining some semblance of credibility in the face of the militarily and economically superior European powers. Lingering bitterness, resentment and economic self-interest drove Great Britain to deliberately antagonize the colonies, most notably by refusing to allow them to trade with the West Indies and impressing their ships The French, with whom America entered into an alliance out of necessity, were not much more respectful. Spain, eager to regain power on the continent, courted the loyalty of Western settlers with assurances of protection from Native Americans that the ramshackle Federal government could not provide. (Brogan 186-198)
The new country desperately needed a structure of government that would allow it to protect its interests in a hostile international environment. In light of these formidable challenges from abroad, the colonies had a short-term incentive to stand united. However, as economic pressure mounted, class and regional tensions began to manifest themselves. At a time when oversight was desperately needed, the anemic Articles of Confederation were unable to mediate disputes between opposing factions. The Confederation was referred to as a "firm league of friendship" and more closely resembled a "league of sovereign states" than a nation. Article II stipulated:
"Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly Delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." (Wood 146) Furthermore, the federal government was not permitted to impose mandatory taxes and tariffs on imports; instead, they had to rely on voluntary donations.
(Wood 146)
It is not difficult to understand the reasoning behind the Articles of Confederation. America had been at the mercy of a tyrannical overseas monarchy that considered the interests of the people secondary to its own. Years of unfair regulations and decrees left the colonists naturally suspicious of any entity with the power to infringe on their hard-fought liberties. Regardless of any abstract merit this argument might have possessed, the Federal government’s inability to raise funds and maintain order convinced many politicians that it needed to be overhauled. The Articles of Confederation had been effective in convincing all of the states, at least in theory, to unite under one government, but long-term survival forced the bestAmerican politicians to look beyond glamorous notions of pure democracy in favor of a practical solution to the problems facing the nation. Fortunately for our country, the Founding Fathers’ long experience in self-government, and their pragmatic recognition of the weaknesses in the Articles of Confederation and the problems inherent in the States’ parochial view of their own powers and sovereignty, would allow them to rise to the challenge of independence.
No man played a greater roll in shaping the Constitution than James Madison, who made the greatest contribution to it as a cohesive political and governing document, although certainly the other Founders played substantial roles It is true that George Washington used his enormous influence (a byproduct of his military successes in the Revolution and the enormous credibility and respect he had earned as the Nation’s winning commander-in-chief) to ensure it inception and thus left others to iron out the nuts and bolts of the document. Alexander Hamilton supplied crucial input on economic matters and commerce, although many of his views, such as his desire to turn the U.S. into a fiscal-military state to "rival the great monarchies of Europe" went too far in limiting democracy. (Wood 48) Although Jefferson’s huge contribution in spirit through the Declaration was evident in the Constitution’s spirit,, he initially opposed the constitution. Eventually he would come to recognize it as a necessity, but this indicated his pragmatism more than endorsement of the document's republican philosophy, as his later actions would prove. A stalwart democrat, Jefferson was always wary of giving the federal government too much power, fearing that doing so would open the door for tyrants to deprive the common people of their hard-fought civil liberties and right to self-govern. (Wood 107) According to a traditional understanding of late 18th- to early 19th-century politics, James Madison fell somewhere in between "Hamilton the authoritarian republican" and "Jefferson the democratic populist."
It is perhaps unfair to judge men with such nuanced ideologies according to the political jargon of the day. All three individuals espoused opinions that at one point or another defied the narrow ideologies they are associated with. That said, Hamilton and Jefferson did possess a certain consistency when it came to their political leanings. In simple terms, the former usually supported a stronger federal government and policies that favored the moneyed interests, as his conception of a strong government put an emphasis on its economic well-being as a means of ensuring its success and freedom, while Jefferson more often than not stood up for the rights of common folk along the lines of “We the People.” Madison went back and forth. In 1787, he contributed heavily to the Constitution (he is often referred to as the document's "father"), which called for a more republican government, and in 1795 reluctantly addedthe Bill of Rights to win over Anti-Federalists who were concerned that it gave the government too much power. For years following its ratification, he remained "A great friend to strong government." (Madison 153) In 1785, he defected to Thomas Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party. Some historians have taken to pointing out a so-called “Madison problem” (Wood 151) However, at his core, Madison was a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He was no doubt capable of great conviction and indeed fought hard for various causes in his lifetime, but he did so according to his own reasoning, not a specific political party. By his own standards, he was incredibly consistent. Madison was the nuts and bolts, pragmatic architect who put into black and white the language that could make the document work in real life.
Madison may have taken to jumping back and forth across the aisle (a convenient term for a species that loves categories), but he always acted to mitigate factionalism. In Federalist #10, widely regarded as his most famous and influential work, Madison discussed the need for a “well-constructed union” to control the “violence of faction.” Madison defined a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” (Madison) Madison did not see factionalism as a product of time and circumstance, but rather as an irrepressible aspect of human nature. Even in the absence of a “substantial occasion” to provoke dissent, humans would nevertheless find “frivolous and fanciful distinctions” to divide them. Because factionalism is embedded in the human condition, Madison reasoned that to eradicate it would require a cure more harmful than the disease. Instead, the key was to mitigate its effects. His acceptance of faction and disagreement as a key and universal aspect of political discourse, and building a system that would take it into account and balance this in a way that would allow the country to hold together, is his unique insight and contribution to our Constitution.
In addition to being Madison's most explicit theoretical writing on the dangers of factionalism, Federalist #10 also had a practical purpose. Recognizing the need to replace the Confederation with a strong government capable of dealing with the nation’s many crises, he and several others authored a series of essays called the Federalist Papers and submitted them to the Daily Advertiser. Federalist #10 was published on November 22 1787. Madison argued in favor of a constitution that would structure government in such a way as to control and create a system of checks and balances that would limit the ability of factions to wreak havoc as they had for years in the form of state and class conflicts.
In a writing titled Vices of the Political System of the United States, Madison addressed the former:
"This evil has been so fully experienced both during the war and since the peace, results so naturally from the number and independent authority of the States and has been so uniformly exemplified in every similar Confederacy, that it may be considered as not less radically and permanently inherent in, than it is fatal to the object of the, the present system."
(Rakove 69)
Indeed, sectional conflicts were becoming increasingly common, with state politicians proving time and time again their inability to look beyond their own narrow self-interest. For example, in ________ New York erected customs barriers and taxed all trade ships traveling to ports in New Jersey and Connecticut, eliciting great anger from those states and leading some to "expect an inter-state war in the near future.” Meanwhile, Virginia and Maryland clashed over conflicting claims to the river Potomac, the navigation of which was essential to both of their economies. The States also refused to abide by treaties with other nations, severely undermining the nation's credibility. Such irresponsible, reckless behavior destroyed Madison's faith in the ability of states to self-govern and Congress's ability to enforce its laws. In an 1877 letter to Thomas Jefferson he spoke of the need for federal oversight:
"Over & above the positive power of regulating trade... to arm the federal head with a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local Legislatures... The effects of this provision would be not only to guard the national rights... against invasion, but also to restrain the States from thwarting and molesting each other." (Letter to Thomas Jefferson, 65)
That the measures proposed in the Constitution went against the democratic ideals of the Revolution did not go unnoticed by Madison. However, by that point, he was so thoroughly disillusioned by the states’ behavior that he was prepared to strip away their power to virtually nothing. The key phrase in the above quote is “in all cases whatsoever”.. Democrats such as Thomas Jefferson, already wary of any law that infringed in any way on states’ rights, were naturally horrified at the notion of a Federal veto. Madison would come to sympathize with their position later on, but at the time he accepted the Bill of Rights reluctantly, although he did play a major role in its composition.
In addition to geo-political conflicts, Madison cited the unequal distribution of wealth and property as one of, if not the most critical, causes of factionalism. According to his reasoning, men of greater intelligence and ability would naturally coalesce into an upper class with interests that ran counter to those of their less able countrymen. This was all too apparent at the time.
Madison’s proposed government unquestionably favored the elite in the short term in that it neutered states’ authority and concentrated power in a smaller number of positions and government structures in which only the wealthiest citizens with sufficient money and property could participate. This is understandable considering he and the other founding fathers all belonged to this aristocracy. Madison took it as a given that the poor were poor because they lacked the intellectual means (he mentions certain “faculties of acquiring property”) to advance in society. Although he was not as strident as his then-ally Alexander Hamilton in condemning the folly of the masses, he was certainly more afraid of them than he was of aristocrats abusing their authority. It would be easier to criticize Madison for his elitism if contemporary events did not so clearly necessitate the change he was proposing.
In the midst of the rampant state-on-state bickering (and to a large extent deriving from it) discussed above, America was caught in an economic predicament, at the center of which lay conflicts stemming from enormous domestic and foreign debts left over from the Revolutionary War. Abundant natural resources were not sufficient to pay off these debts, partially due to British trade restrictions designed to maintain their dominance on the Atlantic and perhaps even convince New England to rejoin the Empire. Congress approved the printing of paper money in an attempt to remedy the situation, but creditors, mindful of the fact that a weak government undermined the value of currency, demanded gold and silver (also known as specie) as payment. Farmers and merchants were cut off from key foreign markets, most notably the West Indies, and could not afford to import specie. As the economy worsened, the moneyed interests became more and more desperate and the debtors more defensive. In 1786, army veteran Daniel Shay led an uprising of farmers in Virginia, managing to capture several courthouses before being defeated by the state militia. Unsuccessful though it may have been, Shay’s Rebellion highlighted the Federal government’s inability to quell even minor uprisings due to lack of military funding and, to Madison, represented another instance of factionalism threatening the prospects of the new country.
Although organized religion was relegated to a single mention in Federalist #10, its tendency to foster division in the masses was a source of great concern for Madison. In a letter to his friend William Bradford, drafted on April 1st, 1774, he wrote: "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion... inflamed them [citizens] much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to cooperate for the common good" (Rakove 7) Years after this correspondence, Madison would be compelled to act on this conviction. In 1785, fellow Virginia assemblyman Patrick Henry proposed a mandatory tax for the support of the Christian religion. Madison took issue with the legislation, not only on the grounds that it excluded non-Christian faiths, but also because it represented an attempt by the Episcopalian clergy to receive preferential treatment over other sects. Madison resolved to prevent the Bill at all costs.
For all his high-minded rhetoric about controlling factionalism, Madison was a man of action and in order to get things done in the world of politics, he occasionally engaged in tactics that on the surface appear to violate his ethics. Case in point, Madison practiced a strategy of what historian Brooke Allen referred to as "divide and rule" in order to protect the realm of government from the potentially divisive intrusion of organized religion. In other words, he played the sects against each other, which may seem hypocritical for such a strong critic of factionalism. While it would be preposterous to suggest that every controversial political maneuver of James Madison was motivated by the abstract notion of combating factionalism, like everyone else, he was subject to error and sometimes acted according to his own self-interest.
That said, his efforts to defeat Patrick Henry's Bill, while technically not consistent with Federalist #10, were nevertheless faithful to the spirit of the document. Underpinning Madison's actions was a resolve to prevent the majority from trampling over the rights of the minority, a concern he shared with Thomas Jefferson even when they disagreed on the most effective way to prevent it from occurring.
It is true that Madison criticized the "violence of faction" in part because it often entailed interest groups inflicting harm on other groups and undermining the best interests of the nation as a whole (which is where his methods in opposing the religious assessment bill seem hypocritical). But more importantly, he feared one faction gaining too much influence; that is, a sufficient amount to infringe on the rights of others. He was particularly obsessed with the idea that States governments needed to be held in check lest they suppress individual liberties and inflict grievous harm on the rest of the Union with their selfish actions. According to Gordon S. Wood: "He [Madison] envisioned a very strange kind of national government. He wanted one that was principally designed to evade popular majoritarian politics in the states in order to protect individual liberties and minority rights" (Wood 158-159) Hence, one might say that Madison sought to control factionalism (especially amongst the states) via the Constitution so that in effect, no faction (be it a state or social class) would ever become all-powerful. Destroying factionalism was exactly the opposite of what he wanted – he wanted faction against faction to counter each other, and in effect be self-limiting with none gaining a permanent advantage, the ultimate result being to protect the freedom and livelihood of all.
It is with this aversion to an untrammeled majority in mind that one should examine James Madison’s support of and subsequent departure from the Federalist Party. He admitted to George Washington in 1787: : "[I] scarcely ventured as yet to form my own opinion either of the manner in which [the executive] ought to be cloathed" (Wood 158)
It is in this area that his views diverged from those of Hamilton and Washington. The first major point of contention came in 1790 when Hamilton proposed buying war bonds from wealthy speculators (many of whom were not even American). The final straw came when Hamilton proposed a National Bank. This was simply more influence than Madison intended one entity to wield – it would throw his concept of checks and balances out of kilter by granting one institution too much power. Madison's original version of the Constitution granted Congress absolute veto power over the states based on the logic that with too much power, they would trample over individual liberties. When he realized that Hamilton intended to give the executive almost unlimited influence over the economy via a National Bank (as Secretary of the Treasury, he would have benefited greatly), it is no wonder that he "switched sides." Power and ambition must be made to counter power and ambition, and Hamilton’s conception of power to the national government in economic policy was too much for him.
Conclusion
It seems ironic that James Madison, the same man who so adamantly spoke out against factions in Federalist #10, ended up as the face (along with Thomas Jefferson) of a political party, the ultimate embodiment of factions. However, it is apparent in his temperament, political writings, and actions that he possessed a core consistency in his belief that the factionalism inherent in free men must be balanced one against another, for the benefit of all.
Perhaps more so than any of his contemporaries, Madison defied political definition. He had a unique sense of what was good for the nation, based around a central goal of ensuring that the individual liberties of minority factions were protected against the excesses of the majority. When class and State conflicts, exacerbated by foreign meddling, threatened to tear the United States asunder, Madison saw the need for a strong Constitution that empowered Congress to manage the conflicts between factions. When Hamilton endeavored to turn the Federal government itself (especially the Executive Branch) into a dominant faction representing the moneyed interests, he did everything in his power to impose limits and give States (whom he saw as more direct representations of popular will) the means to defend themselves against infringements on their rights. He played the leading role in creating an organic document – the Constitution – that embedded in its structure protections against any one faction rising above any other.
Yet, even as he navigated the labyrinth of politics, Madison remained fiercely independent, confident enough in his convictions to change parties despite the risk of criticism for being an opportunist. Ideologues like Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, fairly or not, have come to embody the two major political philosophies of their time, but James Madison embodies only his own.
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